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Abstract
In the first chapter, “Money markets and borrower transparency: Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Act
stress testing policy”, I investigate the eﬀect of increased public information disclosure on lending out-
comes in money markets. Introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing policy and its mandatory
results’ disclosure is used as a shock to the availability of information on banks subject to the policy.
Using micro data on fund portfolio holdings, I show that funds increase their lending more to transpar-
ent relative to non-transparent banks after disclosures. Based on the relationship lending literature,
I use the strength of the lending relationships to distinguish between more and less informed funds.
Overall, my results are consistent with more information disclosure alleviating information asymme-
tries between borrowers and less informed lenders in the money markets, allowing banks to expand
their borrowing. However, increase in borrowing after the disclosure is conditional on disclosure re-
vealing positive information on the bank, which is in line with the disciplining role that disclosures are
to play.
In the second chapter, “Where did the money go? Evidence from money market funds on the portfolio
balance channel of QE,” I aim to identify the portfolio balance channel as a transmission mechanism
of Quantitative Easing (QE). I use micro data on money market fund portfolio holdings to investigate
changes in MMF lending decisions and portfolio composition once the third wave of QE3 resulted in
the withdrawal of Agency repo securities. My results suggest that QE3 did not induce outflows from
the money market industry, but resulted in the increase in uncollateralized lending on behalf of funds
with above-median QE3 exposure. My results indicate that this increase in uncollateralized lending
remains concentrated within former repo issuing banks.
The third chapter, “If fail, fail less: banks decision on systematic vs. idiosyncratic risk”, takes the
theoretical approach to investigate the influence of bailout policy, contingent on the aggregate state
and a bank’s individual characteristics, on the banks’ choice between systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
The regulator who implements the ’fail less’ bailout policy i.e. prefers to bail out the banks with higher
asset values in failure is introduced in the ’too many to fail’ paradigm. Results imply that once the
bank’s bailout probability, conditional on the regulator’s intervention, depends on its value in failure,
banks invest in the uncorrelated project more often. Therefore, this reduces the herding pressure of
the ’too many to fail’ guarantees as well as the occurence of the systemic banking crises.
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Chapter 1
Money markets and borrower
transparency: Evidence from the
Dodd-Frank Act stress testing policy
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I attempt to identify eﬀects of increased public information disclosure on lending out-
comes in the money markets. In response to the 2008 financial crisis, plenty of new regulation aimed at
increasing transparency in the financial system has been introduced. Regulators promoting an increase
in information disclosure argued that more information available allows investors to timely detect exces-
sive risk-taking or bad investment decisions, thus serving as a disciplining device to disclosing financial
institutions (Freixas and Laux [2011]). In this paper, I empirically study whether public information
disclosures in the form of banking stress test results alleviate information asymmetry between money
market funds (MMF) as lenders and banks as borrowers in the money markets.
I use the introduction of Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing (DFAST) policy and its mandatory disclosure
of the stress test results as a shock to information available on the disclosing banks. The scope and the
staggered implementation of the DFAST rule introduced heterogeneity between tested and non-tested
banks in the amount of public information available. Using micro data on MMF portfolio holdings
combined with the fund fixed eﬀects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, I employ diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences specifications to compare changes in fund lending to tested and non-tested banks after
DFAST was introduced. Tested banks are the banks subject to DFAST policy with at least one
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disclosure of stress test results within the scope of my sample, also referred to as the transparent
banks. The non-tested banks are the banks not subject to the DFAST policy, also referred to as the
non-transparent banks.
My main finding is that funds increase their lending to transparent relative to non-transparent banks,
after DFAST results have been disclosed. In addition, during the period of disclosure anticipation, funds
decrease the average maturity of the loans granted to the tested banks that are about to be disclosed.
After information is disclosed, the maturity of lending reverts and funds increase the average maturity
of the loans granted to transparent banks compared to the non-transparent.
Next, I exploit the role of lending relationships in alleviating asymmetric information to provide evi-
dence that the DFAST disclosures reduce asymmetric information between funds and disclosing banks.
I rely on the assumption that the strength of a lending relationship is correlated with the amount of pri-
vate information the lender has on the borrower. Lenders with more private information should be less
aﬀected by the public disclosures. My results indicate that a bank’s borrowing increases significantly
more from weak compared to strong relationship funds after the disclosure of DFAST results. This
is consistent with a public disclosure mitigating information asymmetries between the less informed
MMF and disclosing banks.
My results show that the diﬀerent changes in lending between weak and strong relationship funds
already arise during the period of disclosure anticipation. By exploiting information content disclosed
in the subsequent stress test results, I show that the diﬀerence in funds’ lending during the anticipation
period is due to strong relationship funds decreasing their lending to banks with below median stress
test results. This may suggest that funds with more private information reduce their lending in
anticipation of other lenders’ reactions once negative information becomes public.
The DFAST rule, introduced in October 2012 by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), imposed mandatory
annual supervisory stress testing and result disclosures for bank holding companies greater than $50
billion in total consolidated assets and for the nonbank financial companies designated for supervision
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) (Federal Reserve [2012b]). Mandatory disclosures
were supposed to inform investors on banks’ capital adequacy and their ability to uninteruptedly
function as financial intermediaries in case of severe economic downturns. This required having enough
capital and liqudity to fulfill liabilities to its creditors and counter-parties even under very negative
macroeconomic conditions. Using DFAST as a shock to information available on borrowers allows
overcoming the endogeneity inherent in information disclosures. For example, it is possible that bad
quality borrowers are more willing to disclose information in order to gain access to markets, which
otherwise would not be granted. Alternatively, bad quality borrowers may be more reluctant to disclose
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in order to hide their true type and avoid being cut oﬀ from the market. Using the mandatory rule
imposed by the Fed as a source of heterogeneity in available information on banks subject and exempt
from the rule allows addressing these issues.
I begin by investigating changes in fund lending to transparent and non-transparent banks after DFAST
disclosures were introduced. If the increased availability of public information aﬀects money market
lending outcomes, there should be diﬀerential changes in fund lending between disclosing and non-
disclosing banks after DFAST disclosure. In order to capture this, I employ the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
identification strategy to estimate the diﬀerential in the changes of fund lending to transparent and
non-transparent banks. Micro data on money market fund portfolio holdings from October 2011 to
March 2015, equivalent to lender-borrower loan level data allows me to trace the lending of a given
fund to a particular bank in each month. A ’loan’ is comprised of all unsecured type of money market
securities issued by the bank and held by the fund in a given month. I focus on the unsecured lending
because it is more sensitive to the borrowers’ creditworthiness aﬀected byh the information available
on the borrowers. In contrast, loans collateralized by Treasuries or similar securities are less likely to
be aﬀected by the actual borrowers’ creditworthiness and related information disclosures. Loan level
data allows me to control for unobserved fund level heterogeneity by using fund fixed eﬀects, and thus
account for any changes in lending driven by the unobserved liquidity shocks aﬀecting MMF.
When implementing the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences I exploit the scope of the DFAST rule which encom-
passed only the U.S.-domiciled banks while not covering the foreign banks. This allows me to define
the treated group of banks, i.e. transparent banks, as banks subject to the DFAST rule with at least
one disclosure of stress test results after the introduction of the rule. The control group. i.e. non-
transparent banks, , is represented by the large foreign banks actively borrowing in the money markets
and not covered by the DFAST rule. At the same time, large foreign banks are comparable to the
largest U.S. banks subject to DFAST in terms of the size of their money market debt and scope of
money market securities’ issuance.
My findings reveal that an average fund increases its dollar lending to transparent relative to non-
transparent banks by 15.3% more after information disclosures. A similar result obtains when fund
lending is expressed in terms of fund portfolio exposure to a particular bank. Funds on average increase
their portfolio exposure to transparent banks by 19.4 basis points more after DFAST results have been
disclosed.
In order to address the concern that the eﬀect might be driven by some unobserved heterogeneity
between U.S.-domiciled and foreign banks I exploit the staggered implementation of the DFAST rule to
narrow down the treated and control group to only DFAST covered banks. In October 2012, when the
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DFAST rule was revealed, a subset of rule-covered banks was granted an exemption from participating
in the first DFAST cycle (March 2013). This was justified by more time required to develop systems
and procedures for conducting stress tests for banks which previously never participated in regulatory
exercises of that scope (Federal Reserve [2012b]).1Here I define the treated banks as the ones included in
the first cycle of DFAST dislcosures, while control group banks are the initially exempt banks. During
the period between the first and second round of DFAST, the exempt banks remain non-transparent
while the first-round included banks just had their first disclosure. When comparing diﬀerences in the
fund lending to two bank groups, the results show that funds increase their lending more to banks
which have just become transparent, compared to the still non-disclosed banks. There is no significant
diﬀerence in fund lending after all DFAST-subject banks have become transparent i.e. after the second
round of disclosures.
Next, I show that funds decrease the average maturity of the loan at which they lend to tested banks
prior to the actual results disclosure. This can be consistent with lenders adjusting their lending in
anticipation of some negative information to be disclosed. After the DFAST dislcosure, the average
maturity of the fund loan to transparent banks increases compared to the non-transparent banks.
Increase in fund lending and average maturity of loans to transparent banks after disclosure is consistent
with predictions of models on lending under asymmetric information. Information sharing reduces
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, thus leading to more lending (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981],
Akerlof [1970], Myers and Majluf [1984])). Also, lenders with more information on borrowers benefit
less from an early liquidation option, thus, an increase in the loan maturity is also in line with an
increase in available information on the disclosing banks (Berglöf and von Thadden [1994]).
To provide more evidence that public disclosures aﬀect lending in the money markets by mitigating
asymmetric information, I distinguish between funds with diﬀerent sensitivity to disclosure based on
the amount of private information funds have on the banks prior to the disclosures. Funds with more
private information are expected to be less sensitive to public disclosures. Less informed funds benefit
more from the disclosures as they allow them to learn more about the banks to which they are lending,
thus reducing asymmetric information problems. Based on the relationship lending literature I define
funds with more private information as funds with stronger lending relationships with the borrowers.
Predominantly, lending relationships have been studied in the context of traditional banking (Diamond
[1984], Ramakrishnan and Thakor [1984], Sharpe [1990], Hertzberg et al. [2011], Rajan [1992] and
Boot [2000]). Proximity between the lender and borrower, as well as repeated interactions between
1The banks exempt from the first round of DFAST were banks which were previously not part of the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Programme (SCAP), a one-oﬀ stress testing exercise undertaken in 2009, in the midst of the financial
crisis. At the time, only banks with the total consolidated assets greater than $100 billion were included in the regulatory
exercise. Although the exempt banks were still, on average, smaller than the banks immediately included in DFAST, the
bank assets in both groups did fluctuate over the years alleviating the diﬀerences in the asset size between the groups.
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the two, facilitate the lender’s monitoring and screening of the borrower. This allows the lender to
gain an informational advantage over other potential lenders that previously have not lent to the same
borrower.
Although money markets should be less subject to asymmetric information problems given that the
majority of borrowers are large and well-established institutions, studies have shown that lending
relationships play an important role in these markets as well (Chernenko and Sunderam [2014]).2
Similar to Bharath et al. [2007] and Cocco et al. [2009] I define the strength of a lending relationship
using the average size of the loan prior to introduction of DFAST, measured by the percentage of
fund portfolio allocation to the bank. For each fund-bank pair, the lending relationship is classified as
strong if the fund has an above-median portfolio exposure to the bank during the pre-DFAST period.
A below-median portfolio exposure is classified as a weak lending relationship. For the same borrower
strong-relationship fund has informational advanatage over the weak-relationship fund.
Exploiting the heterogeneity in lending relationships to examine the eﬀect of new public disclosures
relies on two assumptions. First, the relationship strength is correlated with the amount of private
information the lender has on the bank prior to disclosures. Second, the private information gathered
through the relationship is correlated with the information disclosed in the stress test results. If this is
the case, public disclosures are less informative for the strong compared to weak relationship lenders.
Consequently, their lending to the same bank should be less aﬀected by a disclosure.
First, by running separate regressions for funds’ weak and strong relationships, I show that among
weak relationships, funds on average increase their loans by 32% more to transparent relative to non-
transparent banks after DFAST disclosure. This diﬀerence in the change in lending to transparent
and non-transparent banks is insignificant for strong lending relationships. Second, in order to directly
test for diﬀerential in the changes between the strong and weak relationship funds’ lending, I employ
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification with the bank fixed eﬀects. Similar to Khwaja and Mian [2008]
and Schnabl [2012], borrower fixed eﬀects allow to compare changes in the same disclosing bank’s
borrowing from the funds with weak and strong lending relationships. This controls for any unobserved
bank level heterogeneity, including changes in bank demand for the money market funding. My results
indicate that, on average, banks’ borrowing from weak relationship funds increases significantly more
after stress test disclosures, compared to borrowing from strong relationship lenders.
In order to address the possibility that weak relationship funds expand their lending across all borrow-
ers, irrespective of the transparency, I use a triple-diﬀerence specification to compare whether weak
2Brauning and Fecht [2016], Cocco et al. [2009] focus on interbank markets to show that bankruptcy of one important
relationship lender may pose a therat for the stabiluty of the system . Also, lending relationships proved important in
Repo markets (Copeland et al. [2014], Anderson and Kandrac [2016]) More recently, Chernenko and Sunderam [2014]
show that relationships matter for money market fund lending decisions when funds are subject to negative liquidity
shocks (investor outflows).
14
increase their lending more than strong to transparent relative to non-transparent banks. This al-
lows me to control for other contemporaneous shocks aﬀecting MMF lending diﬀerently for weak and
strong lending relationships across all borrowers. The results indicate that after DFAST results have
been disclosed weak relationship funds increase their lending to transparent by 24.3% more than to
non-transparent banks, compared to the same change for the strong relationship funds.
Focusing on the transparent banks, my results show that lending of the weak compared to strong
relationship funds already increases in the period before the DFAST results are disclosed. The magni-
tude of the eﬀect is lower compared to the period after information disclosure. It is plausible that the
announcement of a future disclosure itself represents a piece of information for the less informed funds,
conveying some positive signal on the banks included in the disclosure. For example, stress testing
may imply that the banks will be supervised more closely by the regulator. Funds with more private
information should be less sensitive to the disclosure announcement. However, it is also possible that
the anticipation of disclosure induces heterogeneous reaction of informed lenders across banks of dif-
ferent quality. For example, if an informed lender expects negative information on a bank to become
public, the lender could reduce its exposure beforehand.
To investigate this further, I focus on the diﬀerences in lending between strong and weak relationship
funds conditional on the bank quality disclosed in stress tests. If strong relationship lenders have more
information prior to disclosure, they may reduce lending to bad banks more during the anticipation
period to avoid being exposed to negative market reactions once the information becomes public. In
these specifications, a bank is classified as bad if it has a below-median result in its DFAST disclosure.
This captures the banks’ relative quality with respect to its disclosing peers.
My findings show that during the anticipation period, strong relationship funds reduce lending to bad
banks by 23% more than weak relationship funds. There is no diﬀerence in fund lending to good
banks during the anticipation period. This is consistent with informed lenders being more sensitive
to public disclosure of negative information on the borrowers, in line with the existing evidence on
lenders’ coordination incentives (Hertzberg et al. [2011]). After disclosure, weak relationship funds
increase their loans by 35% more to banks disclosed as good, while there is no significant diﬀerence
in lending to bad banks. This is consistent with uninformed funds adjusting their lending to good
banks in response to the information disclosed in DFAST. Regarding the banks disclosed as bad, it
is plausible that after information is public, the risk-return tradeoﬀ is such that everyone is equally
willing or reluctant to lend to these borrowers.
The evidence supports the hypothesis that public information disclosure reduces asymmetric informa-
tion, in particular among the fund-bank pairs with previously weak lending relationships. Disclosures
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allow banks to expand their borrowing from funds with which they previously had weak lending rela-
tionships. However, the eﬀect is heterogeneous across banks conditional on their quality revealed in
stress test results. For good banks, increased disclosure makes lending relationships less relevant for
borrowing in money markets, while for the bad bank increased public disclosure prompts their strong
relationship lenders to reduce lending to these banks in anticipation of the negative market reactions.
This paper is one of the few attempts to empirically investigate the eﬀect of increased borrower
information disclosure on lending in the money markets.3 Perignon et al. [2017] analyze the role
of asymmetric information in the allocation of wholesale funding in European certificates of deposit
market. In order to inform the existing debate on whether more disclosure on issuer quality is beneficial,
or whether money market participants benefit more from opacity (see Dang et al. [2015] and Holmstrom
[2015] ), more empirical insight on the topic is needed. My paper shows that increase in information
disclosure alleviates the constraints on lending in the money markets for the banks disclosed as good.
Also, it shows that the changes in lending induced by disclosures are in line with the disciplining
role of disclosures on the institutions borrowing in the money markets. In the broader context this
paper empirically evaluates predictions of theories on lending under asymmetric information. Theories
predict that lenders increase their lending more to borrowers with lower information asymmetry to
reduce exposure to adverse selection or moral hazard problems (see Akerlof [1970], Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981], Myers and Majluf [1984] Rajan [1992]).
Using the introduction of mandatory DFAST disclosures as the informational shock that increased
availability of information on certain borrowers, this paper represents an empirical evaluation of the
Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing policy with the focus on the eﬀects in the money markets. An extensive
theoretical literature discusses plausible consequences of DFAST based on diﬀerent theory models of
asymmetric information (see Goldstein and Sapra [2013], Leitner [2014])Landier and Thesmar [2011]).
Papers that focus on the positive role of bank information disclosure use theoretical models to study
the optimal level of bank disclosure with the emphasis on thir role in reducing risks of bank runs
during crises (see Goldstein and Leitner [2016], Bouvard et al. [2015],Leitner [2005]). The strand of
literature studying negative consequences of bank information disclosures discusses negative eﬀects on
bank managers’ behaviour Gigler et al. [2014] as well as willingness of market participants to privately
collect the information, which could impair the ability of the regulator to learn from the market (see
Bond et al. [2012] and Prescott [2008]).
Empirical attempts to quantify the eﬀects of stress test disclosures are mostly focused on capturing
3Papers by Kacperczyk and Schnabl [2013], McCabe [2010], Schmidt et al. [2014], Strahan and Tanyeri [2015] exploit
crises episodes to investigate fund decisions to cut lending to borrowers when subject to negative liquidity shock in the
form of investor outflows. Chernenko and Sunderam [2014] focus on the role of lending relationships between MMF and
borrowers in mitigating the eﬀects of negative liquidity shocks on borrowers in the money markets.
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whether markets learned any new information from these disclosures. They use event study methodol-
ogy to measure stock price, or credit spread market reactions to the information disclosure event (see
Neretina et al. [2015], Peristiani et al. [2010], Flannery et al. [2015] for reactions to diﬀerent DFAST
rounds of disclosures and Petrella and Resti [2013] for ECB stress testing undertaken in 2011). In
this paper, using micro data, I am able to quantify the changes in the money market fund lending
to DFAST-aﬀected banks and to analyze whether and in what way banks’ ability to borrow through
money markets changes once DFAST has been introduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the institutional setting and the
empirical strategy. Section 3 discusses data and provides the summary statistics. Section 4 presents
the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
1.2 Institutional environment and empirical strategy
In this paper, I exploit the introduction of Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing (DFAST) policy and rule
on mandatory results disclosures as an informational shock to lending outcomes in the money markets.
The DFAST policy is part of the broader Dodd-Frank legislation introduced in July 2010 as a regulatory
response to the 2008 financial crisis. The stated aim of Dodd-Frank is to promote financial stability
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system.
The final rule on the DFAST policy was revealed in October 2012. At the time, the rule prescribed
mandatory annual supervisory stress testing and disclosure of results for bank holding companies
(BHC) with total consolidated assets greater than $50 billion and nonbank financial companies des-
ignated for the Fed’s supervision by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.4 The introduced rule
applies only to U.S.-domiciled bank holding companies, while foreign banking organizations are not
subject to it. Stress testing was designed as a forward looking quantitative exercise aimed at mea-
suring whether a bank has suﬃcient capital to support its operations and continue functioning as
an intermediary with respect to its creditors and counter-parties under adverse economic conditions.
Disclosures contained individual bank detailed information on the resilience of their capital position,
risk characteristics and sensitivity of their business acitivities to periods of stress5.
4Asset size was to be calculated as the average of a company’s total consolidated assets over previous four calendar
quarters. Bank holding company was considered to qualify for the year t’s stress testing cycle, if no later than June of
the t  1 year, it meets the consolidated assets size requirement (Federal Reserve [2012a]).
5In parallel with finalising the rule on stress testing, Fed has developed a framework for the forward-looking capital
planning in the form of Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). CCAR represents a complementary
exercise to DFAST with the same group of banks targeted, as well as the same timeline as DFAST in terms of results
disclosure. The key diﬀerence between the two exercises is in the assumption on banks’ capital actions. DFAST uses a
standardized set of capital action assumptions homogeneous across all participating banks and with no significant changes
in banks’ forecasted capital actions. In contrast, CCAR uses each bank’s planned capital actions to asses whether the
bank would be capable of meeting supervisory expectations for minimum capital ratios in economic downturns, for the
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One of the empirical challenges when studying the eﬀects of information disclosure and availability
of public information on lending outcomes is endogeneity of disclosure. If the decision to disclose
information is made by the borrower, it is plausible that depending on the quality and the need for
funding, the borrowers may diﬀer in their willing to disclose. For example, borrowers with the greater
need for funding or larger diﬃculty in raising funds would be more willing to disclose information in
order to convince investors to lend them the money. However, the opposite is also possible. The lower
quality borrowers could be more reluctant to disclose information, as this aggravates their ability
to raise funds. Thus, in order to attribute changes in lending to diﬀerential transparency across
borrowers, an increase in information disclosure would have to be independent from the borrower’s
decision to disclose. In that respect, introduction of the DFAST policy and mandatory stress test
results disclosures resulted in regulator-imposed increase in available public information on certain
banks. In addition, regulator-imposed disclosures are argued to be taken as a more credible source of
information relative to banks’ voluntary disclosures of the similar kind (Goldstein and Sapra [2013]).
Prior to Dodd-Frank, any systematic disclosure of bank-specific information of such scope and content
as DFAST was almost non-existent. However, during the financial crisis, a supervisory exercise in the
form of the one-oﬀ stress test, Supervisory Capital Assesment Program (SCAP), was implemented
and bank-specific results disclosed in May 2009. This was an ad hoc exercise with the main goal to
reduce the investor panic, and enable proper market functioning by restoring confidence in the banking
system. Banks chosen to participate in SCAP had total consolidated assets of 100 billion dollars or
above at the time of the exercise.
In October 2012, when the DFAST rule was published, it was revealed that institutions which qualify
by the rule, but have not previously participated in the similar regulatory exercises will be granted an
exemption from the first round of DFAST. This was justified by the time required to develop systems
and procedures to be able to conduct the stress tests and collect information required for the tests
(Federal Reserve [2012a]). Therefore, the banks granted an exemption from the first round of DFAST
had smaller asset size than $100 billion during the 2009 exercise, but did meet the $50 billion asset size
cutoﬀ of the DFAST rule in 2012. Although, on average, the exempt banks are smaller in their asset
size relative to their non-exempt peers, banks’ balance sheet sizes have evolved since 2009, consequently
making the size split from 2009 less relevant. The staggered implementation of the DFAST rule implied
that in 2013 the stress testing and the bank-specific result disclosure will include only 18 banks6 that
particular proposed capital distributions. The focus of this exercise is evaluation of banks’ capital planning processes
and proposed capital distributions in the context of adverse stress scenarios. See Schuermann [2013] and Hirtle and
Lehnert [2014] for more details on stress testing frameworks.
6The 18 BHCs that participated in the 2013 Dodd-Frank Act stress test are Ally Financial Inc;American Express
Company; Bank fo America Corporation; The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation; BB&T Corporation; Capital
One Financial Corporation; Citigroup Inc; Fifth Third Bancorp; The Goldman Sachs Group Inc; JPMorgan Chase &
Co; KeyCorp; Morgan Stanley; The PNC Financial Services Group Inc; Regions Financial Corporation; State Street
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were previously part of the SCAP regulatory exercises, while the other 127 which qualify by the rule
were to have their first stress testing and disclosure in March 2014, as part of the DFAST 2014.
1.2.1 Empirical strategy
In order to identify the eﬀects of increased information disclosure in the form of stress testing results
on lending outcomes in the money markets, I compare diﬀerences in lending to tested (i.e. transparent)
and non-tested (i.e. non-transparent) banks before and after DFAST disclosure.
Transparent banks are banks subject to the DFAST policy with at least one stress test result disclosed
within the span of the sample and after DFAST was introduced (October 2012 - March 2015). Thus,
the transparent group comprises of 30 banks included in stress testing procedure in two waves. The
first round of DFAST comprised of 18 banks which has their first DFAST disclosure in March 2013.
The remaining 12 banks were granted an exemption from the first round of disclosure, although in
October 2012 it was already known that their asset size otherwise qualifies them. These banks had
their first stress test results disclosed in March 2014.
Non-transparent banks represent the control group and are defined on the subset of banks borrowing
in the money markets and not subject to DFAST policy. Banks in the control group are predominantly
large foreign banks not covered by DFAST policy. There were no public information disclosures during
the DFAST cycle on these banks8At the same time, foreign banks are very important borrowers in the
U.S. money markets which represent their main source of short term dollar funding. Thus, they are
comparable to the largest US banks subject to DFAST in size of their money market debt and scope
of money market securities’ issuance.
In addition, staggered implementation of mandatory DFAST disclosures allows me to also define treated
and control bank groups while restricting observations only to DFAST covered banks. Between the first
and the second round of DFAST disclosure, from March 2013 to March 2014, banks subject to DFAST
can be classified in two diﬀerent transparency groups. During this period, banks included in the first
round of DFAST were already transparent, thus representing the treated group. The control group is
comprised of banks that were only to become transparent after March 2014. This narrow definition
of the treated and control groups using only DFAST covered banks allows controlling for potential
diﬀerences between US-domiciled and foreign banks. For example, foreign banks may have diﬀerent
Corporation; SunTrust Banks Inc; U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Company.
7The 12 BHCs that participated in the 2014 Dodd-Frank Act stress test, but were exempt from 2013 DFAST are
BBVA Compass Bancshares Inc; BMO Financial Corp; Comerica Incorporated; Discover Financial Services; HSBC
North America Holdings Inc; Huntington Bancshares Inc; M&T Bank Corporation; Northern Trust Corp.; RBS Citizen
Financial Group Inc; Santander Holdings USA, Inc; UnionBanCal Corp and Zions Bancorp.
8Although some of these banks may have been subject to similar types of regulation implemented by the European
Central Bank for example (ECB stress testing), first relevant disclosures occured only in October 2014 which does not
coincide with the timing of DFAST disclosures.
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ability to find substitute for money market dollar funding, which may diﬀerently aﬀect borrowing
patterns of these banks.
In an attempt to capture the eﬀect of increased information availability on some borrowers, I exploit
fund-bank level data and employ a diﬀerence-in diﬀerences identification strategy to capture diﬀerential
changes in fund lending to transparent and non-transparent banks after DFAST disclosure. This
specification assumes that the evolution of non-transparent banks’ borrowing represents a reasonable
counterfactual for money market borrowing of the transparent banks. Namely, had there not been
mandatory disclosures under the DFAST policy for transparent banks, their money market borrowing
would evolve in the same way as the borrowing of the non-transparent banks. Figure 1.1 shows the
average MMF lending to transparent and non-transparent banks over the event time, which is centered
around each banks’ first DFAST disclosure (event time=0). Prior disclosure, the average fund loans
to transparent and non-transparent banks evolve in parallel, while there is an increase in the average
loan to transparent banks after the disclosure.
In order to estimate the changes in lending between transparent and non-transparent banks, using
broader or narrower definition of treated and control groups, I employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences spec-
ification given in (1.1):
loanf,b,t = Transparentb +  Interim ⇥ Interimb,t ⇥ Transparentb + (1.1)
+ Post ⇥ Postb,t ⇥ Transparentb + uf,b,t
uf,b,t =  f + ⌧t +Xf,t + "f,b,t
Dependent variable is (log) dollar loan of fund f to bank b in a given month. Transparent is an
indicator variable equal to 1 for the banks in the DFAST tested bank group. Interim is a time
dummy equal to 1 during the period between the introduction of the DFAST rule and the bank’s
actual first stress test results’ disclosure (anticipation period). Post is a time dummy equal to 1 after
disclosure has happened and information on the bank is public. Specification also includes fund-specific
controls Xf,t (asset size and maturity of portfolio). Fund fixed eﬀects,  f , address the time-invariant
heterogeneity across funds and time fixed eﬀects ⌧t control for the aggregate shocks aﬀecting money
market lending.
Second, I attempt to provide evidence that changes in MMF lending are due to information disclosure
alleviating informational asymmetries between MMF and banks as borrowers. In order to do so, I as-
sume that lending relationships, in the absence of public information disclosures, serve as a mechanism
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mitigating information asymmetry. The underlying assumption is that a strong lending relationship
allows the lender to gather more information on the borrower and thus makes him more willing to lend
relative to the lender with no previous lending relationship. Thus, strength of a lending relationship
is reciprocal to the degree of information asymmetry which exists between that lender fund and bank
as borrower.
I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification to compare the diﬀerences in the changes of the same
bank’s borrowing from weak and strong relationship lenders. Specifications at the fund-bank loan
level with bank fixed eﬀects control for bank level heterogeneity, including changes in demand for
money market funding, which aﬀect lending across all relationships in the same way (similar to Khwaja
and Mian [2008] and Schnabl [2012]). The underlying assumption is that a strong relationship fund’s
lending decision is less aﬀected by the public information disclosure, given these funds are already better
informed. The larger the information asymmetry, the stronger the eﬀect of information disclosure on
lending decisions of that lender.
I define strength of lending relationships using lending patterns prior to introduction of the DFAST
policy, during October 2011- October 2012 period. Measures used follow Bharath et al. [2007] and
Cocco et al. [2009] and define stregth of lending relationship using the amount of lending fund allocates
to the borrower. Also, this is consistent with the predictions of the standard portfolio theory postu-
lating that investors with more precise information on a particular investment/issuer (loan/borrower)
allocate a larger fraction of their portfolio to that investment.
In the context of money market funds, strength of lending relationship is classified using two measures
based on the average fund’s portfolio exposure to a particular bank during pre-DFAST period. First,
fund-bank lending relationship is strong if a fund’s portfolio exposure to the bank is above median
exposure the fund allocated to any single bank during the pre-DFAST period (fund-based measure).
The second measure classifies the relationship as strong if the fund’s portfolio exposure is above the
median exposure that any fund lending to that bank allocated during the pre-DFAST period (bank-
based measure).
Figure 1.2 shows how the evolution of the average loan (scaled by fund size) by the strong and weak
relationship funds to transparent banks over the event time defined with respect to banks’ first disclo-
sure of DFAST results. Parallel trend prior to DFAST disclosure supports the assumption that lending
of strong relationship funds represents a good counterfactual for the weak relationship funds’ lending,
had there not been any public information disclosures on the borrowing banks.
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1.3 Data and summary statistics
I construct a novel dataset of the US prime money market fund portfolio holdings. Starting from
November 2010, Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC) has imposed mandatory filing of detailed
information on the fund and securities held in its portfolio for all money market funds. Funds are
required to submit the N-MFP form within 5 business days after the end of the month, while the
forms become publicly available only 60 days later. My dataset is constructed using individual money
market fund filings of the N-MFP form from October 2011 until March 2015. The N-MFP form
contains detailed information on the fund including asset size, age, yield, portfolio maturity and the
like. Portfolio holdings information includes information on the security type, name of the issuer and
security, diﬀerent security and issuer identifiers (CUISP, CIK), maturity at issuance, dollar amount of
the security held by the fund and percent of fund net assets invested in the particular security.
In order to capture lending to borrowers aﬀected by the mandatory DFAST disclosures, I focus on the
portfolio holdings of prime money market funds which are funds allowed to invest in non-government
securities. The analysis is restricted to 164 funds existing throughout the entire span of the sample
period (October 2011-March 2015).9 On the borrower’s side, my sample encompasses large U.S. bank
holding companies subject to DFAST regulation as well as large non-U.S. banks not covered by the
DFAST regulation.
To arrive at the fund-bank level dataset, I use security identifiers submitted in the N-MFP form to
match each security to the issuer at the highest level of aggregation. Each security issuer is matched
with their parent bank holding company. The matching algorithm combines information on securities’
CUSIP with the CUSIP database, also Moody’s Investor Service information on ABCP vehicles and
their sponsors, SEC’s list of all CIKs matched with entity names, as well as the organizational hierarchy
of bank holding companies provided by Federal Financial Insitutions Examinations Council - National
Information Center (FFIEC) for matching the bank subsidiary level issues to the holding company.
For example, in case of JP Morgan Chase & Co, all securities issued by JP Morgan bank and JP
Morgan securities, or Jupiter securitization (ABCP conduit sponsored by JPMorgan) will be ultimately
matched to JP Morgan bank holding company.
When studying changes in the money market lending outcomes, the subject of my analysis is predom-
inantly the fund-bank loan. ’Loan’ is defined as the total fund holdings of unsecured money market
securities issued by a particular bank and held by the fund in a given month. Unsecured securities
represent more infomration sensitive type of money market securities as they are either enitrely non-
9This ensures that none of the results are driven by funds entering or exiting the sample. However, all the results
remain robust to including all filing funds in the analysis.
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collateralized or do not use Treasuries or Government Agency debt as collateral. Therefore, this type
of unsecured lending should be more sensitive to issuer’s perceived creditworthiness. Thus, loans stud-
ied comprise of certificates of deposits, commercial paper, floating rate notes, other repo (repurchase
agreements collateralized by non-Treasury and non-Government Agency type of securities) and the
like.10
Table 1.1 reports fund summary statistics calculated using observations on 164 prime money market
funds at the fund-month level. Table 1.1 shows that there is a significant variation across funds in their
asset size, with the mean asset size being $8,400 million, while the median size is only $1,490 million.
However, funds are quite similar along other characteristics including their portfolio maturity, age and
portfolio yield. Portfolio maturity and fund age as well as fund yield are based on the total fund
portfolio holdings, while bank portfolio maturity represents the weighted average maturity of the loans
granted to banks in the sample. Unsecured fund lending to banks in the treated and control group,
on average amounts to 25% of total fund assets. Table 1.1 shows that within the matched sample
a fraction of unsecured lending to treated banks represents on average 45% of the total unsecured
lending, with little variation across funds.
Table 1.2 reports bank summary statistics separately for banks subject to mandatory stress test disclo-
sures (transparent), and for banks not subject to DFAST (non-transparent). Statistics are calculated
using bank-month level observations over the entire sample period (October 2011-March 2015). Trans-
parent and non-transparent banks diﬀer in the size of the average total money market debt. The total
debt of transparent banks averages at 10.4 billion with the median being only 1.46 billion. This implies
a significant dispersion in the size of total money market debt among the treated banks. On the other
hand, this is not the case with non-transparent banks which have an average total debt at $26.7 billion
(median $26.8bn).
Relative importance of the unsecured debt for both bank groups is similar, averaging at 82% of to-
tal money market debt per bank for transparent banks, while being slightly lower at 72% for the
non-transparent. Since unsecured debt is more information-sensitive, this implies that information
asymmetries between fund lenders and banks may be equally important for both bank groups.
Maturity of bank’s money market borrowing is calculated using only unsecured debt. Table 1.2 un-
derlines that transparent banks on average borrow at longer maturities from money market funds,
relative to the non-transparent. Weighted average maturity of banks’ unsecured debt has a mean of 68
days for transparent, while only 33 days for the non-transpatenr banks. Average number of lenders per
bank is higher for the non-transparent banks in line with the overall larger amount of debt these banks
10It may be argued that the riskiness of other repo securities is aﬀected by both issuer’s creditworhtiness and the
quality of the collateral. My results remain robust to excluding other repo from the analyses.
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raise from the money markets. A fraction of strong lending relationships is balanced across both bank
groups, with the mean being at 33% for DFAST-tested banks, while 36% for the banks not subject to
DFAST.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show summary statistics on the fund-bank loans. The unit of observation is at
the fund-bank-month level and the statistics are presented separately for the period before and after
introduction of the DFAST policy. The pre-DFAST period spans from October 2011 to October 2012,
while the post-DFAST period, from October 2012 to March 2015. During the post-DFAST period,
transparent banks have at least one DFAST disclosure with the first round of disclosures in March
2013 and the second round in March 2014.
Table 1.3 compares characteristics of loans to transparent and non-transparent banks before and after
mandatory stress test disclosures were introduced. The average fund loan to transparent and non-
transparent banks as well as fund portfolio exposure is similar across both bank groups, with dollar
loans being slightly higher for the non-transparent banks. The average loan maturity is higher for the
transparent banks with the mean at 47 days during the pre-DFAST and increasing even further after
stress test disclosures were introduced. For the transparent banks, both the mean and dispersion of
the size of dollar loans increase after DFAST is introduced. This is consistent with more information
on borrowers allowing lenders to adjust their lending accordingly, conditioning on transparent banks’
disclosed quality. One can think that prior to information disclosure, lenders assume some average
bank quality when granting loans. However, after stress test results on banks are disclosed, it is
plausible to condition lending decisions on the bank’s quality disclosed in the stress test. This may
generate greater variability in the size of the loan among transparent banks. On the other hand, there
is no similar increase in dispersion of the loan size among the non-transparent banks, consistent with
no information shock aﬀecting them.
Furthermore, the average fraction of the new loans granted by the fund within the bank group is 50%
among the loans to transparent banks, and 20% among loans to non-transparent ones after DFAST
was introduced. This is in line with disclosures alleviating information asymmetry between funds and
transparent banks. With more public information available on the borrower, lenders are more willing
to start lending to the new borrowers.
In the second part of the analysis I explore changes in transparent bank’s borrowing from funds
with strong and weak lending relationships. Table 1.4 presents summary statistics on fund-bank
loans between strong and weak lending relationships, before and after DFAST was introduced. Loans
are restricted to transparent banks. By construction, weak relationship loans are significantly lower
compared to strong relationships loans during pre-DFAST period. However, after disclosures happen,
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weak relationship loans increase from an average 90 to 158 million dollars after DFAST was introduced.
Similarly, funds’ portfolio exposures increase for weak lending relationship funds after DFAST was
introduced, while no comparable increase exists within strong relationship lenders.11 Persistence of a
lending relationship is defined as a percentage of dates during each sub-period (pre and post-DFAST)
when fund lends to a bank. Among weak relationships, there is an increase in lending persistence after
DFAST was introduced.
1.4 Empirical results
1.4.1 Eﬀect of information disclosure on MMF lending to transparent vs.
non-transparent banks
In order to investigate whether public information disclosure aﬀects MMF lending, I begin by doc-
umenting heterogeneity in fund lending to transparent and non-transparent banks after stress test
results of DFAST tested banks have been disclosed. Using the loan level data, I employ diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences specification with fund fixed eﬀects given in (1.2) to compare the changes in fund lending
to transparent and non-transparent banks. Dependent variable is fund-bank loan defined as fund f ’s
holdings of uncollateralized securities issued by bank b expressed either using log of dollar amount
invested in securities or as a percentage of fund’s net assets (portfolio exposure).
loanf,b,t = Transparentb +  Interim ⇥ Interimb,t ⇥ Transparentb + (1.2)
+ Post ⇥ Postb,t ⇥ Transparentb + uf,b,t
uf,b,t =  f + ⌧t +Xf,t + "f,b,t
Variable Interim is a dummy equal to 1 for the period of disclosure anticipation for a given bank.
During this period, funds know that the tested bank’s information is to be disclosed at a given point
in the future. Variable Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 after disclosure happens and information
on the bank is public. Transparent is an indicator variable representing the group of banks subject to
mandatory disclosures under DFAST. The specification also includes fund fixed eﬀects  f which control
for the unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across funds, and time fixed eﬀects ⌧t which capture
11MMF regulation, under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, prescribes that money market funds
must not hold more than 5% of their assets in any unsecured instrument by a single issuer with the highest rating
and not more than 1% of their assets in any instrument of a single issuer with the second-highest rating. However,
both loans within both types of lending relationships when expressed as a percentage of fund net assets are quite below
diversification imposed portfolio limits.
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the time-varying aggregate shocks that homogenously aﬀect lending in the money markets across all the
funds. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Coeﬃcients of interest are  Interim and  Post
which estimate the diﬀerential in the changes of fund lending to transparent relative to non-transparent
banks during anticipation of disclosure period and after disclosure happens for transparent banks.
Table 1.5 shows that an average fund increases its loan to transparent relative to non-transparent
banks by 15.3% more after the DFAST disclosure happens for the transparent banks. Similarly, if
loans are expressed as fund portfolio exposure to a particular borrower, funds, on average, increase
their portfolio exposure to transparent banks by 19.4 basis points more, after the disclosure. It follows
that public information disclosure aﬀects fund lending and prompts funds to increase their loans and
portfolio exposure more to disclosing banks after they become transparent.
In addition, Table 1.5 shows that during the interim period, on average, fund’s portfolio exposure to a
bank from the tested group decreases relative to the non-tested group. The eﬀect is negative, although
not significant, when loans are measured in dollars. The interim period captures the fund behaviour
during anticipation of future information disclosure for transparent to-be banks. It is plausible that
funds abstain from lending while waiting for the information asymmetry to be resolved by public
information disclosure.
Documented lending patterns are consistent with lenders being more willing to lend to transparent
borrowers with more information available on them after the disclosures. To an extent to which more
public information available on the borrower can be associated with a lower degree of information
asymmetry, identified fund lending patterns are consistent with hypothesis that public information
disclosure alleviates information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the money markets.
Next, I show that these result also hold when observations are restricted only to the banks subject to
DFAST. Using staggered implementation of mandatory DFAST disclosures, I am able to distinguish
between the treated and control groups while focusing only on the banks subject to the DFAST policy
(all U.S.-domiciled). In this specification the subset of banks included in the first round of DFAST
disclosure represents the treated group. Banks exempt from the first round of DFAST but known
to be included in disclosures from the second round represent the control group. Variables T1, T2
and T3 are dummy variables capturing diﬀerent time periods over the calendar time after DFAST
rule was introduced. Variable T1 is equal to 1 for time periods from October 2012 to February 2013,
encompassing the anticipation period for the DFAST banks included in the first round of disclosures.
Variable T2 is a dummy equal to 1 between the first two rounds of DFAST, spanning from March
2013 to February 2014. During this period DFAST subject banks have diﬀerent realized levels of
transparency, measured by the stress test results disclosure. Finally, variable T3 is equal to 1 after
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March 2014 spanning the period after the second round of DFAST disclosure when all DFAST banks
have become transparent.
Similar to previous results, Table 1.6 shows that funds on average increase their lending to banks
included in the 1st round DFAST disclosure by 12.1% more when loans are measured in dollar terms,
and by 20.5 basis points more in terms of portfolio exposure, after their DFAST results are disclosed in
March 2013, while exempt banks remain non-transparent. After March 2014, when all DFAST banks
had their stress test results disclosed at least once, there is no significant diﬀerence in fund lending
between the two bank groups. It is worth acknowledging that the result on the increased lending to
banks disclosed in the first round of DFAST may as well be attributed to a decline in lending to exempt
banks prior their disclosure. Still, the captured dynamics corresponds to the identified diﬀerences in
fund lending between transparent and non-transparent banks in Table 1.5. This mitigates concerns that
the unobserved diﬀerences between DFAST covered (transparent) and foreign banks (non-transparent)
may be driving the results on fund increased lending to transparent banks after information disclosure.
Next, I analyze the changes in the average loan maturity between the loans granted to transparent
and non-transparent banks after DFAST disclosure has been introduced. As before, the transparent
banks are defined as all DFAST covered banks, while the non-transparent banks are foreign banks
not covered byh the DFAST rule. Using the same diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification given in (1.2),
I focus on the weighted average maturity of a fund-bank loan as a dependent variable. Coeﬃcients
 Interim and  Post now capture diﬀerences in the changes of the average loan maturity granted by the
fund to transparent relative to non-transparent banks, during anticipation and after DFAST disclosure.
Table 1.7 shows that during anticipation of the disclosure, DD estimate  Interim is significant and
negative. An average fund decreases the maturity of loans granted to transparent compared to non-
transparent banks by 4.6 days more during the anticipation period. This result may indicate that
lenders have incentives to coordinate due to the announced public disclosure (for example see Morris
and Shin [2004], Goldstein and Pauzner [2005] for theory, and Hertzberg et al. [2011] for empirical
evidence on lender coordination motives). Lenders may choose to abstain from lending before the infor-
mation becomes public, in order to avoid holding securities of the issuer once the negative information
on the issuer is publicly disclosed.
The results show that an average fund increases loan maturity to transparent banks by 3.23 days
more than to the non-transparent banks, after public disclosure takes place. Longer term lending
is consistent with the lower level of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. From
the lender’s perspective, the value of the early liquidation option is lower when more information is
available on the borrowers (see Berglöf and von Thadden [1994], Hart and Moore [1994], Bolton and
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Scharfstein [1996]).
Presented results on the increased fund lending and loan maturities to transparent banks are consistent
with a decline in information asymmetries between fund lenders and banks included in the stress testing.
However, observed loans represent equilibrium lending outcomes. Thus, it is plausible that a change in
lending outcomes comes from transparent banks increasing their overall demand for MMF borrowing
after disclosure. This would also result in a greater increase in fund holdings of transparent banks’
debt. In order to further investigate if public disclosures mitigate information asymmetries, I exploit
the heterogeneity in lenders’ sensitivity to disclosure based on diﬀerences in the amount of private
information they may have on the banks before any disclosures happening.
If public information in the form of DFAST results disclosure indeed alleviates informational asymme-
tries between MMF and banks in the money markets, this eﬀect should be stronger for funds with less
private information on the borrowers. Consequently, funds with less private information are expected
to increase their lending to transparent banks more, after public information disclosure. For these
funds the public disclosure reduces the level of information asymmetry with respect to borrowers the
most.
Drawing on the relationship lending literature I use the strength of lending relationships to distinguish
between lenders with diﬀerent amount of private information on borrowers prior DFAST disclosure.
Theories on relationship lending postulate that the stronger lending relationship allows the lender to
gather more private information on the borrower, thus reducing the problems of asymmetric informa-
tion (Berger and Udell [1995], Rajan [1992], Petersen and Rajan [1994], Boot [2000]).
Similar to Bharath et al. [2007] and Cocco et al. [2009], I define measures of lending relationship
strength using quantity of fund lending to a particular bank prior to introduction of the DFAST
policy. The strength of lending relationship per fund-bank pair is defined using the average fraction of
fund’s portfolio invested in bank’s securities during the pre-DFAST period. A fund-bank relationship
is classified as strong if fund-portfolio exposure to a bank is above the median fund portfolio exposure
to any bank fund lends to prior to DFAST is introduced (fund-based measure). The second measure
classifies a fund-bank relationship as strong if the fund-bank portfolio exposure is above bank’s median
loan granted by any fund lending to the bank prior to the introduction of the DFAST (bank-based
measure).
Assuming that a stronger lending relationship implies that the fund has more private information on the
bank, I expect to find that the public information disclosure has a stronger impact on lending outcomes
of the weak relationship fund-bank pairs. As a first indication of heterogeneity induced by DFAST
disclosure on diﬀerent lending relationships, I estimate specification in (1.2) separately for strong and
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weak fund-bank relationships. Table 1.8 shows that among weak relationships, on average, a fund
increases lending to transparent relative to non-transparent banks by 32.2% more, after disclosure of
stress test results. On the other hand, there is no significant diﬀerence in the changes of fund lending
to transparent relative to non-transparent banks after DFAST disclosure among the strong lending
relationships. Since the strength of the relationship is assumed to be reciprocal to the information
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower, a larger increase in lending for weak relationships
is consistent with the public information disclosure being more impactful when previous information
asymmetry is higher.
DD estimate capturing the diﬀerential in the changes in lending during the anticipation period points
to another diﬀerence between the strong and weak lending relationships. Table 1.8 shows that within
strong lending relationships, on average, a fund decreases lending to treated relative to control group
banks by 12.1% (7% using the bank-based strength measure) during the anticipation period, prior to
public information disclosure. This may be consistent with informed lenders adapting their lending
decisions prior to the information becoming public. Informed lenders may prefer to abstain from lend-
ing to borrowers on which disclosed information may result in the negative reaction and withdrawal of
funding by other lenders, thus aggravating borrower’s ability to repay its outstanding loans. Next, I in-
vestigate in greater detail heterogeneity between funds with diﬀerent private information on borrowers
and how stress test result disclosures diﬀerently aﬀect their lending decisions.
1.4.2 Public information disclosure and lending relationships in the money
markets
Here, I directly test whether public information disclosure diﬀerently aﬀects lending decisions of funds
with more and less private information on borrowers. Using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification given
in (1.3), I compare diﬀerences in the changes of the same bank’s borrowing from the funds with weak
compared to strong lending relationships. Exploiting the granular loan level data combined with the
borrower fixed eﬀects (similar to Khwaja and Mian [2008] and Schnabl [2012]) allows to control for
the bank level heterogeneity or changes in bank demand for money market debt that equally aﬀect
the funds. Thus, DD estimate of diﬀerential changes in lending between weak and strong relationship
funds captures the eﬀect of increase in available information on lending decisions of the uninformed
relative to informed lenders.
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loanf,b,t =  Interim ⇥ Interimb,t ⇥Weakf,b +  Post ⇥ Postb,t ⇥Weakf,b + uf,b,t (1.3)
uf,b,t = ↵b ⇥ ⌧t + ↵b ⇥Weakf,b +Xf,t + "f,b,t
Dependent variable is (log) dollar loan of a fund f to bank b in a given month t. In this specification
observations are restricted only to Transparent banks, capturing changes in fund lending during an-
ticipation and post-disclosure periods relative to before DFAST was introduced. Treatment variable
is defined at the fund-bank relationship level, using lending pattern from before the introduction of
DFAST to distinguish between strong and weak lending relationships with the weak lending relation-
ships being the treated ones. Variables Interim and Post are time dummy variables defined as before,
capturing the anticipation and the post-disclosure period for each bank.
Specification includes the interaction of bank and type of relationship fixed eﬀects, which account for
within bank diﬀerences in lending levels across funds with strong and weak lending relationships (and
consequently diﬀerent amount of private information on the bank). Second, it contains the interaction
of bank and time fixed eﬀects capturing the aggregate shocks diﬀerentially aﬀecting bank’s borrowing
over time. Finally, some specifications also include the interaction of fund and time fixed eﬀects which
capture aggregate shocks diﬀerentially aﬀecting fund lending over time.
Coeﬃcients of interest are  Interimand  Post which represent DD estimates of diﬀerential change in
bank’s borrowings from weak compared to strong relationship funds during the anticipation period
(Interim), and after public information disclosure happened (Post), relative to the period before
DFAST was introduced. Thus, diﬀerential changes in lending estimate the eﬀect of the announcement
and the actual stress testing disclosure on funds, depending on the strength of their lending relationship
with the banks. Table 1.9 shows that bank’s borrowing from the weak relationship funds increases by
51.1% more (or by 42.3% more if using the bank-based relationship strength measure) compared to
strong relationship funds, after the disclosure of stress test results.
In order to control for possibility that weak relationship funds increase their lending across all banks,
irrespective of transparency, I employ triple-diﬀerence specification to estimate if the increase in lend-
ing by the weak compared to the strong relationship funds is more pronounced among the transparent
relative to the non-transparent banks, after DFAST disclosure. This allows me to control for other
contemporaneous shocks diﬀerently aﬀecting MMF lending across weak and strong lending relation-
ships. The results in Table 1.10 indicate that after DFAST disclosure weak relationship funds increase
their lending to transparent banks by 24.3% more than to non-transparent banks, compared to the
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same change for the strong relationship funds.
Focusing on transparent banks’ borrowing from lenders of diﬀerent relationship strength, Table 1.9
shows that banks’ increased borrowing from weak relationship lenders is positive and significant already
during the disclosure anticipation period, as captured by the DD coeﬃcient  Interim. Although the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient is much lower, it follows that even during anticipation of the future
information disclosure, weak relationship funds increase their lending by 14% (or 9.8% using bank-
based relationship strength measure) more than strong funds, when lending to the same bank.
It is plausible that being included in disclosures represents a positive signal on banks’ quality to less
informed lenders. For example, stress testing may imply that banks will be supervised more closely by
the regulator. Thus, the announcement of the future disclosure may prompt less informed lenders to
increase lending during Interim period, while lenders with more private information are less sensitive
to this announcement. Such reaction of the less informed lenders would yield homogeneous diﬀerences
in lending between weak and strong relationship funds across all banks to be included in the disclosure.
However, the anticipation of disclosure may induce a heterogeneous reaction of informed lenders across
banks of diﬀerent quality. If strong relationship funds have more information on the banks prior to
public disclosure, during the anticipation period they may choose to reduce their exposure to banks
on which negative information is to be disclosed in DFAST. This may be a result of coordination
incentives prompting informed lenders to change their lending prior to the information becoming
public.12 Previous findings, in Table 1.8 indicate that strong relationship funds actually decrease
lending to transparent relative to non-transparent banks during the anticipation of disclosure period.
In order to explore this possibility, and provide additional evidence on whether strong relationship
funds have more private information on banks prior to disclosure, I analyze diﬀerences in fund lending
conditional on banks’ quality disclosed in the stress tests.
1.4.3 Changes in banks’ money market borrowing, conditional on the qual-
ity disclosed in the stress tests
In order to expect any heterogeneity in fund lending to banks of diﬀerent quality, prior to information
on quality being disclosed, I rely on two assumptions. First, as in the previous analysis, the strength
of the lending relationship is correlated with the amount of private information lender gathers about
the borrower. Second, I assume that the private information gathered through a lending relationship
is correlated with information disclosed in public disclosure of stress test results.
12This can be further supported by fund exposure to so-called headline risk, risk that their investors could withdraw
their money from the MMF mentioned in the headlines as funding (being exposed) to a bank disclosed in the stress
testing as a bad or an undercapitalized one.
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Thus, in order to investigate whether privately informed lenders change their lending to good and
bad banks before information on the bank quality becomes public, I define bank quality based on the
information disclosed in the stress test. A bank is classified as ’bad’ if it had a below-median result
in its first stress test result disclosure.13 Also, this allows me to claim that funds’ decision to change
lending is driven by the actual information content to be disclosed and the plausible eﬀect that the
dislcosure of that information will induce on other lenders in the money markets.
I use the specification in (1.4) to test whether, during the anticipation period, strong relationship funds
diﬀerently change their lending to good and bad banks compared to the weak relationship funds. In
particular, I am interested in tracing whether the diﬀerential changes in tested banks’ borrowing from
diﬀerent lenders during the anticipation are driven by the strong relationship funds’ decrease in lending
to bad banks. Uninformed lenders are not expected to discriminate between banks before information
on quality is disclosed.14
loanf,b,t =  Interim ⇥ Interimb,t ⇥ Strongf,b +  Interim ⇥ Interimb,t ⇥ Strongf,b +
+ Interim✓ ⇥ Interimb,t ⇥ Strongf,b ⇥ ✓b +  Post✓ ⇥ Postb,t ⇥ Strongf,b ⇥ ✓b + uf,b,t
uf,b,t =  f ⇥ ⌧t + ↵b ⇥ ⌧t + ✓b ⇥ Strongf,b +Xf,t + "f,b,t (1.4)
Dependent variable is (log) dollar loan of fund f to bank b while the right hand side variables include
the interactions of the bank and time fixed eﬀects, ↵b ⇥ ⌧t, as well as fund and time fixed eﬀects,
 f ⇥ ⌧t. These capture the time-varying shocks aﬀecting each bank’s borrowing, and each fund’s
lending patterns over time. Variable ✓b represents the bank’s quality, and is equal to 1 for banks with
below-median result in their first stress test result disclosure, i.e. the bad banks. Else, it is equal
to 0 for banks with above-median stress test results i.e. good banks. The specification includes the
interaction of the bank quality type and relationship fixed eﬀects which account for within bank type
(good vs bad) diﬀerences in borrowing levels across funds with strong and weak lending relationships.
Coeﬃcients of interest are DDD estimates  Interim✓ and  Post✓ which represent the diﬀerential in
the changes of bad banks’ relative to good banks’ average borrowing from strong relative to weak
relationship funds, during the anticipation period of the future public disclosure (Interim), and after
public information disclosure happened (Post).
Table 1.11 shows that prior to the disclosure of stress test results, the average bad bank’s borrowing
13Result used to specify the bank quality is based on the minimum stress tested capital ratio (Tier 1 capital)).
14In these specifications I restrict observations to capture only the eﬀect of the first stress test disclosure across all
banks (bank quality based on its first stress test results dislcosure), in order not to confound changes in lending induced
by disclosure content of the second round of results. In my study, after the first disclosure took place the banks are
considered transparent.
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from its strong relationship lenders decreases by 22.9% (by 38% if relationship strength is measured
using the bank-based measure) more than borrowing from weak relationship lenders. On the other
hand, the coeﬃcient capturing the diﬀerence in good bank’s borrowing from strong compared to weak
relationship lenders during the anticipation period, is negative yet not significant when using fund-
based strength measure, but positive and significant for the bank-based strength measure. This implies
that, if anything, strong relationship funds increase lending to the good banks more relative to the
weak relationship funds. Also, strong relationship funds decrease their lending to bad banks before
the stress test results are disclosed.
Once the information on bank quality is disclosed, an average good bank’s borrowing from its strong
relationship lenders decreases by 35% relative to borrowing from the former weak relationship lenders.
This implies that weak relationship funds increase their lending significantly more to banks disclosed
as good once the stress test results become public. Lending to banks disclosed as bad does not
significantly diﬀer between strong and weak relationship lenders. It is plausible that after information
on bank quality is disclosed, the risk-return trade-oﬀ for bad banks makes all lenders either equally
willing or equally reluctant to lend to these banks.
Presented evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that public information disclosure reduces infor-
mation asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, particularly among fund-bank pairs with previously
weak lending relationships. Disclosures allow banks to expand their borrowing from funds with which
they previously had weak lending relationships. However, the eﬀect is heterogeneous across banks
conditional on the information revealed in the stress test results.
1.5 Discussion
Presented evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that public information disclosures reduce infor-
mation asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, particularly among fund-bank pairs with previously
weak lending relationships. Disclosures allow banks to expand their uncollateralized borrowing from
funds with which they previously had weak lending relationships. To further support this hypothesis
I investigate diﬀerential in secured fund lending to the same bank conditional on the strength of the
lending relationship . Due to the existence of collateral, this type of lending should be less aﬀected by
the lender-borrower information asymmetry. Therefore, there should be no significant increase in weak
relative to strong relationship fund collateralized lending to stress-tested banks after the disclosure of
stress test results.
Using the same relationship strength classification previously defined, I analyze whether weak rela-
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tive to strong relationship funds change their collateralized lending to DFAST banks diﬀerently after
introduction of DFAST. Collateralized lending is comprised of Government Agency and Treasury col-
lateralized repo securities.
Table 1.12 shows that after DFAST disclosure the same bank’s collateralized borrowing from its weak
relationship funds decreases, on average, by 54.3% more relative to borrowing from its strong rela-
tionship funds. At the same time weak relationship funds increase their uncollateralized lending to
transparent banks more, as previously shown. This is consistent with lenders being more willing to
substitute the former collateralized lending with uncollateralized loans after more information about
the borrowers has been disclosed. Uncollateralized lending bears more risk, but also comes at a higher
yield. More public information disclosed on banks and inherent supervision of DFAST banks by the
regulator may prompt funds to lend more to these banks through unsecured loans as this would allow
them to earn higher yield, while the probability of a sudden negative shock or news dislcosed on these
borrowers is lower, given the higher amount of already disclosed public information.
Evidence presented is consistent with the asymmetric information story and increased public disclosures
alleviating information asymmetry between less informed lenders and disclosing banks. However, this
interpretation relies on the assumption that any changes in bank demand, if any, equally aﬀect all
lenders irrespective of the lending relationship strength. If this is not the case, documented lending
patterns could be subject to alternative interpretation.
For example, it is plausible that measures used to classify lending relationships into strong and weak
are correlated with some other constraints determining fund lending. Strength of lending relationships
is defined using fund portfolio exposure to each particular borrower. This classification of lending
relationships could be correlated with risk management limits funds set for exposures to individual
borrowers. Money market fund portfolio limits are regulated under Rule 2A-7 of the 1940 Invetsment
Company Act such that funds must limit their exposure to no more than 5% of fund assets invested in
uncollateralized securities of any single issuer. In the sample, funds’ average portoflio exposures are at
2.3%. Although funds could expand their lending without the portfolio limit constraint binding, they
could also have their own internal risk management contraints set at diﬀerent optimal levels.
Finding that weak relationship funds expand their lending to transparent banks more than strong
relationship funds is consistent with strong relationship funds already having saturated lending posi-
tions with respect to these banks. Therefore, strong relationship funds are not able to expand their
lending more without breaching their internal portfolio limits. In that case, presented results can be
interpreted as evidence for the importance of risk management in the money market fund industry
and how existing fund exposures may determine lenders that are more able to absorb increased debt
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issuance by certain borrowers.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I document the eﬀects of increased public information disclosure on lending outcomes
in the money markets. Introduction of Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing policy and mandatory stress
test results disclosure is used as a shock to availability of public information on banks. In order to
capture the eﬀect of increased public information I analyze diﬀerential changes in money market fund
lending between transparent (stress tested) and non-transparent (non-tested) banks using micro data
on money market fund portfolio holdings. My results indicate that funds increase their lending to
transparent relative to non-transparent banks, after DFAST results are disclosed. These results are
consistent with more available information reducing problems of adverse selection or moral hazard
between the lender and the disclosing borrowers.
In order to further investigate whether stress testing disclosures reduce information asymmetries be-
tween lenders and disclosing banks in the money markets, I use the strength of lending relationships
to distinguish between funds with diﬀerent sensitivity to disclosures. Namely, I rely on the assumption
that the strength of lending relationship is correlated with the amount of private information lender
gathers on the borrower. Lenders with more private information should be less aﬀected by public infor-
mation disclosures. My results indicate that bank’s borrowing increases significantly more from weak
compared to strong relationship funds after DFAST results disclosure. This is consistent with public
disclosure mitigating information asymmetries between less informed MMF and disclosing banks.
In addition, my results indicate that diﬀerential changes in lending between informed and uninformed
funds exist during the period of disclosure anticipation. By exploiting the informational content of
the disclosed stress test results, I show that the strong relationship funds decrease their lending to
banks wth below-median stress test results more during the disclosure anticipation period. This is
consistent with privately informed lenders adjusting their lending beforehand in anticipation of negative
information disclosure. During the same period, there is no significant diﬀerence in strong relative to
weak relationship funds’ lending to banks with above-median stress test results.
Regulators in favour of greater transparency and information disclosure in the financial system argue
that an increase in available information serves as a disciplining device for disclosure-making financial
institutions. My results show that stress test result disclosures did aﬀect lending outcomes in the
money markets. Disclosures allow banks to expand their borrowing from previously weak lending
relationship funds. However, the eﬀect is heterogeneous across banks conditional on their quality
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revealed in the stress test results. Banks disclosed as good are able to increase their money market
borrowing, while the banks disclosed as bad may suﬀer from a decline in their borrowing after the
introduction of disclosures. Identified lending patterns are consistent with previously less informed
lenders learning from the public information dislcosures.
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1.7 Tables and figures
Figure 1.1: Transparent vs. non-transparent banks: (ln) dollar loan
Figure 1.2: Transparent banks: strong vs. weak lending relationship (fund portfolio exposure)
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics: Funds
The table reports summary statistics on 164 prime money market funds over the sample period from October
2011 to March 2015. Portfolio maturity and fund age are based on the total fund portfolio holdings, while bank
portfolio maturity is the weighted average maturity of the fund exposure to all banks in the sample. Fund
yield is the yield on the total portfolio, as reported by the funds in their N-MFP forms. Unsecured lending
to transparent banks represents the fraction of the fund’s total sample lending invested in transparent banks’
uncollateralized securities.
Percentile
Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Total Net Assets (millions) 8,790 17,900 432 1,470 10,200
Portfolio maturity (days) 42 11 35 44 51
Fund age (days) 67 24 49 67 86
Fund yield (bps) 21 7 16 20 25
Bank Portfolio maturity 40 20 28 39 50
Unsecured lending to Transparent (%) 0.45 0.19 0.33 0.44 0.55
Table 1.2: Summary statistics: Transparent and non-transparent banks
This table reports summary statistics for transparent, i.e. DFAST covered banks and non-transparent, i.e.
foreign banks not subject to DFAST. The unit of observation is at the bank-month level. Bank’s unsecured
debt is defined as the sum of all uncollateralized money market securities issued by the bank and held by prime
money market funds in a given month. % Strong relationships represents a percentage of strong relationship
lenders in the total number of funds lending to the bank in a given month.
Percentile
Mean SD 25 50 75
Transparent
Debt outstanding (millions) 10,400 15,100 23.5 1,460 18,000
Unsecured debt (millions) 7,810 12,800 21,9 558 11,500
Unsecured debt (%) 0.82 0.29 0.78 0.99 1
Maturity (days) 68 84 11 38 77
Number of lenders 29 37 2 9 46
% Strong relationships 0.33 0.28 0 0.33 0.54
Non-transparent
Debt outstanding (millions) 26,700 19,300 6,370 26,800 43,800
Unsecured debt (millions) 21,200 17,400 2,910 18,400 37,700
Unsecured debt (%) 0.72 0.24 0.55 0.78 0.93
Maturity (days) 33 18 19 34 45
Number of lenders 64 39 25 65 98
% Strong relationships 0.36 0.25 0.14 0.39 0.58
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics: Loans to transparent and non-transparent banks
This table reports summary statistics for the fund-bank loans. It compares loans to transparent and non-
transparent banks, before and after DFAST introduction. A fund-bank loan is defined as the fund’s dollar
holdings of all unsecured money market securities issued by a particular bank, while portfolio exposure rep-
resents the loan expressed as a percentage of the fund’s net assets in a given month. New loans granted
represents the fraction of the total loans granted by the fund, during the Post-DFAST period, to transparent
or non-transparent issuers without any prior lending relationship with the fund in the pre-DFAST period.
Percentile Percentile
Mean SD 25 50 75 Mean SD 25 50 75
Transparent banks
Pre-DFAST Post-DFAST
Fund-bank loan (millions) 202 472 10 44.3 182 218 507 10 37 191
Portfolio exposure (%) 2.24 1.90 0.8 1.8 3.3 2.25 1.71 0.93 1.93 3.17
Loan maturity (days) 47 62 9 26 59 52 55 16 37 70
New loans granted 0.52 0.36 0.50 0.50 0.60
Non-transparent banks
Pre-DFAST Post-DFAST
Fund-bank loan (millions) 261 560 14.8 51 260 254 547 12.3 49 238
Portfolio exposure (%) 2.57 1.61 1.25 2.34 3.8 2.48 1.62 1.19 2.25 3.51
Loan maturity (days) 34 36 7 25 48 39 36 10 31 59
New loans granted 0.23 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.33
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics: Loans conditional on the relationship strength
This table reports summary statistics for the fund-bank loans, conditional on the fund-bank lending relationship
strength. Statistics are reported separately for strong and weak lending relationships, during pre-DFAST
(October 2011- September 2012) and post-DFAST periods (October 2012- March 2015). A loan is defined
as the fund dollar holdings of all securities issued by a particular bank, while portfolio exposure is the loan
expressed as a percentage of the fund’s net assets in a given month. Lending relationship persistence is defined
as a frequency of fund lending to the bank, expressed as a percentage of time periods during which the fund
lends to a bank.
Percentile Percentile
Mean SD 25 50 75 Mean SD 25 50 75
Strong relationships (fund based)
Pre-DFAST Post-DFAST
Fund-bank loan (millions) 291 596 19 72 306 300 638 14.3 52 294
Portfolio exposure (%) 3.05 2.01 1.64 2.62 4.09 2.74 1.87 1.4 2.37 3.73
Lending relationship persistence (%) 0.73 0.31 0.45 0.82 1 0.75 0.31 0.55 0.93 1
Weak relationships (fund based)
Pre-DFAST Post-DFAST
Fund-bank loan (millions) 90.10 189 5 22 92 158 370 7.7 29 150
Portfolio exposure (%) 1.26 1.18 0.38 0.86 1.72 1.72 1.38 0.64 1.37 2.53
Lending relationship persistence (%) 0.51 0.31 0.27 0.45 0.82 0.56 0.32 0.31 0.55 0.90
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Table 1.5: Lending to transparent vs. non-transparent banks
The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the (log) of fund-bank dollar loan, while in columns 3-4 the dependent
variable is the loan expressed as a percentage of the fund’s net assets (portfolio exposure). Variable Interim
is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of disclosure anticipation, while Post is equal to 1 during the
post-disclosure period.Transparent is an indicator variable for the banks subject to DFAST disclosures. Fsize
is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio.
Specifications include fund and time fixed eﬀects and errors clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan) Fund-bank portfolio exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transparent -0.300 -0.289⇤⇤⇤ -0.00341⇤⇤ -0.00340⇤⇤⇤
(0.281) (0.0624) (0.00135) (0.00127)
Interim x Transparent -0.0143 -0.0282 -0.00152⇤⇤⇤ -0.00149⇤⇤⇤
(0.0519) (0.0339) (0.000559) (0.000560)
Post x Transparent 0.166⇤⇤ 0.153⇤⇤⇤ 0.00192⇤⇤⇤ 0.00194⇤⇤⇤
(0.0644) (0.0380) (0.000674) (0.000684)
Fsize 0.935⇤⇤⇤ -0.00133⇤⇤⇤
(0.0188) (0.000381)
Fage 0.002 0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0001)
Fund FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
N 64736 64736 64736 64736
adj. R2 0.556 0.814 0.141 0.148
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
41
Table 1.6: Lending within transparent banks: exploiting the staggered rule implementation
In columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the (log) of fund-bank dollar loan, while in columns 3-4 the dependent
variable is fund-bank portfolio exposure. Variable Transparent First is an indicator equal to 1 for the banks
included in the first round of DFAST representing the treated group in these specifications. The control group
are the banks exempt from the first round of disclosures but covered by the DFAST rule. Here, T1 is a time
dummy equal to 1 during the months from October 2012 to February 2013, which is the anticipation period for
the treated banks. T2 is equal to 1 for the time periods between the first two rounds of DFAST, from March
2013 to February 2014. T3 is equal to 1 from March 2014 onwards, spanning the period after the second round
of disclosures when all DFAST banks are transparent.Fsize s defined as the (ln) of fund net assets, while Fage
is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include fund and time fixed eﬀects and
errors clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan) Fund-bank portfolio exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transparent First 0.0759 0.0657 0.00264⇤⇤⇤ 0.00267⇤⇤⇤
(0.0541) (0.0536) (0.000894) (0.000893)
T1 x Transparent First -0.0107 0.000739 0.00110 0.00107
(0.0472) (0.0464) (0.000784) (0.000786)
T2 x Transparent First 0.100⇤ 0.121⇤⇤ 0.00212⇤⇤ 0.00205⇤⇤
(0.0544) (0.0529) (0.000880) (0.000887)
T3 x Transparent First 0.0124 0.0216 -0.000129 -0.000177
(0.0590) (0.0571) (0.000909) (0.000910)
Fsize 0.858⇤⇤⇤ -0.00201⇤⇤
(0.0523) (0.000909)
Fage 0.00295⇤⇤ 0.0000422⇤⇤
(0.00130) (0.0000200)
Fund FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
N 30056 30056 30056 30056
adj. R2 0.772 0.785 0.200 0.201
Standard errors in parentheses:clustered at fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Loan maturity: Transparent vs. non-transparent banks
The dependent variable is the weighted average maturity of the fund-bank loan.Variable Interim is a time
dummy equal to 1 during the period of disclosure anticipation, while Post is equal to 1 during the post-
disclosure period.Transparent is an indicator variable for the banks subject to DFAST disclosures, representing
the treated group, while the control group comprises of foreign banks not covered by the DFAST rule. Variable
ln(loan) is the (ln) of fund-bank dollar loan. Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the, while Fage
is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include fund and time fixed eﬀects and
errors clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
(1) (2) (3)
Transparent 14.65⇤⇤⇤ 14.69⇤⇤⇤ 12.80⇤⇤⇤
(3.066) (3.004) (2.754)
Interim x Transparent -4.445⇤⇤ -4.405⇤⇤⇤ -4.589⇤⇤⇤
(1.633) (1.634) (1.605)
Post x Transparent 2.219 2.235 3.237⇤
(1.817) (1.796) (1.717)
Fsize -1.443 4.667⇤⇤⇤
(1.181) (1.422)
Fage 0.0442 0.0541
(0.0598) (0.0564)
ln(loan) -6.532⇤⇤⇤
(1.262)
Fund FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
N 64736 64736 64736
adj. R2 0.114 0.115 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Lending to transparent vs. non-ransparent banks conditional on the lending relationship
Dependent variable is the (ln) of fund-bank dollar loan and specifications are run separately for the funds’
strong and weak lending relationships. The fund-based measure classifies the lending relationship as strong if
the fund-bank portfolio exposure is above the median value for the fund. The bank-based measure classifies
the lending relationship as strong if the portfolio exposure if above the median value for the bank. Variable
Interim is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of disclosure anticipation, while Post is equal to 1 during
the post-disclosure period. Transparent is an indicator variable for the banks subject to DFAST disclosures.
Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund
portfolio. Specifications include fund and time fixed eﬀects and errors clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan)
Strong relationships Weak relationships
fund-based bank-based fund-based bank-based
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transparent -0.189⇤⇤⇤ -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.488⇤⇤⇤ -0.377⇤⇤⇤
(0.0598) (0.0501) (0.0883) (0.0687)
Interim x Transparent -0.121⇤⇤⇤ -0.0691⇤ 0.0682 0.0600
(0.0417) (0.0392) (0.0543) (0.0538)
Post x Transparent 0.0457 0.0565 0.322⇤⇤⇤ 0.250⇤⇤⇤
(0.0499) (0.0485) (0.0591) (0.0465)
Fsize 0.972⇤⇤⇤ 0.975⇤⇤⇤ 0.883⇤⇤⇤ 0.967⇤⇤⇤
(0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0257) (0.0182)
Fage 0.000460 -0.00126 0.00203 0.00420⇤⇤⇤
(0.00124) (0.00113) (0.00143) (0.00107)
Fund FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
N 30897 27296 26278 29878
adj. R2 0.874 0.861 0.821 0.832
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Lending to transparent banks: Weak vs. strong lending relationship
Dependent variable is the (ln) of fund-bank dollar loan. Regressions are restricted to banks subject to DFAST
and compare the same bank’s borrowing from its weak and strong relationship funds before and after DFAST
disclosure. Weak is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the fund-bank lending relationship classified as weak
using any of the two measures both defined using the pre-DFAST period.The fund-based measure classifies
the relationship as weak if the fund-bank portfolio exposure is below the median value for the fund. The
bank-based measure classifies the lending relationship as weak if the portfolio exposure is below the median
value for the bank. Variable Interim is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of disclosure anticipation,
while Post is equal to 1 during the post-disclosure period.Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and
the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include diﬀerent fixed
eﬀects and errors are clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan)
fund-based bank-based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weak -0.770⇤⇤⇤ -1.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.035)
Interim x Weak 0.204⇤⇤⇤ 0.166⇤⇤⇤ 0.140⇤⇤⇤ 0.249⇤⇤⇤ 0.169⇤⇤⇤ 0.0981⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Post x Weak 0.457⇤⇤⇤ 0.438⇤⇤⇤ 0.511⇤⇤⇤ 0.505⇤⇤⇤ 0.491⇤⇤⇤ 0.423⇤⇤⇤
(0.072) (0.063) (0.062) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056)
Fsize 0.923⇤⇤⇤ 0.925⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤ 0.960⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Fage -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Bank x Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank x Weak FE no yes yes no yes yes
Fund x Time FE no no yes no no yes
N 26246 26246 25636 26246 26246 25636
adj. R2 0.834 0.837 0.853 0.854 0.857 0.858
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Transparent and non-transparent banks: Weak vs. strong relationship lending to the same
bank
Dependent variable is the (ln) of fund-bank dollar loan. Triple-diﬀerence specification is used to estimate
diﬀerential in the changes of weak compared to strong relationship lending to transparent relative to non-
transparent banks, before and after DFAST disclosure. Weak is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the
fund-bank lending relationship classified as below-median pre-DFAST portfolio exposure. The median value
corresponds to the fund or to the bank, depending on the measure used. Transparent is an indicator variable
for the banks subject to DFAST disclosures. Variable Interim is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period
of disclosure anticipation, while Post is equal to 1 during the post-disclosure period.Fsize is defined as the (ln)
of fund net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications
include diﬀerent fixed eﬀects and errors are clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan)
fund-based bank-based
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interim xTransparent x Weak 0.0618 0.0541 -0.00232 -0.0125
(0.0605) (0.0671) (0.0625) (0.0600)
postw3f 0.243⇤⇤⇤ 0.229⇤⇤⇤ 0.139⇤⇤ 0.112⇤
(0.0689) (0.0850) (0.0614) (0.0627)
Fsize 0.932⇤⇤⇤ 0.935⇤⇤⇤ 0.970⇤⇤⇤ 0.974⇤⇤⇤
(0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0119) (0.0118)
Fage 0.000160 0.000158 0.00105 0.00106
(0.00168) (0.00167) (0.00118) (0.00118)
Fund x Time FE yes yes yes yes
Transparent x Weak FE yes yes yes yes
Weak x Time FE yes yes yes yes
Transparent x Time FE yes no yes no
Bank FE yes no yes no
Bank x Time FE no yes no yes
N 56926 56894 56926 56894
adj. R2 0.857 0.866 0.867 0.875
Standard errors in parentheses:clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Lending to good and bad banks conditional on lending relationships
Dependent variable is the (ln) of fund-bank dollar loan. Regressions are restricted to banks subject to DFAST
and compare if strong compared to weak relationship funds diﬀerently change their lending to good and bad
banks that are to become transparent. Coeﬃcients on the interaction with the Interim captures diﬀerential
changes in lending during the period of disclosure anticipation, while the coeﬃcients on the interaction with
the Post capure diﬀerential lending during the post-disclosure period. Strong is an indicator variable equal to
1 for the fund-bank lending relationship classified as above-median portfolio exposure where the median value
corresponds to the fund or the bank, depending on the measure used. Relationship strength measure is defined
using portfolio exposures from the pre-DFAST period.Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the,
while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include diﬀerent fixed eﬀects
and errors are clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan)
fund-based bank-based
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interim x Strong -0.00108 -0.00644 0.134⇤ 0.137⇤
(0.0852) (0.0885) (0.0751) (0.0728)
Post x Strong -0.234⇤ -0.353⇤⇤ -0.337⇤⇤⇤ -0.357⇤⇤
(0.139) (0.152) (0.0990) (0.108)
Interim x Strong x Bad -0.265⇤⇤⇤ -0.229⇤⇤ -0.435⇤⇤⇤ -0.380⇤⇤⇤
(0.0976) (0.105) (0.0866) (0.0951)
Post x Strong x Bad -0.142 -0.0252 -0.0386 0.0996
(0.140) (0.153) (0.103) (0.144)
Fsize 0.968⇤⇤⇤ 0.974⇤⇤⇤
(0.0475) (0.0430)
Fage 0.00247⇤⇤ 0.00245⇤⇤
(0.00104) (0.000974)
Fund FE yes no yes no
Fund x Time FE no yes no yes
Strong x Bad FE yes yes yes yes
Bank x Time FE yes yes yes yes
N 21375 20300 21375 20300
adj. R2 0.866 0.854 0.873 0.861
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Collateralized lending to transparent banks: strong vs. weak lending relationships
Dependent variable is the (ln) of fund-bank dollar secured loan comprising of Government Agency and Treasury
collateralised repo securities. Regressions are restricted to banks subject to DFAST and compare the same
bank’s borrowing from its weak and strong relationship funds before and after DFAST disclosure. Weak is
an indicator variable equal to 1 for the fund-bank lending relationship classified as weak using any of the two
measures both defined using the pre-DFAST period.The fund-based measure classifies the relationship as weak
if the fund-bank portfolio exposure is below the median value for the fund. The bank-based measure classifies
the lending relationship as weak if the portfolio exposure is below the median value for the bank. Variable
Interim is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of disclosure anticipation, while Post is equal to 1 during
the post-disclosure period.Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted
average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include diﬀerent fixed eﬀects and errors are clustered at
the fund level.
Dependent variable: ln(Fund-bank dollar loan)
fund-based bank-based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weak 0.0756 -0.174
(0.197) (0.187)
Interim x Weak -0.183 -0.133 -0.290 -0.0703 -0.0397 0.0872
(0.173) (0.150) (0.237) (0.156) (0.127) (0.294)
Post x Weak -0.602⇤⇤⇤ -0.418⇤⇤ -0.543⇤⇤ -0.466⇤⇤ -0.307⇤ -0.378
(0.208) (0.196) (0.263) (0.191) (0.178) (0.281)
Fsize 0.723⇤⇤⇤ 0.721⇤⇤⇤ 0.734⇤⇤⇤ 0.737⇤⇤⇤
(0.0432) (0.0405) (0.0445) (0.0394)
Fage -0.0104⇤⇤ -0.0114⇤⇤⇤ -0.00931⇤⇤ -0.00780⇤
(0.00411) (0.00383) (0.00424) (0.00352)
Bank x Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank x Weak FE no yes yes no yes yes
Fund x Time FE no no yes no no yes
N 3786 3786 1940 3786 3786 1945
adj. R2 0.584 0.607 0.709 0.589 0.619 0.693
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
Where did the money go? Evidence
from money market funds on the
portfolio balance channel of
Quantitative Easing
2.1 Introduction
What are the eﬀects of Quantitative Easing (QE) on lending in the money markets? Quantitative
Easing is an unconventional monetary policy which involves large scale asset purchases by the central
bank with the aim to improve liquidity, aﬀect interest rates and provide support to the overall economy.
Quantitative Easing used the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet as a tool aimed at achieving price stability,
supporting economic growth and contributing to the decline of unemployment (Bernanke [2012]). The
Federal Reserve Board posited the portfolio balance channel as the main transmission mechanism
through which QE is to aﬀect the economy. This mechanism assumes that due to a decline in QE
targeted asset’s availability and imperfect substitutability of assets, investors will substitute towards
other asset classes and this will aﬀect prices and yields of the broader spectrum of assets in the
markets.1
This paper explores the changes in money market fund (MMF) lending decisions to identify the portfolio
1Based on the ideas of a number of well-known monetary economists, including Brunner and Meltzer [1972]Tobin
[1969]Friedman and Schwartz [1982]Brunner and Meltzer [1972].
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balance channel as a transmission mechanism of QE. In order to do so, it exploits the third wave of
QE (QE3) implemented from October 2012 to October 2014 which involved Fed’s extensive purchases
of Agency Mortgage Backed Securities (Agency MBS). In the money markets, Agency MBS serve as a
collateral for Agency repurchase agreement securities (Agency repo), widely held by MMF as part of
their collateralized lending. Banks act as borrowers from the money markets using repo loans to fund
Agency MBS held on their balance sheets. The Fed’s extensive purchases of Agency MBS resulted in
a decline of available collateral and consequently decline in Agency repo securities outstanding in the
money markets. In the analysis to follow, I explore in detail the response of MMF prompted by these
changes. One possibility is that MMF investors withdraw their funds from the money markets in the
absence of collateralized securities to invest in. This would result in a decline of MMF assets size and
cash available for investment. Alternatively, if there are no outflows from the money markets, funds
may subsitute former repo loan investments by other asset classes within money markets, which would
allow me to identify the substitution prompted by the portfolio balance channel within the money
markets.
My main findings are that QE3 purchases of Agency MBS formerly used as collateral, do not result
in investor outflows from the money markets, in spite of a declining availability of collateralized assets
funds can invest in. Instead, I show that funds with above median exposure to QE3 increase their
uncollateralized lending once QE3 is introduced. This suggests that QE3 freed up liquidity in the money
market funds to be invested in other, uncollateralized securities. This is consistent with predictions
of the portfolio balance channel being a transmission mechanism of the policy. However, the increase
in funds’ available liquidity does not evenly spread over all money market borrowers, but remains
concentrated within former repo issuing banks. This implies that the eﬀects of QE3 are heterogeneous,
and highly depend on the previous distribution of the targeted asset.
First, I show that the introduction of QE3 and extensive purchases of Agency MBS coincide with the
changes in the aggregate portfolio composition of prime money market funds. Between the period prior
to QE3 (pre-QE3 period) and period when QE3 was introduced (post-QE3 period) the aggregate fund
holdings of Agency repo securities decline from 11% to 7%. This is consistent with QE3 purchases
targeting Agency MBS which banks previously funded through repo loans in the money markets, as
previously shown by Elamin and Bednar [2014].
Exploring diﬀerent plausible responses of MMF and their investors to the reduction in availability of
Agency repo securities, I show that there has been no decrease in the size of money market assets overall.
This implies that money market funds did not suﬀer from investor outflows due to decreased availability
of collateralized securities. In fact, I show that on aggregate, QE3 resulted in the substitution of
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collateralized for uncollateralized debt in money market fund holdings. It follows that QE3 purchases
of Agency MBS, formerly used as collateral in repo loans, freed up fund liquidity for investment in other
securities. This is consistent with the proposed portfolio balance channel as a transmission mechanism
of the QE policy.
However changes in the aggregate money market fund holdings may be aﬀected by other contempo-
raneous aggregate shocks or simply driven by the changes in borrowers’ demand for money market
funding. Thus, I turn to a more granular analysis to identify the portfolio balance channel induced by
QE3. At a macro level the challenge is, usually, to find an adequate control group unaﬀected by the
macro eﬀects of QE. Having micro data on security level MMF holdings allows to distinguish between
funds diﬀerentially aﬀected by QE3 by exploiting heterogeneity in fund holdings of QE3 aﬀected se-
curities (Government Agency repo). Cross-sectional variation in fund exposure to QE3 enables me to
classify funds into a treated and control group. Thus, I employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification
strategy to isolate the eﬀect of the QE3 induced portfolio balance channel on fund lending decisions.
Additionally, fund-borrower loan level data allows me to control for the unobserved heterogeneity at
the borrower level by employing borrower fixed eﬀects.
I capture the intensity of fund’s exposure to QE3 using the fund’s average fraction of total assets
invested in Government Agency repo securities before the introduction of QE3. The intensity of QE3
exposure varies significantly across funds, ranging from 0 to 77.7%, with the median exposure being
7.5%. A fund is classified as a high QE3 exposure fund (treated group) if it has above-median average
portfolio holdings of Agency repo securities in the pre-QE3 period. Else, it is classified as a low QE3
exposure fund (control group).2
First, I show that funds with higher exposure to QE3 increase other lending by 6.05% more relative to
lower QE3 exposure funds. This is consistent with QE3 purchases of MBS generating excess available
liquidity for investment in other securities for funds with high pre-QE3 portfolio holdings of Agency
repo. Other lending is defined as uncollateralized lending, excluding any Treasuries and Agency debt
or any other government sponsored securities.
Next, I turn to granular fund-borrower loan level analysis to explore how increase in other lending
is distributed across diﬀerrent borrowers. One possibility is that high exposure funds homogeneously
increase other lending across all borrowers. However, it is plausible that the portfolio balance channel
generates heterogeneous eﬀects across borrowerrs. Similar to Khwaja and Mian [2008] and Schnabl
[2012], I use the loan level data to estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification with borrower fixed
2My results are robust to using the actual percentage exposure as a continuous treatment variable as well as to using
specifications that define treated and control group using the top and bottom quartile of the exposure distribution.
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eﬀects. A loan is defined as all other securities3 issued by one borrower and held by the fund in
its portfolio at a given date. Thus, in order to identify the eﬀect of QE3 on fund lending I explore
heterogeneity in fund exposure to QE3 to capture a diﬀerential between high and low QE3 exposure
funds’ lending to the same borrower.
When comparing fund lending across all borrowers, the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerences in lending between
high and low exposure funds to an average borrower is positive, yet not significant. However, when the
set of issuers is restricted to banks, in particular former repo issuing banks, I find that the high QE3
funds increase their lending by 8.9% more than low QE3 exposure funds while lending to the same
repo bank. This diﬀerence cannot be attributed to unobservable borrower characteristics, including
changes in demand, since these equally aﬀect all MMF. The results imply that the QE3 induced
increase in other lending of high exposure funds, remains concentrated among former repo borrowers.
Thus, the increase in available fund liquidity for other investments gets heterogeneously transmitted
across issuers, with the former repo issuing banks absorbing most of it.
Funds’ concentrated increase in uncollateralized lending to banks may be consistent with search for
yield behaviour. In the low interest rate environment generated by QE3, funds find higher yield in-
struments attractive as they allow them to deliver higher returns to their investors and thus attract
more investor flows (see Kacperczyk and Schnabl [2013] for evidence on fund yield chasing behaviour
and Di Maggio and Kacperczyk [2017] for evidence on MMF behaviour in the low interest rate envi-
ronment). At the same time, higher yield always comes at a higher risk. Therefore, uncollateralized
lending to banks is consistent with for the same yield banks being considered safer relative to other
issuers of uncollateralized securities, due to implicit support provided by the regulator.
For the banks previusly using repo loans to fund Agency MBS securities, selling MBS in exchange for
liquid reserves with the Fed eliminated their repo positions and implied that they no longer need to
raise funding for these securities. All else equal, this would have reduced the banks’ overall money
market borrowing. However, if these borrowers target particular levels of short-term leverage (Adrian
and Shin [2010]), repaying repo loans may prompt their increased issuance of other types of money
market securities, in order to keep the overall level of borrowing unchanged. Thus, lending which
remains concentrated among former repo banks is consistent with banks’ maintaining stable levels of
short term borrowing from the money markets.
In order to test the hypothesis that banks subject to a larger decrease in the overall money market
borrowing due to QE3 are more able or willing to absorb excess fund liquidity, I distinguish within repo
banks based on the intensity of the QE3 induced shock to banks’ overall level of money market debt. I
3Other securities comprise of all uncollateralized securities excluding Treasuries and Agency debt or any other gov-
ernment sponsored securities.
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measure the intensity of the QE3 shock using the bank’s average pre-QE3 fraction of MMF borrowing
issued in Agency repo securities. Heterogeneity in repo issuing banks’ QE3 exposure is significant. It
ranges from only 0.4% up to 85.4% of total money market debt being issued in Agency repo, with the
median being 19.6%. High QE3 exposure banks, also referred to as high repo borrowers, are defined
as banks with the above-median fraction of debt issued in Agency repo securities prior to QE3. If
banks target a certain level of short term debt, higher QE3 exposure implies that a bank will be more
inclined to increase other borrowing, since a larger fraction of its money market debt is eliminated by
its sales of MBS through QE3.
The results show that within repo issuing banks, high QE3 exposure banks increase total other bor-
rowing by 22.2% more relative to low QE3 exposure repo banks. It follows that, after selling MBS to
the Fed, banks increase their unsecured money market borrowing. This increases the liquidity of their
balance sheets and may contribute to an expansion of their lending and further transmission of QE3
to the real economy (see Darmouni and Rodnyansky [2017] for evidence on the QE liquidity channel).
Diﬀerences in total other borrowing of repo issuing banks of diﬀerent QE3 exposures imply that these
banks borrow in line with maintaining stable money market leverage. Alternative explanation is that
these diﬀerences can be attributed to the heterogeneity of lenders from which diﬀerent banks borrow,
in particular high repo banks being more exposed to funds with a greater increase in available liquidity.
In order to understand the heterogeneity in lending stemming from the QE3 induced portfolio balance
channel, I further explore what determines lending decisions at the fund level among funds with freed
up liquidity to distribute. Restricting the analysis to high QE3 exposure funds, I investigate whether,
at the fund level, lending to diﬀerent repo banks is determined by banks’ ability to absorb more money
market funding. In order to control for fund heterogeneity, I use diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences with fund
fixed eﬀect specification to capture diﬀerential lending of the same fund between high and low QE3
exposed banks. Results imply that there is no significant diﬀerence in fund lending between repo banks
of diﬀerent QE3 exposure intensity. The borrower’s ability to absorb liquidity does not seem to be the
key determinant of lending decision at the fund level.
Second, as QE3 prompted funds to substitute their former collateralized for uncollateralized portfolio
holdings, I explore whether the lack of collateral, and thus, increase in the riskiness associated with
the new loans aﬀects fund lending decisions. In particular, greater holdings of uncollateralized loans
may have increased the emphasis funds put on portfolio diversification. This would prompt funds to
limit their portfolio exposure to each borrower more than when lending through collateralized loans. In
addition, money market fund regulation prescribes strict portfolio limits on funds’ unsecured exposures
to individual issuers. Thus, diversification motives combined with the existing portfolio exposure to
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unsecured debt issuers may play an important role in determining the distribution of the excess supply
of funds across borrowers.
In order to analyze the importance of diversification motives for high QE3 exposure fund lending
decisions within repo banks, I define two measures of the fund-borrower unsecured lending relationship
diversification relying on the lending patterns during pre-QE3 period. A relationship is considered less
diversified (more saturated) if the fund already holds large fraction of its portfolio in other securities
issued by that particular borrower. If portfolio diversification motives are important, the fund increases
other lending more to issuers with which it has a more diversified (non-saturated) lending relationship.
The first measure classifies a lending relationship as non-saturated if the fund’s average pre-QE3
Agency repo lending to the issuer is larger than its non-repo lending to the same issuer. This measure
includes only relatonships with positive average total lending during pre-QE3 period. The second
measure uses the fund’s pre-QE3 non-repo loans to classify a lending relationship as non-saturated if
the fund’s non-repo exposure to the borrower is below the fund’s median non-repo exposure across all
borrowers.4Relative to the first measure, the second measure includes the relationships in which the
fund never lent to the borrower before the QE3 period.
Focusing on lending decisions of funds to repo issuers, high QE3 exposure funds, on average, increase
other lending by 21.8% more to issuers with non-saturated unsecured lending relationships. The eﬀect
is even stronger when lending to new borrowers is included in non-saturated relationships. In that
case, funds increase other lending by 43.7% more to issuers with non-saturated unsecured lending
relationships. The larger magnitude of the lending increase when using the second measure implies
that QE3 prompted funds to start lending to new borrowers through uncollateralized loans.5
These results suggest that less saturated borrowing relationships can absorb more of the available
liquidity. The importance of diversification motives gave certain borrowers within repo banks an
advantage in raising money market funding, after they sold their MBS to the Fed. In particular, being
a former repo issuer with little or none non-repo borrowing from funds with increased available liquidity
to QE3 purchases would allow for the largest expansion in unsecured money market borrowing.
This paper sheds light on the role of private investors in the transmission of QE3 eﬀects, as they
previously provided funding to banks for the QE3 targeted asset, Agency MBS. Without money
market funds substituting former collateralized lending for the unsecured lending, QE3 would prompt
banks to repay their repo loans without gaining much liquidity. Thus, it is the interaction of the
4Here, median is defined conditional on the group of borrowers, in particular, within repo issuing banks.
5This result complements previous studies on the eﬀects of negative liquidity shocks on the money market fund
lending. Chernenko and Sunderam [2014] show that when facing investor outflows, funds cut lending to the borrowers
with weak lending relationships first. However, the implications of weak lending relationships may overturn in the
presence of positive liquidity shocks, in particular when portfolio diversification limits become binding.
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QE3 and the money markets that allowed banks to both sell their Agency MBS to the Fed and still
raise more short term funding and plausibly expand their lending activity. My results show that QE3
yielded heterogeneous eﬀects across money market borrowers, depending on their exposure to QE3, as
captured by the fraction of total money market borrowing in the form of Agency repo securities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3
outlines the institutional setting of quantitative easing and money markets. Section 4 gives an overview
of the data and the empirical strategy, as well as summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
My paper contributes to the literature on the impact of unconventional monetary policy, in particu-
lar literature on the transmission mechanisms of large scale asset purchases programmes.Within this
literature a substantial number of papers focus on the macroeconomic consequences of quantitative
easing by capturing the changes in the bond prices and interest rates induced by QE (see Gagnon
et al. [2010], Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011], Krishnamurthy et al. [2013], Wright [2012],
D Amico and King [2013] for evidence on the eﬀects of Fed’s QE programme;Joyce et al. [2011] and
Breedon et al. [2012] for evidence on the eﬀects of the Bank of England’s large scale asset purchases).
These papers consistently find that QE purchases of targeted longer-term securities coincide with the
reduction of interest rates and relevant credit spreads.
The portfolio balance channel, proposed as the most prominent mechanism of QE, relies on economic
theories and ideas presented in Tobin [1965, 1969], Friedman and Schwartz [1982], Modigliani and
Sutch [1966] Brunner and Meltzer [1972]. The channel relies on the imperfect substitutability of
assets in investors’ portfolios (introduced by Vayanos and Vila [2009]), to generate increase in prices
and decline in yields over a broader set of assets, as investors sell the QE targeted asset to the Fed
and susbtitute towards other asset classes. Bernanke and Reinhart [2004] and Bernanke et al. [2004]
provide a discussion and evaluation of the channel in the context of Fed’s large-scale asset purchases.
The literature aiming to identify the portfolio balance channel of QE mostly focuses on capturing a
decrease in yields or credit spreads of the targeted asset and plausible substitute assets during diﬀerent
waves of Fed’s QE (see Krishnamurthy et al. [2013], Gilchrist and Zakrajšek [2013] Stroebel and Taylor
[2012])
Chodorow-Reich [2014] investigates the eﬀects of QE on diﬀerent classes of financial institutions focus-
ing on the value of their assets and tendency to reach for yield in the low interest rates environment.
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Carpenter et al. [2015] provide macro level evidence on diﬀerent investors participating in large-scale
asset purchases to show that investors on aggregate subtitute towards riskier asset classes during QE
purchases of longer-term Treasuries. Thornton [2012] provides evidence on the limitations of the port-
folio balance channel and shows that the interest rate changes induced by QE seem to be overestimated
once the trend in interest rates is accounted for.
Studies taking a more micro approach to identify the eﬀects of quantitative easing policy focus on the
eﬀect of QE on bank lending behaviour. Darmouni and Rodnyansky [2017] find that the eﬀects of QE
highly depend on the asset targeted in the Fed’s purchasing program and are largely heterogeneous
across banks. They argue that the increased liquidity of the balance sheet, stemming from banks
replacing less liquid MBS for the liquid reserves with the Fed, prompts more bank lending.6 Kandrac
and Schlusche [2017] provide more evidence in support of this liquidity channel prompting the increase
in bank lending. Chakraborty et al. [2016] identify the negative spillover eﬀects of large-scale MBS
purchases by showing that QE incentivized banks to increase origination of the mortgage loans, while
reducing the amount of commercial and other loans. Acharya et al. [2017] study the eﬀect of ECB’s
large scale asset purchases on bank lending.
In relation to this literature, my paper sheds light on the QE induced changes on the money market
funds’ investment decisions and the liability side of banks’ balance sheet. Since banks extensively used
Agency MBS as collateral to borrow in the money markets, selling this collateral to the Fed could have
aﬀected their ability or willingness to borrow. For QE to increase the liquidity of a bank’s balance
sheet, and consequently, aﬀect its lending, it matters whether money market lenders are willing to
substitute their former repo lending with uncollateralized loans.
More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of unconventional monetary policy
on the private transactions in financial markets. For example, Di Maggio and Kacperczyk [2017] study
the eﬀects of zero interest rate policy on the industrial organization of the money market fund industry
and behaviour of money market investors. Kandrac [2014] and Anderson and Kandrac [2016] attempt
to capture potential crowding out eﬀects for private transactions induced by the Fed’s purchases
by measuring the changes in volume and number of private transactions and other market liqudity
measures, once large scale purchases are introduced.
6Having said that, Darmouni and Rodnyansky [2017] find no eﬀects on bank lending during QE2. They argue that
this is consistent with QE2 purchases targeting only Treasuries, while banks overall hold fewer Treasuries on their balance
sheets. On the other hand, they find that QE1 and QE3 which targeted MBS, induced positive eﬀects on bank lending,
as banks sold their MBS held on the balance sheet in replacement for the liquid reserves which allowed for the expansion
of lending.
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2.3 Institutional setting
2.3.1 Quantitative Easing
During 2008, the Federal Reserve (Fed) reduced its federal funds rate target to nearly zero in its
eﬀorts to tackle the consequences of the financial crisis. The aim was to support economic recovery by
providing stimulus to household and business spending. Soon after the federal funds rate hit the zero
lower bound, the Fed additionally engaged in other, more unconventional types of monetary policy
in order to further support the improvement of the economic and financial market conditions. The
unconventional policies involved large-scale asset purchases (LSAP), also known as quantitative easing
(QE).
During the period from 2008 until 2014, the Fed has conducted several waves of large scale asset
purchases. LSAP encompassed purchases of the longer-term securities issued by the U.S. government
and securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored agencies such as Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, including Agency debt and Mortgage Backes Securities (MBS). Securities were purchased in the
private market through a competitive process.
The Fed argued that quantitative easing would aﬀect financial markets and provide stimulus for the
economic recovery through several channels. The mechanism strongly advocated by B.Bernanke, the
Fed Chairman at the time, was the portfolio balance channel. This mechanism relied on the assumption
that diﬀerent classes of financial assets are not perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios. Imperfect
substitutability implies that changing the supplies of certain assets available to private investors as a
first-order eﬀect may change the prices and yields of these assets. Second, as investors reshuﬄe the
composition of their portfolio and invest in other assets, prices and yields of the broader set of assets
can be aﬀected.7
The first series of large-scale asset purchases was initiated in November 2008 (Quantitative Easing 1
(QE1)) when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced a programme to purchase up
to $500 billion of agency MBS and $100 billion of agency debt. During 2009 this programme expanded
by increasing the Fed commitment to $1.25 trillion of agency MBS. The purchases were completed in
March 2010. The main goal of QE1 was to resuscitate the mortgage markets by providing liquidity
and boosting prices of MBS.
In November 2010, although market liquidity normalized, the FOMC launched the second round of
large-scale asset purchases, known as QE2, which lasted until June 2011. This wave targeted solely
7The imperfect substitutability assumption may hold due to certain regulatory restrictions, high transaction or
information costs or particular risk characteristics costly to hedge for some investors.
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the long-term Treasuries. It encompassed a $600 billion programme allocated purchases and $178
billion as reinvestment of the principal payments from the Fed’s agency debt and MBS holdings. Even
when QE2 ended the reinvestment of the agency debt and MBS holdings payments continued, but
throughout 2011 was directed into agency MBS. At the time, these reinvestment purchases were the
only source of Fed’s demand for MBS.
In September 2012, the FOMC announced the third round of Quantitative Easing (QE3) after estab-
lishing that economic recovery is still very slow while unemployment high. The novelty about QE3
was that it was posited as an open-ended programme with the purchases to continue until economic
outlook improves and unemployment decreases. The initial size of purchases was set to be $40 billion
per month targeting solely the agency MBS, and in December 2012, £45 billion in long-term Treasuries
were added to the monthly purchase programme. The third wave of quantitative easing formally ended
on October, 29, 2014.
2.3.2 MMF regulation
Money market funds (MMF) represent financial intermediaries which invest in low-risk and liquid
securities issued by banks and corporations with short-term borrowing needs. Money market funds,with
an aggregate volume of $1.8 trillion, are the most important lenders in the wholesale short term
debt markets, and the most important source of dollar funding for large international banks and
corporations.
In the United States, MMF are regulated by Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. By
the Rule, funds are prohibited from purchasing long-term assets such as mortgage-backed securities,
corporate bonds or equity and can only invest in short-term, highly rated securities.The type of instru-
ments MMF invest in spans from commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and repurchase agreements
to Treasury and Agency debt. In March 2010 after the unraveling of the financial crisis, certain amend-
ments to the 2a-7 Rule have been introduced with the goal of limiting risks and reducing the fragility of
money market funds. New rules have introduced stricter requirements on portfolio holdings disclosure
and tighter restrictions on particular portfolio exposure to second tier securities.
Regarding fund portfolio diversification, the rule specifies that money market funds must limit their
exposure to first tier securities issued by any single issuer to no more than 5% of fund assets. This
restriction does not hold for government securities and securities subject to a guarantee issued by a
non-controlled person. Portfolio exposure to any single issuer’s securities of the second tier must not
exceed 1% of fund assets.
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In my analysis, I focus on the eﬀects of QE3 on the lending outcomes in the money markets. In
other words, I analyze how purchases of Agency MBS and Treasuries during QE3 aﬀected portfolio
composition of the money market funds. Although MMF are allowed to invest in the Treasuries,
they face a constraint on the maximum remaining maturity of the security held in their portfolio not
exceeding 397 days.8 Treasuries purchased through the QE3 spanned maturities from 4 to 30 years,
with the estimated average duration of the bonds purchased being around 9 years, as stated in FOMC
statement from December 2012. Thus, QE3 purchases of Treasuries have not directly aﬀected MMF
porfolio holdings. At the same time, Treasuries used as collateral were not aﬀected by QE3 purchases,
also shown in steady and QE3 unaﬀected MMF holdings of Treasury repo securities (see Figure 2.4).
Similarly, the MMF are not allowed to directly invest in the MBS securities. However, there is evidence
that QE3 purchases of MBS have significantly changed the composition of collateral in the repo markets
(Elamin and Bednar [2014]) by reducing the availability of Agency securities used as collateral (also see
Figure 2.2). MMF extensively invested in repo securities collateralized by Agency MBS. The removal
of the safe collateral from the markets may have lead to significant changes in investor behaviour and
fund’s portfolio decisions.
2.4 Data and Empirical strategy
2.4.1 Data
In March 2010, one of the amendments introduced to the rule regulating money market fund industry
was the increased requirement for transparency and more frequent public disclosure. Starting in
November 2010, MMF are required to disclose detailed security level information on their portfolio
holdings. The information is filed to EDGAR through the N-MFP form each month. Funds are
required to submit the form within 5 business days after the end of the month, while the forms become
publicly available only 60 days later.
The N-MFP form contains information on fund characteristics and details on securities held in the
portfolio in that particular month. Fund information includes total asset and net asset value, fund age,
yield, maturity of its portfolio and the like. With regards to the portfolio holdings, the form contains
information on the type of security, name of the issuer,CUISP identifier, CIK (Central Index Key -
EDGAR identifier) of the issuer, maturity at issuance, dollar amount of the security held by the fund
and percent of fund net assets invested in the particular security.
8In order to limit the interest rate and credit spread risk, the remaining maturity of securities in the fund’s portfolio
should not exceed 397 days, while the dollar-weighted average maturity of the securities owned by the fund may not
exceed 60 days.
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My analysis is focused on the lending decisions of prime money market funds, since prime MMF are
allowed to invest in both government and non-government securities. In order to capture the portfolio
balance channel induced by QE3, it is valuable to analyze the broader set of asset classes towards
which funds can substitute, once QE3 purchases reduce availability of collateralized securities.
Using monthly filings of the N-MFP form, I construct a novel dataset of the U.S. prime money market
fund portfolio holdings at the fund-security-issuer level. The dataset spans a period from September
2011 until October 2014.
In order to analyze the eﬀects of QE3 on fund lending decisions with respect to diﬀerent issuers, I
exploit the granularity of fund-security level information to construct fund-issuer loan at each time
period, as the total dollar amount lent by the fund to an issuer through investment in that issuers’
money market securities.
Using security identifiers submitted in the N-MFP form, I match each security to the issuer at the
highest level of aggregation. For example, in the case of banks, all securities issued by diﬀerent bank
subsidiaries or ABCP vehicles sponsored by the bank are matched to the bank holding company. The
matching algorithm combines information on securities’ CUSIP with the CUSIP database, also Moody’s
Investor Service information on ABCP vehicles and their sponsors, SEC’s list of all CIKs matched with
entity names, as well as the organizational hierarchy of bank holding companies provided in the FFIEC
for matching the bank subsidiary level issues to the holding company.
In total, the matched sample comrpises of 195 issuers in the money market fund portfolio holdings.
There are 123 non-financial and 72 financial issuers (banks), out of which 28 banks have issued Agency
repo securities prior QE3, and thus are classified as repo issuers. Other issuers, in total 167, including
banks which did not use Agency repo to raise funding and the non-financial issuers represent the
non-repo issuers. Matched sample of fund-issuer level holdings represents my fund-issuer loan level
dataset. The loan is defined as the total amount of securities held by the fund and issued by the same
issuer, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of fund’s net assets. Most of the analysis focuses on
the fund portfolio holdings of the matched subset of issuers. In the analysis I distinguish between
repo and other loans. Repo loans stand exclusively for Government Agency collateralized repurchase
securities, while other loans comprise of mostly uncollateralized securities, excluding any Treasuries,
Agency debt or other government-sponsored securities. In the analysis, other lending also includes
the so-called other repo securities which are repo loans collateralized by the nongovernment securities.
The results are robust to excluding other repo securities from other lending.
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2.4.2 Empirical strategy
First, I show that QE3 purchases of Agency MBS coincide with a decline in money market fund
portfolio holdings of Agency repo securities. Figure 2.1 shows that both dollar amount, as well as the
overall percentage of total money market assets invested in Agency repo decreases during the period
of QE purchases of Agency MBS securities, implemented from October 2012 onwards.
This is consistent with the existing evidence that a significant decline in the Agency collateral in the
repo market happened in a lockstep with the Fed expanding its balance sheet through QE purchases
of Agency securities. Elamin and Bednar [2014] argue that over the course of QE3, the Fed increased
its market share of Agency MBS securities by 10 percent of the total market, while MBS used as
collateral in the triparty repo transactions constituted only about 12 percent of the Agency MBS
market at the time. This suggests that the Fed’s purchases targeted exactly MBS used as a collateral
in repo transactions. Figure 2.2 shows a negative correlation between the Fed’s holdings of Agency
MBS and availability of Agency MBS collateral in the repo markets.
In order to claim that QE3 purchases resulted in freed up liqudity to be invested in other securities, I
first show that the prime money market funds industry did not experience any outflows due to a decline
of collateralized securities for investment. Figure 2.3 shows that total asset size of MMF industry, if
anything, has only increased during QE3 period. This implies that fund investors did not withdraw
in the absence of Agency collateralized loans to invest in. Thus, QE3 has generated liquidity available
for investment across other asset classes within money markets. This as a positive liquidity shock
for investments in other securities, aﬀecting funds which were highly invested in Agency collateralized
repo securities.
The goal of this exercise is to identify the portfolio balance channel of the QE policy by attributing
changes in the MMF lending decisions to QE3 induced changes in available securities. One of the
empirical challenges is to disentangle the eﬀect of QE from other possible contemporaneous shocks
aﬀecting MMF lending decisions. Capturing the QE induced changes in fund lending solely in a time
series could confound the eﬀects of the protfolio balance channel with other contemporaneous shocks
also aﬀecting the money market fund lending. Thus, being able to distinguish between the treated and
control group funds in the context of QE3 allows controlling for macroeconomic shocks that coincide
with QE3 and equally aﬀect all the funds.
When using macro data, the challenge is to determine a control group unaﬀected by the policy. For
example, all MMF were aﬀected by the overall decrease in interest rates during QE3 period. Therefore,
the advantage of having granular data on fund portfolio holdings allows to define QE3 exposure at the
fund level. Then, using the cross-sectional variation in fund exposure to QE3 I am able to employ a
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diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification to estimate the eﬀect of QE3 induced portfolio balance channel.
I construct the measure of fund QE3 exposure using the average fund holdings of Government Agency
repo securities before QE3 was implemented, from September 2011 - September 2012. Fund QE3
exposure is defined as the average fraction of fund portfolio invested in Government Agency repo
(across all issuers) during the pre-QE3 period (specified in (2.1)).
fexpQE3f =
1
T
X
t
P
i
fgari,t
fnet assetst
(2.1)
Variable fgari,t represents the dollar amount invested in the Government Agency repo securities issued
by the issuer i at time t, while fnet assetst are fund assets measuring the total size of fund portfolio
at the time t. Basically, for each month in the pre-QE3 period, I construct the measure of fund
portfolio exposure to Government Agency repo (GAR) securities, and then average this across the
entire pre-QE3 period in order to obtain the measure of a fund’s exposure to QE3.
A fund is classified as treated if it has above median portfolio exposure to Agency repo during the
pre-QE3 period. Control group funds have below median portfolio holdings of Agency repo. While
for the high exposure funds QE3 significantly aﬀected the composition of the portfolio by reducing
the availability of Agency repo securities, for the low-exposure funds it induced low or no shock. This
allows me to implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy to estimate the diﬀerential
changes in other lending between high and low QE3 exposure funds.
An implicit assumption behind this empirical approach is that lending of low QE3 exposure funds’
represents a good counterfactual for the high QE3 exposure fund lending. In other words, changes in
other lending of high and low QE3 exposure funds would have evolved in a similar fashion had there
not been any QE3 purchases of Agency MBS securities, and the consequent positive liquidity shock on
high QE3 exposure funds. Figure 2.5 supports this assumption by showing the evolution of the average
total other lending by high and low exposure funds before and after QE3 was introduced. Consistent
with the identification assumption it shows that other lending of high and low QE3 funds follows a
parallel trend before the introduction of QE3. During QE3, both groups increase their total other
lending with the increase for high QE3 funds being somewhat larger. Focusing on the evolution of the
average other loan issued to repo banks, figure 2.6 shows that loans by high and low QE3 exposure
funds follow the parallel trend prior introduction of QE3 with high QE3 funds substantially increasing
their lending to repo banks once QE3 was introduced.
In an attempt to identify the portfolio balance channel by estimating diﬀerential changes in MMF
lending, I use the following diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification:
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yf,i,t = ↵i + ⌧t +  1 ⇥QE3t +  2 ⇥HighFf +  3 ⇥QE3t ⇥HighFf +Xf,t + "f,i,t (2.2)
The dependent variable is the (log) loan of fund f to borrower i in a month t. This specification exploits
the granularity of the fund-issuer loan level dataset to compare the changes in lending between high
and low QE3 exposure funds to the same borrower, before and after QE3 was introduced. This
allows to control for any borrower specific unobserved heterogeneity, including changes in demand for
money market funding which equally aﬀect all MMF. The coeﬃcient of interest is  3, coeﬃcient on
the interaction term between time dummy variable QE3 and the fund treatment indicator HighF .
The QE3 is an indicator variable equal to one during the treatment period of QE3 implementation
(October 2012-October 2014), while HighF is a fund indicator variable equal to 1 for any fund that
belongs to the high QE3 exposure group. DD estimate  3 captures the eﬀect of QE3 on fund lending
decisions.
In the analysis, I also explore the QE3 exposure heterogeneity within former repo issuing banks.
Namely, since repo banks used Agency repo securities to raise funding in the money markets, it is
reasonable to expect that QE3 may aﬀect their ability or willingness to borrow from the MMF. In
particular, a reduction in availability of Agency repo can be attributed to banks selling Agency MBS
to the Fed during QE3. Therefore, banks have to repay their former Agency repo loans, which, all
else being equal, decreases their total level of money market debt. In order to investigate diﬀerences
in banks’ response to QE3, I distinguish between banks using the intensity of their exposure to QE3.
Banks’ QE3 exposure is defined as the average fraction of its total money market debt issued in the
form of Agency repo securities during the pre-QE3 period:
issuerexpQE3i =
1
T
X
t
Igart
Idebtt
Igart represents the total dollar Agency repo issuance of a particular bank at time t, and Idebtt is the
total money market debt of the bank at time t. High QE3 exposure banks (i.e. high repo intensity
banks) are the ones with the above median fraction of the total money market debt issued in Agency
repo securities. For the higher fraction of debt issued in Agency repo securities, QE3 prompts a larger
decrease in the overall money market leverage, thus increasing the bank’s capacity for issuance of other
securities. In this context, a bank’s QE3 exposure captures the positive shock to its ability to absorb
more money market funding.
I exploit the variation in borrowers’ exposure to QE3 within repo banks, to analyze whether this
aﬀects fund lending decisions, once the fund has available liquidity to lend. Using granularity of the
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fund-issuer loan level dataset, combined with the fund fixed eﬀects DD specification in (2.3) captures
the eﬀect of QE3 by estimating diﬀerences in lending of the same fund between high and low QE3
exposure repo banks.
yf,i,t = ↵f + ⌧t +  1 ⇥QE3t +  2 ⇥HighRepoBi +  3 ⇥QE3t ⇥HighRepoBi + "f,i,t (2.3)
The underlying assumption of this within fund diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification is that high inten-
sity repo banks would not have changed their other money market borrowing diﬀerently from the low
intensity repo banks, had QE3 purchases of Agency collateral not prompted the repayment of former
Agency repo loans. Figure 2.9, supports the assumption on total other borrowing between high and
low repo banks following a parallel trend prior introduction of QE3 in October 2012. It also shows that
after QE3 was introduced, high repo banks significantly expand their other borrowing, consistent with
the predictions of QE3 generating a positive shock to their ability to absorb money market funding.
2.4.3 Summary statistics
The analysis is restricted to 159 prime funds which exist and report their monthly portfolio holdings
throughout the entire sample (September 2011 - October 2014). Table 2.1 presents first evidence
in support of the portfolio balance channel being the transmission mechanism of QE3 in the money
markets. It provides detailed breakdown of aggregate money market fund portfolio composition by
asset class, before and after introduction of QE3. Also, it shows that, on aggregate, there has been
no fund outflows from prime money market industry, captured by the increase in average size of total
money market assets during QE3 (from 1.28 trillion to 1.38 trillion dollars).
Consistent with the QE3 purchases of Agency MBS, there is a decline in aggregate holdings of Agency
repo securities, from 11% to 7% once QE3 was introduced. The most pronounced change in the hold-
ings of other securities is the increase in aggregate holdings of certificates of deposits from 27% to 33%
of total money market portfolio during QE3 period. Certificates of deposits are longer-term, uncollat-
eralized money market securities issued by the banks. Given Agency repo are also issued exclusively
by banks, this suggests that QE3 resulted in funds substituting collateralized for uncollateralized lend-
ing within the same group of borrowers. On the borrowers’ side, this allowed banks to expand their
unsecured borrowing from the money markets.
Using heterogeneity in fund exposure to QE3 to identify the eﬀects of portfolio balance channel induced
by QE3, I first show that there is a suﬃcient cross-sectional variation in QE3 exposure among the funds.
Figure 2.7 shows a histogram for the distribution of Agency repo holdings across funds, before the
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introduction of QE3 (September 2011- September 2012). Fund QE3 exposure ranges from a minimum
exposure being 0 to a maximum 78%, with a mean 11% (median 7.5%) and standard deviation of 12%.
High QE3 exposure funds are defined as funds with the above median holdings of Agency repo prior
to QE3.
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics at the fund level, before and after QE3 was introduced (September
2011-September 2012 and October 2012-October 2014), separately for high and low QE3 exposure
funds. Consistent with fund sorting in two groups, the diﬀerence in QE3 exposure between high and
low exposure funds is significant, with the average QE3 exposure being 20% for the high, and only
2% for the low exposure group. The average size of total fund assets does not vary much between
the groups, yet dispersion in the asset size is much larger among low QE3 exposure funds. Also,
there is almost no change in fund asset size following the introduction of QE3, corroborating previous
observation that there were no outflows from the money market industry due to decline in availability
of collateralized securities.
Changes in the portfolio exposure to Agency repo and other securities are consistent with QE3 reducing
availabilty of Agency repo, while funds respond by increasing their investment in other uncollateralized
securities. Focusing on lending within the matched sample, the average fraction of Agency repo loans
in high QE3 funds’ total lending is 33% before the introduction of QE3, and declines to 24% after QE3
is introduced. The fraction of other securities in high QE3 funds’ lending increases from 57% to 68%.
Table 2.2 also shows that QE3 period coincides with the changes in fund portfolio characteristics
beyond asset composition. In particular, portfolio maturity of high exposure funds increases from
36.44 to 40.62 days. Since the average in-sample maturity of Agency repo loans is 7 days, while the
average maturity of other securities is 49 days9, the increase in portfolio maturity is consistent with
the high QE3 exposure funds susbtituting former Agency repo holdings for the holdings of other,
uncollateralized securities. Increase in portfolio maturity is more modest among low QE3 exposure
funds, given their maturity was already higher prior QE3, consistent with larger portfolio holdings
of other securities. Also, the average fund yield decreased across both high and low exposure funds
during the QE3 period, consistent with the predictions on the macroeconomic eﬀects of quantitative
easing on the interest rates.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics on issuers, using their Government Agency repo issuance to
distinguish between the issuer groups with diﬀerent exposure to QE3. Histogram in Figure 2.8 shows
a significant cross-sectional variation in the intensity of QE3 exposure across repo issuers ranging from
0.5% to 85% of the total money market debt, with mean being 26% (median 19%) and standard
9Asset class with the largest increase in portfolio holdings, Certificate of Deposits, has an average maturity of 72 days
in the sample.
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deviation 25%. Non-repo issuers, by definition, have zero exposure to QE3.
Table 2.3 shows that the average repo issuer has $25.4 billion total debt outstanding held by the prime
money market funds. Non-repo issuers are much smaller in terms of their total debt outstanding in the
prime money markets, borrowing on average only $1.53 billion. Within repo banks, high and low QE3
exposure issuers do not significantly diﬀer in the size of their total borrowing from the money market
funds. On average, repo borrowers issued 24% of their money market debt in the form of Agency repo
securities, while 69% in other securities. Non-repo issuers predominantly use other securities to raise
money market funding, with other debt comprising on average 96% of the total debt outstanding.
Table 2.4 shows summary statistics at the fund-issuer loan level, separately for high and low QE3
exposure funds, during the pre-QE3 (Sepmteber 2011-September 2012) and QE3 period (October 2012
- October 2014). The table shows that the size of the average dollar loan does not diﬀer much across
high and low exposure funds, both before and during QE3. With the introduction of QE3, the average
other loan of high exposure funds increases from $160 to $174 million, while average outstanding
Agency repo loan decreases from $79 to $49.7 million. Interestingly, when the loan is expressed as a
percentage of fund’s total assets i.e. portfolio exposure, a portfolio exposure to an average issuer’s other
securities does not change with the introduction of QE3. High exposure funds on average increase other
portfolio exposure from 1.7% to 1.8% once QE3 is introduced. Lack of significant increase in fund-issuer
portfolio exposure combined with the overall increase in fund holdings of other securities, indicates
that fund lending remains quite diversified across issuers. As shown in Table 2.2, high exposure funds
increase their other lending substantially. At the same time, the modest change in the fund-issuer loan
size suggests that funds start lending to new borrowers once QE3 is introduced.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 QE3 Portfolio balance channel: changes in MMF lending
QE3 purchases of Agency MBS have reduced the availability of Agency collateralized repo loans, by
reducing the availability of the required collateral. This change did not induce investor withdrawals
from the money market industry. Thus, depending on their previous exposure to MBS collateralized
investments, funds were left with available excess liquidity to reinvest in other money market securities.
First, I show that QE3 purchases of MBS coincide with the increase in fund lending through other
securities. This is consistent with funds having ample liquidity to invest in other securities after Agency
repos are no longer available in the market. This eﬀect should be stronger for the funds with high
pre-QE3 portfolio holdings of Agency repo securities, i.e. high QE3 exposure funds.
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Table 2.5 shows that, on aggregate, high QE3 exposure funds increase their total other lending by
20.9% more relative to the low exposure funds. The dependent variable in these specifications is (log)
total other lending of the fund. Specification includes fund fixed eﬀects to control for any time-invariant
unobserved fund heterogeneity and time fixed eﬀects to control for the aggregate shocks which equally
aﬀect lending across funds. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Although consistent with QE3 prompting the substitution between former repo loans and other loans,
a diﬀerential increase in total other lending captured between high and low exposure funds may easily
be attributed to diﬀerences between borrowers to which these two groups of funds lend. Namely, these
borrowers may have very diﬀrent demand for money market funding, or their demand for funding may
diﬀerentially change once QE3 is introduced.
Thus, I explore the granularity of my dataset to run loan level specifications with issuer fixed eﬀects
to control for diﬀerences in borrower characteristics or changes in demand for money market funding.
Including the issuer fixed eﬀects in the specifications where dependent variable is the fund-issuer loan,
allows comparing the changes in lending between high and low QE3 exposure funds to the same issuer.
This ensures that any issuer level unobserved heterogeneity equally aﬀecting lenders is diﬀerenced
out. In the loan level specification, capturing the eﬀects of the increase in available liquidity will be
contingent on the way funds decide to distribute this liqudity over diﬀerent borrowers. It is plausible
that the high QE3 funds favour certain borrowers when distributing this liqudity. This would result
in heterogeneous eﬀects of QE3 across borrowers.
Table 2.6 presents the results on the issuer fixed eﬀect specifications (as defined in (2.2)), which compare
diﬀerences in lending to the same issuer by high and low QE3 exposure funds. Column (1) of the table
shows that DD estimate of the QE3 eﬀect on issuer’s borrowing is positive, yet not significant when the
eﬀect is measured across all borrowers. However, when the set of borrowers is restricted to banks, high
exposure funds increase their loans by 8.4% more relative to low exposure funds when lending to the
same bank. When the set of financial borrowers is narrowed down to the former Agency repo issuing
banks, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient increases to 8.9%. At the same time, there is no significant
eﬀect of the QE3 induced available liqudity shock on the fund lending to non-financial borrowers.
Specifications estimated in Table 2.7 use funds’ actual holdings of Agency repo securities to distinguish
between diﬀerent intensities of QE3 induced liquidity shock. Similar to the previous DD regressions,
they compare changes in the loans to the same borrower by funds with diﬀerent intensity of QE3
exposure. In this case, for every 10% higher exposure to QE3, issuer’s borrowing increases by 4.6%
more relative to the fund with lower QE3 exposure. The magnitude of the eﬀect increases once the set
of borrowers is narrowed to financial borrowers, and in particular former repo issuing banks.
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Results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 document heterogeneity in the transmission of QE3 eﬀects across diﬀerent
groups of borrowers in the money markets. This may indicate that the changes in available liquidity
across diﬀerent MMF are not the only determinant of lending outcomes during QE3. For example,
funds particular preference towards financial issuers could be consistent with the search for yield
incentives which often arise in the low interest rate environment generated by QE3 (see Di Maggio
and Kacperczyk [2017]). Uncollateralized instruments are riskier, but oﬀer higher yield for bearing
this additional risk relative to the collateralized securities. Allocating most of the freed up liquidity to
banks could be due to banks oﬀering higher yield securities while posing the lowest risk for a given yield
due to implicit support provided by the regulator (Acharya et al. [2016]). Documented heterogeneity
in lending is also consistent with issuers having diﬀerent ability to absorb the excess supply of funds.
Next, I discuss plausible eﬀects of QE3 on diﬀerent borrowers’ ability to absorb the money market
funding.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous eﬀects across borrowers
During QE3, the Fed’s purchases of Agency MBS allowed the owners of these securities to exchange
them for the reserves with the Fed. For Agency repo borrowers, selling MBS to the Fed would eliminate
their repo borrowing positions, thus reducing their total borrowing from the money markets. If repo
banks simply used the money markets to obtain funding for Agency MBS held on the balance sheet,
selling MBS during QE3 purchases would imply that these banks no longer have to raise the short
term funding from the MMF.
However, if these banks target certain level of short term borrowing, repaying repo loans may prompt
an increase in the issuance of other money market securities. In order to maintain the overall level
of money market debt unchanged, repo banks can increase their borrowing from MMF through other
securities. Therefore, banks subject to the larger QE3 induced decrease in the overall money market
borrowing may be more able or willing to absorb the fund excess liquidity to keep their borrowing
levels unchanged. Repo bank’s exposure to QE3 is defined using its pre-QE3 fraction of total borrowing
issued in Agency repo securities. This corresponds to the intensity of QE3 induced shock to the bank’s
overall level of money market debt.
Table 2.8 shows that, on aggregate, high exposure repo banks increase other borrowing by 22.2% more
relative to the low QE3 exposure repo banks. The eﬀect is significant and of the similar magnitude
when comparing the high repo banks to all other borrowers. These findings are consistent with the high
QE3 exposure repo banks being more able to absorb the money market funding once they repay their
former repo loans. If repo banks aim to maintain the stable level of their money market debt, high QE3
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exposure banks should increase other borrowing more, since the larger fraction of their money market
debt is aﬀected by the sales of MBS to the Fed. Figure 2.9 supports this by showing the evolution
of other money market debt for high and low QE3 exposure repo banks. Total other borrowing
increases significantly for the high exposure banks while total money market borrowing of low repo
banks remains almost unchanged during QE3. The results imply that the ample liquidity of high QE3
exposure funds, generated by QE3, remains concentrated among the former repo issuing banks. In
order to better understand the heterogeneous eﬀects of the QE3 induced portfolio balance channel in
the money markets, I analyze determinants of the fund lending decision within repo borrowers while
focusing on the high QE3 funds, funds with ample liquidity made available by QE3 purchases.
2.5.3 Fund lending within repo banks
First, I analyze whether, at the fund level, lending between repo banks is determined by the bank’s
ability to absorb more money market funding. In order to control for fund heterogeneity, I use the fund
fixed eﬀect specification to capture the diﬀerential changes in lending of the same fund between high
and low QE3 exposed banks. If distribution of the available liquidity is determined by the borrowers’
ability to absorb money market debt, the same fund, on average, increases lending more to the high
QE3 exposure banks.
Second, QE3 coincides with the funds substituting the former collateralized for the uncollateralized
portfolio holdings. All else being equal, lending through uncollateralized loans is riskier, and thus,
may incentivize funds to put more emphasis on diversification considerations when making lending
decisions. Diversification implies spreading the loans over more issuers to ensure smaller unsecured
exposure to each individual issuer. In addition, money market funds face strict regulatory requirements
on their portfolio limits on the fund unsecured exposures to the individual issuer. As prescribed by
Rule 2a-7 , MMF are not allowed to have a higher than 5% portfolio exposure to a single issuer through
securities other than Treasuries or Agency debt, as well as repo securities collateralized with the former
two. Thus, reducing the availability of the loans not subject to diversification requirement (Agency
collateralized repos) puts substantial pressure on the funds to rebalance their portfolios in accordance
with diversification requirements. Thus, I explore whether diversification motives combined with the
existing portfolio composition of unsecured debt issuers aﬀects fund lending decisions within repo
banks.
In the analysis, a lending relationship is considered diversified (i.e. non-saturated) if the fund does
not hold a large fraction of its portfolio in other securities issued by that particular borrower. I
construct two measures characterizing the degree of unsecured lending relationship diversification for
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each fund-borrower pair. First measure is based on the fund-issuer lending relationships which exist
prior introduction of the QE3 (through either secured or unsecured lending). It includes only lending
relationships which existed prior QE3 introduction. Fund-issuer relationship is classified as diversified
(non-saturated) if the percentage of the average pre-QE3 total lending issued in Agency repo is larger
than the percentage of lending in non-repo securities, for that fund-issuer pair.
Second measure classifies the lending relationship as the non-saturated if the fund’s portfolio non-
repo loans exposure to that issuer is below the fund’s median (non-repo) exposure. This includes
the relationships in which funds never lent to the borrower before the QE3 period. All measures are
constructed per fund-issuer pairs using lending exposures during the pre-QE3 period (September 2011-
September 2012). If the distribution of excess liquidity is determined by diversification motives, the
fund would increase lending more to issuers with more diversified (non-saturated) lending relationship.
The specifications given in Table 2.9 explore how high QE3 exposure fund, on average, changes its
lending to diﬀerent subsets of former repo banks. In order to control for the fund heterogeneity these
regressions include fund fixed eﬀects, while the dependent variable is at the fund-borrower level. Results
in Column (1) of the Table indicate that there is no significant diﬀerence in lending to high and low
QE3 exposure repo banks, at the fund level. This indicates that at the fund level, the borrowers’ ability
to absorb money market funding does not seem to determine fund lending within repo borrowers.
Columns (2) and (3) show diﬀerences in fund lending to borrowers with the non-saturated relative to
saturated lending relationships, using two measures previously defined. These specifications include
issuer-time fixed eﬀects, in order to control for any issuer specific changes in demand. On average, a
fund increases other lending by 21.8% more to issuers with non-saturated unsecured lending relation-
ship. The eﬀect is even stronger when the second measure which includes lending to new borrowers
is used. In that case, a fund, on average, increases other lending by 43.7% more to issuers with non-
saturated relationship. Larger magnitude of the eﬀect indicates that substitution to uncollateralized
loans prompted funds to start lending to new borrowers. These results are consistent with diver-
sification motives being an important determinant of the fund lending decisions within former repo
borrowers.
In order to analyze how diversification motives interact with the borrower’s ability to absorb additional
money market funding, I compare how the fund-issuer lending relationship characteristics matter for
borrowers with diﬀerent exposure to QE3. Using DDD specification I test whether bank’s ability to
abosrb additional money market funding matters in determining fund lending decisions, after con-
trolling for the degree of lending relationship diversification. The results in Columns (3) and (6) of
Table 2.10 show that even after controlling for diﬀerent intensity of issuers’ QE3 exposure, the eﬀect of
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non-saturated fund-issuer relationship remains positive and significant. When restricting the observed
relationships to the ones existing pre-QE3, on average, the fund increases its other lending to high
QE3 exposure bank by 30.3% more than to low QE3 exposure borrower with non-saturated lending re-
lationship. Lending to low QE3 exposure borrowers with non-saturated lending relationships does not
change significantly.When including the new lending relationships created after QE3 was introduced
in the regression, the fund, on average, increases its other lending to non-saturated low QE3 banks by
38.6%, while to the non-saturated high QE3 exposure banks by additional 14.8% more relative to the
low QE3 banks.
The diﬀerence in DDD coeﬃcient magnitudes between the two measures of relationship saturation
comes from the fact that the second measure also captures the fund’s decision to initiate new lending
relationships once it increases lending through the uncollateralized loans. The results imply that the
fund initiates new lending relationships across both high and low QE3 exposure banks. In addition,
positive and significant DDD coeﬃcient captures that the lending increase is larger to banks with the
greater ability to absorb more money market funding. Within the old lending relationships, once the
relationship saturation is controlled for, the bank’s ability to absorb additional funding determines the
fund lending.
My findings underline the importance of the fund diversification motives once the availability of se-
cured loans declines in the money market. Presented evidence implies that less saturated unsecured
borrowing relationships can absorb more of the available liquidity for investment in unsecured loans.
Diversification incentives together with existing portfolio composition of unsecured debt issuers de-
termine the distribution of excess funds across borrowers. In particular, being a repo issuing bank
with little or no non-repo borrowing from high QE3 exposed fund, would have allowed for the largest
expansion in money market borrowing and overall increase in liqudity for the bank.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper uses granular data on money market fund portfolio holdings to identify the portfolio balance
channel as a transmission mechanism of QE policy. It focuses on the eﬀects of the third wave of QE
implemented by the Fed, from October 2012 until October 2014 which involved extensive purchases
of Agency MBS, formerly used as collateral in money markets. First, it shows that QE3 purchases
coincide with a declline in the money market fund holdings of the collateralized debt. Second, it shows
that this decline in availability of collateralized securities did not induce investor outflows and decrease
in the asset size of the money market industry. Thus, QE purchases freed up fund liquidity previously
invested in Agency repo securities.
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The paper exploits heterogeneity in the intensity of the fund’s QE3 exposure using fund pre-QE3
holdings of Agency repo loans to distinguish between treated and control funds. The cross-sectional
variation in the fund QE3 exposure together with the fund-borrower loan level data allows to implement
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identification strategy to capture diﬀerential changes in fund lending between
high and low exposure funds, that can be contributed to the eﬀects of QE3. My results show that the
high QE3 exposure funds increase their uncollateralized lending more once QE3 is introduced. This
is consistent with the predictions of the portfolio balance channel suggesting that investors substitute
towards other asset classes as QE purchases reduce the availability of the targeted asset in the markets.
Next, I show that that the QE3 induced portfolio balance channel has heterogeneous eﬀects across
diﬀerent market participants. Namely, results imply that the increase in funds’ available liquidity
does not get evenly distributed across borrowers, but remains concentrated within the former repo
issuing banks. This is consistent with the repo issuers having greater ability to absorb additional fund
liquidity after sales of Agency MBS to the Fed through the QE3 purchases allowed them to eliminate
their former repo loans. Further, the paper explores potential channels determining fund lending
within former repo issuing banks. It provides evidence consistent with diversification motives strongly
determining fund uncollateralized lending. On average, funds increase uncollateralized lending more
to issuers with less saturated or no previous unsecured lending relationships.
The paper presents evidence on the role of private investors in the transmission of QE3 eﬀects, as
they previously provided funding for the QE3 targeted asset (Agency MBS) held by banks. Without
money market funds substituting the former collateralized lending by the unsecured lending, the banks
would only repay their repo loans without gaining much liquidity, irrespective of the QE3. Thus, the
interaction of QE3 and the money markets allowed the banks to both sell their Agency MBS to the
Fed and still raise more short term funding from the money markets.
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2.7 Tables and figures
Figure 2.1: Total holdings of Government Agency repo: Dollar amount (USD million) and % of total
fund assets
Figure 2.2: Fed holdings of Agency MBS vs. collateral value of Agency securities
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Figure 2.3: Total MMF assets (USD billion)
Figure 2.4: Fund holdings of Treasury repo securities: Dollar amount (USD milion) and % of total
MMF assets
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Figure 2.5: High vs. low QE3 funds: Total other lending
Figure 2.6: Average other loan to repo banks: ln(dollar loan)
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Table 2.1: Portfolio holdings by asset class
This table reports summary statistics for the aggregate MMF portfolio composition by asset class, before and
after the introduction of QE3. Portfolio holdings are defined as total dollar holdings of the particular asset
class scaled by the size of the aggregate money market fund portfolio. MMF total assets represent the size of
the aggregate money market fund portfolio.
Pre-QE3 QE3
Mean SD p50 Mean SD p50
GovAgency Repo 0.108 0.015 0.108 0.071 0.028 0.067
Agency debt 0.109 0.009 0.111 0.088 0.012 0.091
Treasury Repo 0.030 0.007 0.029 0.042 0.023 0.037
Treasury debt 0.093 0.012 0.098 0.072 0.012 0.077
Certificate of Deposits 0.267 0.014 0.261 0.325 0.032 0.321
Financial CP 0.128 0.006 0.127 0.145 0.009 0.148
ABCP 0.067 0.003 0.067 0.052 0.005 0.050
Other CP 0.037 0.004 0.037 0.046 0.006 0.044
Other Note 0.051 0.004 0.052 0.053 0.005 0.054
Other Repo 0.043 0.003 0.043 0.044 0.004 0.044
All other sec 0.073 0.010 0.071 0.067 0.013 0.065
MMF total assets (billions) 1,290 17.8 1,290 1,380 21.6 1,380
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Table 2.2: Fund characteristics
This table reports summary statistics for 159 prime money market funds in my sample. Statistics are reported
separately for high and low QE3 exposure funds, prior to the introduction of QE3 (september 2011- October
2012) and during QE3 (October 2013 - October 2014). Funds are classified as high QE3 exposure if they have
the above-median portfolio holdings of Agency repo securities during the pre-QE3 period. Total secured loans
comprise of Treasuries and Agency securities as well as repo loans collateralised with these securities. Total
GAR loans represent fund total holdings of government Agency collateralised repo securities. Total other loans
comprise of uncollateralised lending and repo loans collateralised by non-Treasuries and non-Agency debt.
Percentile Percentile
Mean SD 25 50 75 Mean SD 25 50 75
High QE3 exposure funds
Pre-QE3 QE3
Total Net Assets (millions) 8,230 11,900 904 2,210 11,700 8,820 13,000 811 2,090 12,400
Portfolio maturity (days) 36.44 12.43 28 38 46 40.62 12.16 33 44 50
Fund age 56.43 23.83 41 53 75 66.92 23.60 51 70 85
Fund yield (bps) 24.09 8.01 18 24 30 18.75 6.22 15 19 23
Total loans (millions) 4,680 7,010 469 1,210 6,590 4,710 7,190 435 1,120 6,470
Total GAR loans 0.33 0.17 0.21 0.30 0.41 0.24 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.34
Total secured loans 0.43 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.55 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.43
Total Other loans 0.57 0.22 0.45 0.62 0.72 0.68 0.24 0.57 0.73 0.84
QE3 exposure (Supply shock) 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.24
Low QE3 exposure funds
Pre-QE3 QE3
Total Net Assets (millions) 8,030 19,900 332 1,010 4,520 8,590 21,900 300 861 3,530
Portfolio maturity (days) 42.13 11.22 34 43 52 44.83 9.77 39 47 52
Fund age 65.42 25.77 43 63 88.50 68.34 24.29 49 69 87
Fund yield (bps) 25.27 9.08 19 26 31 18.97 6.23 15 18 23
Total loans (millions) 3,810 9,510 117 369 2,190 4,070 10,400 124 403 1,670
Total GAR loans 0.05 0.08 0 0 0.07 0.06 0.12 0 0 0.08
Total secured loans 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.32 0.17 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.25
Total Other loans 0.79 0.21 0.68 0.82 0.95 0.83 0.20 0.75 0.88 0.98
QE3 exposure (Supply shock) 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.04
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Figure 2.7: Cross sectional variation in funds’ QE3 exposure
Figure 2.8: Cross-sectional variation in repo issuing banks’ QE3 exposure
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Table 2.3: Issuer characteristics
This table reports summary statistics for the issuers in the sample, separately for repo (in total 28) and non-
repo issuers (in total 167). Within repo issuers, high and low intensity issuers are distinguished using the
above/below median exposure to QE3, as captured by the average pre-QE3 fraction of total debt issued in
Agency repo securities.The table reports statistics on the fraction of Agency repo loans and other loans in the
issuers’ total borrowing from the money market, where other loans are defined as uncollateralized securities.
Percentile
Mean SD 25 50 75
High Repo
Total debt (millions) 21,600 16,800 6,440 18,900 34,600
Total Agency Repo debt (millions) 6,830 6,300 2,080 4,800 9,480
Total Other debt (millions) 13,000 11,800 1,180 11,400 22,400
Agency Repo % debt 0.43 0.30 0.18 0.34 0.71
Other % debt 0.51 0.30 0.22 0.58 0.75
QE3 Exposure 0.49 0.20 0.33 0.44 0.61
Low Repo
Total debt (millions) 28,500 17,900 9,510 31,900 43,100
Total Agency Repo debt (millions) 2,470 2,810 305 1,590 3,700
Total Other debt (millions) 24,900 16,700 5,850 27,900 38,600
Agency Repo % debt 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.12
Other % debt 0.85 0.18 0.80 0.92 0.97
QE3 Exposure 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.16
All Repo
Total debt (millions) 25,400 17,700 7,430 26,100 39,800
Total Agency Repo debt (millions) 4,460 5,200 800 2,800 6,010
Total Other debt (millions) 19,500 15,800 3,750 18,000 32,900
Agency Repo % debt 0.24 0.27 0.04 0.13 0.34
Other % debt 0.69 0.29 0.53 0.79 0.93
QE3 Exposure 0.27 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.42
Non-Repo
Total debt (millions) 1,530 3,640 28 173 1,130
Total Agency Repo debt (millions) 0 0 0 0 0
Total Other debt (millions) 1,390 3,410 20 149 1,010
Agency Repo % debt 0 0 0 0 0
Other % debt 0.96 0.19 1 1 1
QE3 Exposure 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 2.4: Fund-issuer loan level characteristics
This table reports summary statistics for the fund-issuer loans, separately for high and low QE3 exposure
funds prior to QE3 and during QE3. Loans are expressed in millions of dollars, while portfolio exposure
represents the loan as the fraction of the fund’s net assets. Loans and portfolio exposures per fund-issuer are
presented separately for diﬀerent types of securities included in the definition of the loan: across all types of
securities (total loan), uncollateralized securities (other loan) and Government Agency repo securities (Agency
repo loan).
Percentile Percentile
Mean SD 25th 50th 75th Mean SD 25th 50th 75th
High QE3 exposure funds
Pre-QE3 QE3
Total loan (millions) 255 463 18 75 290 233 430 15 63.7 250
Other loan (millions) 160 325 3 30 175 174 349 5 35 188
Agency Repo loan (millions) 79 265 0 0 2.65 47.9 187 0 0 0
Total Fund Portfolio exposure 0.031 0.033 0.010 0.022 0.041 0.027 0.028 0.010 0.020 0.035
Other Fund Portfolio exposure 0.017 0.017 0.003 0.012 0.027 0.018 0.016 0.005 0.014 0.027
Repo Fund Portfolio exposure 0.010 0.027 0 0 0.002 0.007 0.022 0 0 0
Low QE3 exposure funds
Pre-QE3 QE3
Total loan (millions) 251 687 9.78 35 180 238 645 8.94 30 146
Other loan (millions) 201 539 5.40 25 140 214 575 6 24.70 124
Agency Repo loan (millions) 17.50 140 0 0 0 11.90 130 0 0 0
Total Fund Portfolio exposure 0.028 0.026 0.011 0.022 0.038 0.025 0.023 0.01 0.021 0.035
Other Fund Portfolio exposure 0.022 0.017 0.007 0.019 0.033 0.021 0.016 0.008 0.019 0.031
Repo Fund Portfolio exposure 0.001 0.009 0 0 0 0.002 0.013 0 0 0
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Table 2.5: Total other lending of high vs. low QE3 exposure funds
The dependent variable is (ln) of the fund’s total other dollar lending, with other lending comprised of un-
collateralized securities. Variable HighF is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the high QE3 exposure funds,
classified as the funds with above-median pre-QE3 holdings of Agency repo securities. Variable QE3 is a time
dummy equal to 1 during the period of QE3 (October 2012-October 2014). Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund
net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specification in column
1 includes only time fixed eﬀects, while specification in column 2 includes fund and time fixed eﬀects. Errors
are clustered at the fund level in both specifications.
Dependent variable: Fund ln(Total Other lending)
(1) (2)
HighF -0.281⇤⇤⇤
(0.0680)
QE3 x HighF 0.209⇤⇤ 0.0605⇤⇤
(0.0955) (0.0300)
Fsize 1.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.936⇤⇤⇤
(0.0227) (0.0283)
Fage -0.000462 0.00104
(0.000998) (0.000610)
const -1.093⇤⇤
(0.497)
Time FE yes yes
Fund FE no yes
N 5921 5921
adj. R2 0.920 0.994
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
81
Table 2.6: Changes in borrowing from high vs. low QE3 exposure funds
The dependent variable is (ln) of the fund-issuer dollar loan, comprised of uncollateralized securities (other
securities). Specifications 1-4 estimate diﬀerences in the changes of an issuer’s borrowing from high compared
to low QE3 exposure funds, across diﬀerent groups of issuers. Column 1 results include all the issuers, while
column 2 and 3 estimate the eﬀects for the non-financial and financial issuers. Column 4 results are restricted
to only repo issuing banks. Variable HighF is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the high QE3 exposure funds,
classified as the funds with above-median pre-QE3 holdings of Agency repo securities. Variable QE3 is a time
dummy equal to 1 during the period of QE3 (October 2012-October 2014). Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund
net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include
issuer and time fixed eﬀects and errors are clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: Fund-issuer ln( Other loan)
All issuers Non-financial issuers Financial issuers Repo issuers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HighF -0.145⇤⇤⇤ -0.109 -0.156⇤⇤⇤ -0.147⇤⇤
(0.0550) (0.0768) (0.0572) (0.0577)
QE3 x HighF 0.0489 -0.0687 0.0838⇤⇤ 0.0887⇤⇤
(0.0298) (0.0601) (0.0335) (0.0353)
Fsize 0.932⇤⇤⇤ 0.897⇤⇤⇤ 0.943⇤⇤⇤ 0.956⇤⇤⇤
(0.0121) (0.0143) (0.0125) (0.0121)
Fage -0.00191⇤ -0.00447⇤⇤⇤ -0.00133 -0.000319
(0.00112) (0.00151) (0.00112) (0.00112)
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Issuer FE yes yes yes yes
N 96066 23542 72524 63995
adj. R2 0.818 0.803 0.823 0.831
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Changes in borrowing from funds with diﬀerent QE3 exposure intensity
The dependent variable is (ln) of the fund-issuer dollar loan, comprised of uncollateralized securities (other
securities). These specifications use the actual percentage of fund’s pre-QE3 holdings of Agency repo loans
as the the treatment variable defined by Fund QE3 exp. The results estimate diﬀerences in the changes of an
issuer’s borrowing from funds with diﬀerent intensities of their QE3 exposure. Column 1 results include all the
issuers, while column 2 and 3 estimate the eﬀects for the non-financial and financial issuers. Column 4 results
are restricted to the repo issuing banks only. Variable HighF is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the high
QE3 exposure funds, classified as the funds with above-median pre-QE3 holdings of Agency repo securities.
Variable QE3 is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of QE3 (October 2012-October 2014). Fsize is
defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio.
Specifications include issuer and time fixed eﬀects and errors are clustered at the fund level.
Dependent variable: Fund-issuer ln( Other loan)
All issuers Non-financial issuers Financial issuers Repo issuers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fund QE3 exp -0.943⇤⇤⇤ -0.683⇤ -1.010⇤⇤⇤ -0.934⇤⇤⇤
(0.309) (0.375) (0.335) (0.350)
QE3 x Fund QE3 exp 0.463⇤⇤ 0.0203 0.565⇤⇤⇤ 0.601⇤⇤⇤
(0.196) (0.323) (0.210) (0.226)
Fsize 0.931⇤⇤⇤ 0.893⇤⇤⇤ 0.942⇤⇤⇤ 0.955⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Fage -0.002⇤ -0.004⇤⇤⇤ -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Issuer FE yes yes yes yes
N 96066 23542 72524 63995
adj. R2 0.819 0.803 0.824 0.831
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Total other borrowing of repo issuers
The dependent variable is (ln) of an issuer’s total dollar borrowing, issued in uncollateralized securities. Variable
RepoB is a dummy equal to 1 for the repo issuing banks defined as banks borrowing through Agency repo loans
prior to QE3. Specification in column 1 estimates diﬀerential changes in the borrowing of repo and non-repo
issuers. Variable QE3 is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of QE3 (October 2012-October 2014).
Specifications in columns 2 and 3 define high intensity repo issuers as the treated group, captured by the
indicator variable High RepoB equal to 1 for repo issuing banks with above median QE3 exposure. Columns
2 and 3 compare diﬀerential changes in total borrowing between high repo issuers and all other issuers, and
within the repo issuers between high and low repo issuing banks. All specifications include issuer and time
fixed eﬀects and robust errors are estimated.
Dependent variable: ln(Total Other borrowing)
All: Repo All: High Repo Repo: High Repo
(1) (2) (3)
QE3 x RepoB 0.09
(0.0825)
QE3 x High RepoB 0.21⇤ 0.22⇤⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.08)
Time FE yes yes yes
Issuer FE yes yes yes
N 5138 5138 1034
adj. R2 0.92 0.92 0.93
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Figure 2.9: Repo issuing banks: total other debt (USD million)
84
Table 2.9: Borrower’s QE3 exposure vs. fund portfolio diversification
Dependent variable is (ln) of the fund-issuer dollar loan, comprised of uncollateralized securities (other secu-
rities). Variable High RepoB is equal to 1 for the repo issuing banks with above median QE3 exposure. QE3
exposure is defined as the average fraction of total debt issued in Agency repo securities during the pre-QE3
period. Variable QE3 is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of QE3 (October 2012-October 2014).
Specification in column 1 estimates diﬀerential changes in fund lending to high and low QE3 exposure repo
banks. Specifications in columns 2 and 3 present the results on diﬀerential changes in fund lending to bor-
rowers with diﬀerent lending relationship saturation. Variable Non-Sat captures two diﬀerent measures of the
relationship saturation. The first measure (column 1) classifies the lending relationship as non-saturated if
the fund’s average pre-QE3 Agency repo lending to the issuer is larger than its non-repo lending. The second
measure (column 2) classifies the relationship as non-saturated if the fund’s non-repo exposure to that issuer
is below the fund’s median non-repo exposure across all issuers. The second measure also includes lending
relationships which did not exist prior to QE3 period.Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the,
while Fage is the weighted average maturity of the fund portfolio. Specifications include fund and time fixed
eﬀects and errors are clustered at the issuer level.
Dependent variable: Fund-issuer ln(Other loan)
Demand channel Diversification channel
(1) (2) (3)
High RepoB -0.238
(0.140)
QE3 x High RepoB 0.0168
(0.138)
Non-Sat -0.323⇤⇤⇤ -0.826⇤⇤⇤
(0.0733) (0.0600)
QE3 x Non-Sat 0.218⇤⇤ 0.437⇤⇤⇤
(0.090) (0.065)
Fsize 0.886⇤⇤⇤ 0.903⇤⇤⇤ 0.904⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023)
Fage 0.00217⇤ 0.00313⇤⇤⇤ 0.00279⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time FE yes no no
Fund FE yes yes yes
Time x Issuer FE no yes yes
N 33807 31731 33776
adj. R2 0.820 0.855 0.871
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the issuer level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Interaction of diversification motives and intensity of the QE3 shock
Dependent variable is (ln) of the fund-issuer dollar loan, comprised of uncollateralized securities (other secu-
rities). Variable High RepoB is equal to 1 for the repo issuing banks with above median QE3 exposure. QE3
exposure is defined as the average fraction of total debt issued in Agency repo securities during the pre-QE3
period. Variable QE3 is a time dummy equal to 1 during the period of QE3 (October 2012-October 2014).
Specifications in columns 1-3 use the measure of relationship saturation defined only on the pre-QE3 existing
lending relationships. Specifications in columns 3-6 use the measure which also includes the new lending rela-
tionships entered into during the QE3 period. Triple-diﬀerence specifications are estimated in columns 3 and
6, for diﬀerent measures of the relationship saturation. The coeﬃcient of interest is the triple interaction term,
estimating whether the eﬀect of the non-saturated lending relationship diﬀers for high and low repo intensity
borrowers. Fsize is defined as the (ln) of fund net assets and the, while Fage is the weighted average maturity
of the fund portfolio. Specifications include fund and issuer - time fixed eﬀects, while errors are clustered at
the fund level.
Dependent variable: Fund-issuer ln(Other loan)
Non-saturated: old relationships Non-saturated: old and new relationships
High Repo Low Repo DDD High Repo Low Repo DDD
Non-Sat -0.356⇤⇤⇤ -0.156⇤ -0.156⇤ -0.707⇤⇤⇤ -0.840⇤⇤⇤ -0.859⇤⇤⇤
(0.0716) (0.0913) (0.0882) (0.0524) (0.0571) (0.0574)
QE3 x Non-Sat 0.322⇤⇤⇤ 0.0294 0.0276 0.510⇤⇤⇤ 0.389⇤⇤⇤ 0.386⇤⇤⇤
(0.103) (0.112) (0.114) (0.0803) (0.0481) (0.0480)
High RepoB x Non-Sat -0.265⇤⇤ 0.104
(0.117) (0.0673)
QE3 x High RepoB x Non-Sat 0.303⇤ 0.148⇤
(0.155) (0.0834)
Fsize 0.846⇤⇤⇤ 0.938⇤⇤⇤ 0.901⇤⇤⇤ 0.859⇤⇤⇤ 0.936⇤⇤⇤ 0.905⇤⇤⇤
(0.0730) (0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0621) (0.0441) (0.0446)
Fage 0.00319⇤ 0.00304⇤⇤⇤ 0.00318⇤⇤⇤ 0.00234 0.00273⇤⇤⇤ 0.00266⇤⇤⇤
(0.00175) (0.000789) (0.000940) (0.00164) (0.000836) (0.000967)
Time x Issuer FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fund FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 10261 21470 31731 11492 22284 33776
adj. R2 0.840 0.872 0.855 0.846 0.890 0.871
Standard errors in parentheses: clustered at the fund level
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
If fail, fail less: Banks’ decision on
systematic vs. idiosyncratic risk
3.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis revealed an overall increase in correlations in the financial system and the
underlying fragility stemming from that. The 2008 banking crisis was a clear example that a large
number of banks simultaneously being at the verge of failure represents a serious threat to the stability
of the entire financial system. As a result, a systematic response by the regulators was neccessary given
the potential negative repercussions arising out of multiple banks failing at the same time. The Federal
Reserve Board and U.S. Treasury, as well as ECB responded by putting in place diﬀerent liquidity
provision programmes and troubled asset purchases programmes in order to provide emergency support
to banks and mitigate negative spillovers to the rest of the system. This represents just one of the
most recent episodes wherein the regulators’ behaviour during the banking crises was substantitally
impacted by the implicit ’too many to fail’ guarantees.
Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that regulatory interventions in the event of bank
failures tend to be state contingent. In other words, the regulator’s implemented bailout policy diﬀers
in the systemic banking crisis when the regulator confronts multiple simultaneous bank failures, as
opposed to tackling individual bank failures (Kasa and Spiegel [2008], Santomero and Hoﬀman [1998]
and Hoggarth et al. [2004]). For example, regulatory intervention is more likely to happen when bank
failures are attributed to the aggregate conditions, instead of some idiosyncratic reasons. Deterioration
in aggregate conditions aﬀects everyone and may trigger simultaneous bank failures, thereby increasing
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the risks of a systemic banking crisis. Simultaneous multiple bank failures posit constraints on a
set of available resolution policies that a regulator can employ for the purpose of resolving multiple
bank failures. For example, negative aggregate conditions may imply a lack of liquidity among the
surviving banks to acquire the failing ones, a significant decrease in asset prices due to negative market
expectations and the like. A confluence of such factors increases the probability of the regulator bailing
out the banks to avoid the negative consequences arising from multiple bank failures.
Too many to fail guarantees capture the eﬀect that bailouts are more likely when many banks fail
together, i.e. the banking crisis is systemic, while in the case of isolated bank failures, regulators resort
to diﬀerent bank failure resolutions. This feature of the regulator’s policy aﬀects the ex ante banks’
risk taking incentives. Although saving banks that fail together may be ex post optimal, this generates
the ex ante incentives for banks to herd, thus increasing the risk of simultaneous bank failures and the
systemic crisis (Acharya and Yorulmazer [2007]).
The literature has discsussed several channels that may alleviate these harmful herding incentives
among banks, thus reducing the negative eﬀects of implicit too many to fail bailout guarantees. For
instance, if banks increase their value by seizing the market share of their failing competitors, this
creates incentives for the bank to survive at a time when other banks fail (Perotti and Suarez [2002]).
Also, surviving banks can benefit from purchasing the assets of the failing banks at the fire-sales prices
which also reduces the incentives to increase their correlation with other banks, in order to benefit
from being ’the-last-bank-standing’ when others fail (Acharya and Yorulmazer [2008a]).
In this paper, I argue that a bailout policy contingent on both the aggregate state and bank’s individual
characteristics relative to its failing peers may reduce the banks’ incentives to herd. Basically, if a
bank’s individual bailout probability no longer depends only on the total number of banks that failed,
but also on each bank’s individual characteristics, this may break the link between the increase in
interbank correlation and bailout probability. In other words, if the probability of the overall bailout
intervention still relies on how systemic the banking crisis is, whereas a bank’s individual bailout
probability also depends on the bank’s asset value in failure, this may provide more incentives for
the bank to diﬀerentiate from its peers. Bailout rules based on the banks’ relative performance have
already been studied in the literature. Kasa and Spiegel [2008] empirically show that U.S. bank closures
are based on bank relative performance and that such closure rules are less costly to taxpayers than
the absolute closure rules.
Here, I investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent bailout policies on the banks’ risk-taking incentives. In
particular, I focus on the choice between correlated and uncorrelated risk, also referred to as systematic
and idiosycnratic risks. The risk-taking decision is modelled as the bank’s choice to invest in the
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common or bank-specific project.
I show that introducing the regulator who chooses to bail out banks that have failed less relative to peers
can mitigate banks’ herding incentives. When a bank’s value in failure aﬀects its bailout probability,
banks may prefer to invest in an idiosyncratic project. In some states, this allows them to have a
higher value and consequently, a higher bailout probability, conditional on the bailout intervention
happening, as opposed to peers that invested in a common project. In cases when the bank-specific
project also happens to be the more eﬃcient one (the higher expected value project), this bailout
policy, termed as a “fail less” policy, implements the ex ante optimal investment outcome.
The analysis is undertaken using a two-period model which comprises of n identical risk-neutral banks,
each with a continuum of depositors, a regulator and outside investors endowed with liquidity available
for purchasing the failing banks’ assets, if oﬀered by the regulator. Depositors are assumed to be fully
insured, with the regulator covering their promised return r in case of a bank failure.
Each bank can choose between investing in one of the two projects. The common project is accessible to
everyone and captures the correlated, systematic risk that a bank may choose to undertake. In addition,
each bank is endowed with the bank-specific project, independent across banks and independent from
the common project, thus representing the uncorrelated risk bank may choose to undertake. The
choice between undertaking idiosyncratic or systematic risk is modelled as the choice between investing
in the common or the bank-specific project. Investing in the common project allows achieving the
perfect portfolio correlation with the peers, while choosing the bank-specific project, depending on
the individual project characteristics, may increase the bank’s value in failure. Both projects are two-
period projects with the first-period cash flow realization determining whether or not the bank is in
default. If the low cash flows realize, regardless of the project choice, the bank does not have enough
cash to repay the depositors and is considered to be in default.
The regulator decides on the optimal bank failure resolution policy by maximizing the total output of
the banking sector net of any intervention costs related to the optimal policy. The regulator chooses
between liquidating the bank by selling its assets to the outside investors or bailing the bank out, thus
allowing it to continue operating as a going concern. Selling it to outsiders reduces the cost of deposit
insurance incurred by the regulator, but comes at a cost of potential losses in the banking output that
are attributed to the outsiders’ ineﬃciency at operating the banking assets.
Two assumptions are central to my results and allow me to endogeneize the regulators preference
to bailout better banks. First, I assume that bank’s continuation value, in the event of a default,
depends on its realized value in failure such that the greater severity of its failure, the lower the bank
continuation value. This represents a reduced form of capturing the fact that bank failures are costly
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and have repercussions on its future value as a going concern. This can be justified by the eﬀect of
reputation channel or more stringent constraints imposed by the regulator and the like. Second, I
assume that the liquidation of the failed banks through the sales to outside investors has diminishing
returns. In other words, the liquidation values that outside investors are able to generate from the
purchased banking assets decline in the number of banks that these investors acquire. Therefore, losses
arising out of bank liquidations increase in the number of liquidated banks . This can be justified by
the limited number of investors able to operate banking assets stemming from the asset-specificity
(Williamson [1988], Shleifer and Vishny [1992] and James [1991])
These two features in combination with the regulator who decides on the bank’s failure resolution
strategy by maximizing the total banking output net of any intervention costs, ensures that the bank’s
bailout probability depends on the extent of the crisis aa well as the bank’s value in failure. In other
words, the overall probability of the bailout intervention happening depends on how systemic the
banking crisis is (number of banks failing at the same time). However, the bank’s bailout probability,
conditional on the regulator bailing out any bank, will depend on its value in failure i.e. the project
choice the bank makes ex ante. In this model, banks will be trading oﬀ the probability that any
bailout intervention happens (probability that enough banks fail together) with the probability of
actually being among the bailed out banks (bank’s bailout probability conditonal on the intervention
happening).
I begin by introducing the benchmark model wherein the banks’ value in failure is independent from
the choice between correlated and uncorrelated risks, since all projects are assumed to have identical
cash flows across all state realizations. This captures the eﬀect of the ’too many to fail’ feature of
the bailout policy on the banks’ ex ante choice between systematic and idiosyncratic risk. In this
setup, given the fact that all banks are homogeneous in failure, regardless of the project choice, the
bailout probability is solely contingent on the aggregate state, which is defined by the total number
of failing banks. In order to maximize the expected payoﬀ in the state of default, i.e. maximize the
expected value of bailout subsidies received, banks choose to invest in a common project so as to
maximize the probability of systemic enough crises occuring, thus, maximizing the probability of a
bailout intervention. The bailout policy where the bank’s bailout probability is solely dependent on
the aggregate number of bank failures is referred to as the ’too-many-to-fail’ policy.
Next, I introduce the banks’ heterogeneity in failure by allowing common and bank-specific projects
to yield diﬀerent cash flows at a low state. Here, an underlying assumption is that low state cash
flow realizations of the bank-specific projects are higher than the common project ones. This implies
that in expectation, the bank-specific projects are better than the common project (probability of
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the low state remains the same across projects). When faced with bank defaults, the regulator is
no longer indiﬀerent between banks when deciding on liquidation or bailout, since banks may have
diﬀerent values in failure, thus determining diﬀerent continuation values. In order to maximize the
expected value of the bailed out banks’ output in the second period, the regulator prefers to liquidate
failed banks with the lowest continuation values first. This minimizes the losses from liquidation, while
enabling the regulator to reduce the costs of deposit insurance by capturing the proceeds from the sales
to outsiders.
Here, the probability of any bailout intervention still depends on the aggregate state, determined
by the total number of failures. However, the bank’s bailout probability conditional on the bailout
intervention depends on the bank’s ex ante investment decision and cash flows that are realized in
default. In order to maximize the expected bailout subsidy, the banks trade oﬀ the probability of the
crisis being systemic enough for the regulator to intervene with the probability of their value in failure
being high enough to be bailed out. Thus, for a high enough probability of the low cash flow state
realization, banks always prefer to invest in a bank-specific project. A bailout policy where the bank’s
value in failure aﬀects its bailout probability is referred to as the ’fail less’ policy.
Finally, I relax the assumption on the bank-specific project being more eﬃcient one in terms of the
expected value, by introducing the ex ante heterogeneity among banks. I distinguish between good and
bad banks based on their bank-specific projects being better or worse, relative to the common project
in the low cash flow state. Given the ’fail less’ bailout policy, it is always optimal for bad banks
to choose a common project since it is both eﬃcient and maximizes their bailout probability. The
existence of bad banks which produce enough correlated bank failures for the regulator to intervene,
makes the good banks less likely to herd and consequently, choose their eﬃcient bank-specific projects
more often.
This paper contributes to the literature studying the eﬀects of bailout policy on the banks’ risk-
taking incentives. Large part of this literature studied diﬀerent manifestations of the moral hazard
problem arising from the regulator’s implicit bailout guarantees (see Bagehot [1873], Mailath and
Mester [1994], Huang and Goodhart [1999] and Freixas [2000]). These papers focus on analyzing a
single bank’s risk-taking incentives in the presence of bailout policies. They abstract away from the
potential strategic interactions among banks and the implications on the regulator’s policy stemming
from these interactions.
Papers that introduce the state-contingency in the regulator’s bailout policy attempt to capture the
feature that bailouts are more frequent when the aggregate state of the economy is bad, and the more
bank failures occur simultaneously (see Nagarajan and Sealey [1995], Cordella and Yeyati [2003] for
91
theoretical analysis) Kasa and Spiegel [2008], Brown and Dinc [2011], Santomero and Hoﬀman [1998]
and Hoggarth et al. [2004] provide relevant empirical evidence that bailout interventions are more likely
if the crisis is systemic, while bank closures happen more often in the case of isolated bank failures.
Theoretical models which account for the banks’ strategic response to the regulator’s state-contingent
bailout policy and also endogeneize the systemic nature of the crisis arising from the banks’ decisions
are provided in Acharya and Yorulmazer [2007] and Acharya and Yorulmazer [2008a]. These papers
introduce a framework of the ’too-many-to-fail’ channel of bank herding incentives. They contribute to
a larger strand of literature that explains bank herding incentives using alternative channels (see Penati
and Protopapadakis [1988] and Mitchell [1998] for more discussion on the bailout channel; Rajan [1994]
for the eﬀect of bank managers’ reputational considerations on herding). Since my paper exploits the
changes in the regulator’s bailout policy which can reduce bank herding incentives, it also contributes
to the literature studying the alternative channels which generate a strategic substitutability within
the banks’ actions (see Perotti and Suarez [2002] and Acharya and Yorulmazer [2008b]).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model. Section
3 analyzes the ’too many to fail’ benchmark model, whereas Section 4 introduces heterogeneity in
failure and the ’fail less’ model. Section 5 discusses welfare implications of the ’fail less’ bailout policy
when banks are identical during the first period. Section 6 introduces the ex ante heterogeneous banks
and discusses their optimal investment strategies under the ’fail less’ bailout policy. Finally, Section 7
concludes. The proofs and derivations that are not in the text are given in the Appendix.
3.2 Model setup
Players
In this economy, there are three dates t = 0, 1, 2, n risk-neutral banks, and one risk-neutral regulator.
Each bank i can borrow from a continuum of depositors of measure 1. At date 0 depositors deposit
their one unit of endowment in the bank. Deposits are in the form of a standard debt contract such
that depositors are promised to receive return r at date 1. Deposits are assumed to be fully insured.
In addition, outside investors are endowed with some liquidity to be spent on purchasing the banking
assets, following the oﬀer made by the regulator.
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Banks
Each bank has access to the common investment project R˜m, which I refer to as the market investment
project. In addition, each bank is endowed with the bank-specific, investment project R˜I . Bank-specific
nvestment projects’ are independent of each other, and independent of the market. Given that all banks
can access the market project and achieve a perfect correlation of investment portfolios, market project
represents a systematic, correlated risk. Independent bank-specific projects represent the idiosyncratic
risk that banks can undertake.
Both market and bank-specific projects are two-period projects. First-period cash flows are high R1j
with probability ↵, or low R1j with probability 1  ↵, where j = I,m. If high cash flows are realized,
the bank is able to repay r to its depositors, regardless of the project in which it invested. Namely,
Rm > Ri > r is assumed. If low project cash flows realize, since r > Ri   Rm holds, the bank is
unable to cover r and is considered failed.
Second-period project cash flows depend on the realization of the first-period cash flows in the following
manner:
In case high cash flows are realized at date 1, the cash flows in the second period are equal to V , where
V is independent from the chosen project. However, if the bank fails at date 1, cash flows at date 2
are a function of the cash flow realization at t = 1, defined by
R2j | R1j s U
 
R1j   ", R1j + "
 
(3.1)
for some small enough ".
Path-dependance of cash flows in the low state makes bank continuation value in case of the failure
dependent on the bank’s realized value in failure. The greater severity of the failure, the lower the
future cash flows. This is a reduced form of modelling the feature that bank’s inability to repay its
depositors may have consequence on the bank’s future cash flows. One can think that bank’s default
harms bank’s reputation or it imposes more stringent regulations on the bank after it had to rever to
the regulator as the lender of last resort, all of which may aﬀect the bank’s continuation value. Also, I
assume that failures are expensive, and that banks will be incurring certain costs of financial distress
in the form of lower second-period cash flows, relative to the case where there was no failure. Thus,
V > R2j , for j = I,m
If the bank was able to repay depositors at date 1 or was given the adequate help by the regulator
through the bailout intervention, it will be able to capture the second-period project cash flows. At
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date 0, bank i chooses between investing in a common or bank-specific project, by choosing xi = {0, 1},
where xi = 0 defined the investment in the market project, while xi = 1, investment in a bank-specific
project. The bank is trying to maximize the total expected value of project cash flows.
Outside Investors
Outside investors buy the failing banks’ assets that are oﬀered to them by the regulator. They are
able to generate cash flows L (k) per bank, where k denotes the total number of banks they buy.
Consequently, L (k) represents the liquidation value of a failing bank, given the fact that the regulator
sells k banks to the outside investors.
I assume that outside investors have limited resources to operate the acquired banking assets, thus the
liquidation value generated declines in the number of banks purchased from the regulator. The higher
the number of the liquidated banks sold to outsiders, the lower the liquidation value of each bank i.e.
L0 (k) < 0.
Outsiders are rational, and the price they are willing to pay for the banking assets is less or equal
to the value they are able to produce. In this model, outside investors always break even and their
participation constraint binds:
p (k) = L (k) (3.2)
where p (k) represents the price they pay per bank bought, given that in total k banks are being
liquidated through sales to outsiders. This makes it is obvious that p (k) is also decreasing in k.
Regulator
At date 1, regulator observes bank failures and decides between bailing out the bank or selling it to
the outsiders. Bank has failed if the cash flows generated by its project at date 1 are not suﬃcient
to cover the promised return r to depositors. Since the deposits are insured, regardless of the chosen
failure resolution, the regulator covers for deposit insurance. The regulator’s objective function is to
maximize the total expected output of the banking sector in the following period net of any bailout or
liquidation costs.
Costs incurred by the regulator are the fiscal costs related to the coverage of deposit insurance. I
assume the linear fiscal cost function is defined as C (d) = d, where d represents the number of units
of funds required to cover deposit insurance. Fiscal costs associated with the provision of funds for
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deposit insurance can be explained by the standard distortionary eﬀect that required increase in taxes
may have. Also, other potential costs related to banking crises and bank failures that result from
immediacy of providing these funds may be captured through this cost function.1
Bailout assumes that the regulator covers for the deposit insurance and the bank remains operational,
thus capturing the second-period’s project cash flows. Liquidation assumes that the bank and its
project are sold to the outside investors. This implies that the bank gets nothing, and unrealized
second-period project cash flows are lost, but the proceeds from the sale lower the regulator’s costs of
deposit insurance.
Since the liquidation values outside investors generate decrease in the number of liquidated banks, the
loss from liquidations will be increasing in the number of liquidated banks. Thus, the Regulator is
facing a trade-oﬀ between lowering the cost of deposit insurance through bank sales and incurring the
social loss from selling the banking assets to potentially less eﬃcient outside users.
If k banks in total are being liquidated, the payoﬀ from bailing out the k -th bank is
E
 
R2j | R1j
    r  R1j 
while the payoﬀ from liquidating this k-th bank through the sales to outsiders is
L (k)   r  R1j   p (k) 
I assume that for any single bank failure, it is always optimal to liquidate the bank since E
 
R2j | R1j
 
<
2L(1), for any j = m, I and outside investors paying the break-even price p(1) = L(1).
Lemma 1 Let f be the number of bank failures occuring at date 1. The regulator’s optimal bailout
policy at date 1 is defined by the marginal k⇤   th bank, where k⇤  f such that the following holds:
E
 
R2j | R1j
   L (k⇤) = p (k⇤)
where E
 
R2j | R1j
    L (k⇤) represents the net loss from liquidating the k⇤   th bank, and p(k⇤) is
the net gain from selling the bank to outside investors. Then, for any k⇤ > 1 , it will be optimal to
liquidate k⇤ banks, while bailout f   k⇤of the failing banks, given expressions in (3.3) hold:
1See Calomiris [1998] for a detailed discussion on fiscal costs associated with banking failures and bailouts
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8>><>>:
E
 
R2j | R1j
   L (k⇤   1) < p (k⇤   1) and
E
 
R2j | R1j
   L (k⇤ + 1) > p (k⇤ + 1) (3.3)
This makes it obvious that the pace at which L (k) decreases in the number of banks acquired by
the outsiders determines how costly bank liquidations are. If the social loss from liquidation is too
high relative to the reduction in deposit insurance costs obtained, this implies that there are ’too
many banks to fail’ as termed in Acharya and Yorulmazer [2007]. In such cases, the banking crisis is
considered to be systemic.
Timeline
At date 0 depositors deposit their endowments in the banks and are promised return r at date 1.
At date 0 each Bank i chooses to invest this one unit of depositors’ endowment either in the market
project or in a bank-specific investment project. At date 1 first-period project cash flows are realized.
If the bank is not able to meet its liabilities towards depositors, the bank is considered failed. The
Regulator has to choose between liquidating the bank through sales to outside investors or bailing it
out.
If the bank is bailed out, the bank owners are allowed to continue operatig the bank and they capture
second-period project cash flows. If the bank is sold to outsiders, initial bank owners get nothing in
return and outside investors are only able to realize the bank’s liquidation value.
3.3 ’Too many to fail’ benchmark
In order to analyse the eﬀects of bailout policy on banks’ risk-taking and investment decision, I start
with a benchmark model that is supposed to capture the ’too many to fail’ feature of the bailout policy.
In this setup, I assume that R¯m = R¯i = R¯ and Rm = Ri = R holds. Namely, the market and
bank-specific projects have identical cash flows. By investing in the market project common to all
the banks, banks can achieve perfect correlation of their project cahs flows, while if investing in the
bank-specific projects the correlation will be zero.
In case of failure, given the banks are homogeneous in failure, the regulator will be indiﬀerent between
banks to liquidate and bailout, once the total number of bailouts and liquidations is determined.
Bank’s bailout probability only depends on the total number of banks that failed together. This setup
captures the feature of the ’too many to fail’ bailout policy.
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3.3.1 Solving the Model
Regulator’s decision
The banks fail if the low project cash flows have realized at date 1. Since both the market and bank-
specific projects have the same cash flow in the low state, the banks will be homogeneous in failure.
Given that the regulator cannot observe banks’ investment decision, but only realized cash flows, the
bailout decision cannot be contingent on the banks’ project choice. The bailout probability for each
bank will only be contingent on the aggregate state, where aggregate state is defined by the total
number of failures in the banking system.
According to Lemma 1, there will be some number of bank liquidations k⇤, such that the regulator
is indiﬀerent between liquidating and bailing out the k⇤   th bank. Given f bank failed at date 1,
k⇤banks will be randomly selected and sold to the outside investors, while f   k⇤will be bailed out.
The optimal number of banks to be liquidated, k⇤, is defined by the following expression
R  L (k⇤) = p (k⇤) (3.4)
Since outside investors are rational, and their participation constraint given in (3.2) binds, k⇤ is
determined by
R  L (k⇤) = L (k⇤) (3.5)
Lemma 2 Let k⇤be determined by L (k⇤) = R2 and k
⇤ < n, where nis the total number of banks.
Then, in any sub-game perfect equilibrium, if f is the number of banks that failed at date 1, Regulator’s
ex-post optimal bailout policy is defined as follows:
• when f  k⇤, all failed banks get liquidated and no bailouts happen, implying Pr (Bailout | f) = 0
• when f > k⇤, k⇤banks are liquidated through the sales to outsiders, while f   k⇤ banks are bailed
out, implying Pr (Bailout | f) = 1  k⇤f
Bailouts occur only when enough banks fail together, thus generating systemic enough banking crisis.
Ex ante, the bailout probability would be increasing in the total number of failures and each failing
bank has the same probability of being bailed out.
Unless all banks have invested in the market project, the number of bank failures f will have a binomial
distribution B (n, 1  ↵)such that probability of f banks failing at date 1 is
97
Pr (f) = C (n, f)↵n f (1  ↵)f for f 2 {0, 1, ...n} (3.6)
where C (n, f)is the number of combinations of f objects from a total of n.
Bank’s decision
In the first period all banks choose between investing in the market project or the bank-specific
project. The game between banks is a symmetric game, given that they are identical with the same
set of available actions and assumed unable to distinguishing between the other players (Gale et al.
[1950]).
Therefore, I analyze the choice of a representative bank i which takes the actions of all other banks
as given. I define a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, in which the optimal investment decision for
the representative bank is also optimal for all other banks. When solving for the optimal strategy, I
rely on the assumption that banks are homogeneous, thus if it is profitable for the representative bank
i to deviate, all banks deviate.
When choosing its investment at t = 0, Bank i takes the bailout probability as given. In equilib-
rium, each bank correctly infers the ex-post optimal regulator’s bailout policy. Therefore, given the
bailout policy and implied bailout probabilities, representative bank i decides between investing in the
idiosyncratic, xi = 1, and the market project, xi = 0.
Let E (⇡ (0)) be the expected payoﬀ given all banks invest in the common project. If the low cash flow
realizes at date 1, all banks will fail together and the regulator would randomly pick n  k⇤ banks to
be bailed out, while liquidate the rest. Thus, the expected payoﬀ from investing in the market project
is given as:
E (⇡ (0)) = ↵
 
R  r + ↵V + (1  ↵)✓1  k⇤
f
◆
R (3.7)
If the bank i thinks that all other banks will choose the market project, it is neccessary to check whether
it is profitable for the bank i to deviate and invest in the bank-specific project. Let E (⇡i (1, 0))be the
expected payoﬀ of the bank i given it deviates to xi = 1, while all other banks choose x i = 0:
E (⇡i (1, 0)) = ↵
 
R  r + ↵V + (1  ↵) (1  ↵)✓1  k⇤
f
◆
R (3.8)
Ex post optimal bailout policy of the regulator specified in Lemma 2, implies that the bank will always
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be liquidated when failing on its own, since k⇤   1 is assumed. and bailed out with some positive
probability when failing with other banks.
By comparing (3.7) and (3.8), it is clear that Bank i never chooses to deviate when all other banks
are investing in the common market project, since the expected bailout subsidy decreases, the lower
the probability of the systemic crisis. Therefore, the following holds
E (⇡i (1, 0))  E (⇡ (0)) =  ↵ (1  ↵)
✓
1  k
⇤
f
◆
R < 0
If all banks choose to invest in the bank-specific projects, bank i’s expected payoﬀ from investing in
the bank-specific project is:
E (⇡ (1)) = ↵
 
R  r + ↵V + (1  ↵) n 1X
f=k⇤
Pr (j)
f + 1  k⇤
f + 1
R (3.9)
Uncorrelated projects imply that bank failures will be scattered. In the states in which very few banks
fail together, bank failures are resolved by the sales to outside investors. Only when enough failures
occurs simultaneously, some banks will be bailed out.
Investing in the bank-specific or the market project when all other banks invest in their bank-specific
projects, is payoﬀ equivalent For the representative bank i since the bank remains equally uncorrelated
with other banks. Given all projects are identical in terms of cash flows and success probabilities, then,
for the same level of interbank correlation, payoﬀs from diﬀerent strategies could be the same. Thus,
there might be multiple Nash equilibria resulting in the same level of interbank correlation which are
all payoﬀ-equivalent.
Here I focus on the symmetric equilibria in which all banks take the same equilibrium action. Therefore,
given the ex-post optimal bailout policy of the Regulator, defined in Lemma 2, banks always choose
to invest in the market project. Herding allows them to maximize the bailout subsidies by maximizing
the probability of bailouts happening. Increasing the probability of the systemic crisis is achieved by
choosing the perfectly correlated investment portfolios.
Lemma 3 Let E (⇡ (0)) be defined as in (3.7) and E (⇡ (1)) as in (3.9). If the Regulator implements
the ex post optimal bailout policy, banks will always choose to invest in the common market project,
rather than in the bank-specific projects. This is due to x = 0 being a weakly dominant strategy for
each bank, i.e. E (⇡ (0)) > E (⇡ (1)).
Proof: See appendix.
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Ex-post optimal bailout policy of the Regulator, defined in Lemma 2, combined with the optimal
investment decision of the banks, gives the subgame perfect equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let k⇤be determined by L (k⇤) = R2 . Then, in the unique symmetric pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium:
If f is the number of failed banks at date 1, and f > k⇤, the Regulator will liquidate at maximum k⇤
banks and bailout the rest of the failed ones, such that the bailout probability for each bank is equal
across all failed banks.
Then, the optimal investment choice for each bank is to invest in the common market project and
therefore maximize the expected bailout subsidy by maximizing the interbank correlation.
3.4 ’Fail less’ Model - Heterogeneity in Failure
In order to investigate how the banks’ choice between systematic and idiosyncratic risk changes when
the regulator cares about bailing out the banks that failed less, I introduce the heterogeneity in banks’
failure through heterogeneity in projects’ cash flows in the low state.
The bank-specific projects remain homogeneous and uncorrelated across banks, but now yield a higher
cash flow than the market project in the low state, i.e. Ri > Rm. In the high state, the cash flows
remain the same across projects, i.e. Ri = Rm.
Since in case of bank failure, the second-period cash flows are a function of the realized first-period
cash flows as defined in (3.1), how bad the bank failed at date 1 determines the bank continuation
value. Consequently, the value maximizing regulator is no longer indiﬀerent between banks to bailout
or liquidate.
3.4.1 Solving the Model
Regulator’s decision
At date 1, for each bank that failed, the regulator compares payoﬀs from bailing out and liquidating
the bank, given the total number of failures in the banking system.
Since the Regulator is maximizing the total banking output at date 2, net of the costs of his intervention,
it follows that the bailout probability for each bank will be contingent on the aggregate state, where
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aggregate state is defined by the total number of failures in the banking system, but also on the bank’s
value (cash flow realized) in failure.
Let j = I,m , then for any bank that failed, regardless of the project in which it invested, the payoﬀ
from bailing out bank i is given as:
E
 
R2j | R1j
    r  R1j  = R1j    r  R1j 
On the other hand, payoﬀ from liquidating the Bank i, where the bank is k  th bank to be liquidated
is:
L (k)   r  R1j   p (k)  = L (k)   r  R1j   L (k) 
By comparing these payoﬀs, it follows that the social loss from selling the k-th bank, Rj   L (k), is
now dependent on the bank’s choice of the project j and increases in the bank continuation value. At
the same time, the gain from selling the k-th bank to outside investors, given k banks were liquidated
in total, is equal to p (k) and only depends on the total number of banks liquidated.
For each project j there will be some number of bank liquidations k⇤j , such that the regulator is
indiﬀerent between liquidating and bailing out the k⇤j   th bank, where j = i,m. For a bank which
invested in the project j, the regulator’s liquidation/bail out decision is defined by the indiﬀerence
condition given in 3.10:
Rj   L
 
k⇤j
 
= p
 
k⇤j
 
(3.10)
Outsiders are rational, and their participation constraint binds, thus p
 
k⇤j
 
= L
 
k⇤j
 
holds for any
k⇤j . The price outsiders pay is only contingent on the total number of banks they purchase while
independent of banks’ values. On the other hand, the losses from bank liquidation will be increasing
in the bank’s value. This creates incentives for the regulator to preserve the higher value banks in the
banking system, while liquidating the lower valued ones first. Consequently, if the regulator observes
bank failures across both banks that invested in the market and idiosyncratic projects, he will always
choose to liquidate the lower-value banks, in this case, banks that invested in the market project.
Lemma 4 Let bank-specific projects have higher cash flow than the market project in case of failure,
i.e. RI > Rm, and k⇤m and k⇤I represent the maximum number of banks liquidated that invested in the
market project, and the bank-specific project.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, the maximum number of liquidated banks that invested in the bank-specific
projects will be lower than the number of liquidated banks that invested in the market project i.e.
k⇤m > k⇤I holds.
Proof: Since RI > Rm and outsiders participation constraint, it follows that L (k⇤I ) > L (k⇤m). Given
L (k) is decreasing in k, it follows that k⇤m > k⇤I .
Ex-post optimal bailout policy for the regulator depends on the total number of failures. If not enough
banks fails at the same time, crisis is not systemic enough and even the high-value banks are sold
to outsiders. Whenever the crisis is systemic enough for bailouts to happen and some of the failed
banks invested in the bank-specific projects, while others invested in the market project, the banks
that failed less have higher probability of being bailed out. The bailout probability, conditional on
the intervention happening, increases in the bank’s value in failure. This defines the ’fail less’ bailout
policy.
Proposition 2 Let k⇤j be determined by L
 
k⇤j
 
=
Rj
2 , where j = I,m. Then, in any sub-game perfect
equilibrium, Regulator’s ex post optimal bailout policy is defined as follows:
If n > k⇤I and fj is the total number of banks that failed at date 1 while investing in project eRj , then:
• when fj  k⇤j , all failed banks fj get liquidated and no bailouts happen
• when fj > k⇤j , k⇤j banks are liquidated through the sales to outsiders, while fj k⇤j banks are bailed
out
Then, Regulator’s ex-post optimal bailout policy translates into the corresponding bailout probabilities
as defined in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 Let f = fI+fm, where fm is the number of failed banks that invested in the market and
fI is the number of failed banks that invested in the bank-specific project. The banks will face diﬀerent
bailout probabilities, following from Regulator’s ex post optimal bailout policy, depending on the total
number of failures, and their investment decision:
1. When f  k⇤I no bailouts happen, and each failed bank gets liquidated regardless of its investment
project
2. If f > k⇤I , such that
• fm  k⇤I , all fm failed banks are liquidated, so that Pr
⇣
Bailout | fI,m, R˜m
⌘
= 0, while
k⇤I   fm of fI banks are liquidated , so that Pr
⇣
Bailout | fI,m, R˜I
⌘
= fI (k
⇤
I fm)
fI
= f k
⇤
I
fI
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• k⇤I  fm < k⇤m, all fm banks are liquidated, so that Pr
⇣
Bailout | fI,m, R˜m
⌘
= 0, while all
fi banks are bailed out, so that Pr
⇣
Bailout | fI,m, R˜i
⌘
= 1
• fm > k⇤m, then k⇤m out of fm banks are liquidated, while the rest of the failed banks are bailed
out, so that bailout probabilities are Pr
⇣
Bailout | fI,m, R˜m
⌘
= fm k
⇤
m
fm
, and for banks that
invested in the idiosyncratic project Pr
⇣
Bailout | fI,m, R˜I
⌘
= 1
Bank’s decision
As in the benchmark model, banks are identical in the first period and they choose between investing
in the market or in the bank-specific project. Following the definition and assumptions of symmetric
games, as before, I analyse the investment choice of a representative bank i .
If all banks choose to invest in the market project, and low cash flows realize at date 1, all banks
fail together. According to Proposition 2, the bailout probability for each bank is 1   k⇤mn . Thus, the
expected payoﬀ from investing in the market project is given as:
E (⇡ (0)) = ↵
 
Rm   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵)
✓
1  k
⇤
m
n
◆
Rm (3.11)
If bank i deviates and chooses the bank-specific project, while others invest in the market, the bank’s
failure is no longer correlated with other banks’ failures. Given k⇤i   1, the bank will always be
liquidated when failing on its own. However, if the low cash flow of the idiosyncratic project realizes,
when the market project also yields the low cash flow, bank i will be bailed out with certainty, as it
will be the bank with the highest value in failure.
Thus, the expected payoﬀ given bank i deviates to xi = 1, while all other banks choose x i = 0 is the
following:
E (⇡i (1, 0)) = ↵
 
RI   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵) (1  ↵) · 1 ·RI (3.12)
If the payoﬀ from deviating is high enough, the bank will choose the idiosyncratic project, even when
all other banks invest in the common project. Therefore, the condition that should hold is:
E (⇡i (1, 0))  E (⇡ (0)) > 0
which translates into
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(1  ↵)RI >
✓
1  k
⇤
m
n
◆
Rm (3.13)
Condition (3.13) implies that, given failure, expected bailout subsidies have to be higher when the
Bank i chooses the bank-specific project, than when it chooses the common project. From (3.13),
I calculate the ↵⇤FL , the probability of projects yielding high cash flows, that makes the Bank i
indiﬀerent between the two projects, when all other banks invest in the market:
↵⇤FL = 1 
✓
1  k
⇤
m
n
◆
Rm
RI
(3.14)
Then, if ↵ < ↵⇤FL, it is profitable for Bank i to invest in the bank-specific project, even if all other
banks choose the common project. Since banks are identical, this implies that in that case, all banks
would choose to deviate and invest in the bank-specific project.
In case all banks choose to invest in the bank-specific projects, the expected payoﬀ E (⇡ (1)) is
E (⇡ (1)) = ↵
 
Ri   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵)
n 1X
f=k⇤i
Pr (f)
f + 1  k⇤i
f + 1
Ri (3.15)
Since bank-specific projects are uncorrelated, if only few banks fail together, Regulator can always
liquidate them at the high enough price, such that the opportunity cost of bailout is too high. It
is never profitable for the bank i to deviate and invest in the market project, when all other banks
are investing in their bank-specific projects, since its expected bailout subsidy would be zero. This
is because bank i would always be the lowest value bank in failure, therefore always the first to be
liquidated. Therefore, if bank i believes that all other banks will choose to invest in the bank-specific
projects, it is optimal for the bank i to invest in its bank-specific project as well, since that maximizes its
expected bailout subsidies. The optimal investment strategy for banks, given the Regulator implements
the ex post optimal ’fail less’ bailout policy is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Let ↵⇤FL be defined as in (3.14) and the ex post optimal bailout policy of the Regulator
be defined as in Proposition 2.
• If ↵ < ↵⇤FL holds, in equilibrium all banks choose to invest in their bank-specific projects x⇤ = 1
• If ↵   ↵⇤FL holds, there will be two pure strategy symmetric equilibria:
– if Bank i believes that all other banks will choose the common project, it is optimal for Bank
i to do the same, therefore x⇤ = 0
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– if Bank i believes that all other banks will choose the bank-specific project, it is optimal for
Bank i to choose its bank-specific project, therefore x⇤ = 1.
In this model, ↵ represents the probability of projects yielding high cash flows and no bank failures
occuring which may represent an indicator of the aggregate economic conditions. For example, if
aggregate economic conditions are poor, such that probability of high cash flows is low enough, banks
will prefer to invest in their bank-specific projects. In other words, when probability of bank failure is
high enough, such that systemic crisis will occur even when banks choose the uncorrelated investments,
banks care to maximize their individual bailout probability by choosing project which entails higher
values in failure. However, when the aggregate state of the economy is good, i.e. ↵ is high enough and
bank failures are less probable, banks prefer to invest in the correlated investment in order to maximize
the probability of the systemic crisis happening. Therefore, the result described in Proposition 3 is
aligned with the procyclicality of bank herding behaviour that has been established in the literature
(Acharya and Yorulmazer [2008b]).
3.5 Ex ante optimal investment choice
In order to compare the optimality of diﬀerent bailout policies from the ex ante standpoint, I analyze
the expectation at date 0 of the total banking output given diﬀerent possible bank investment decisions.
Let E (⇧ (x)) represent the ex-ante banking output net of bailout/liquidation costs for the symmetric
banks’ investment choice x, where x stands represents a decision between the idiosyncratic (x = 1) or
the common project (x = 0).
The total banking output in the high cash flow realization states is independent of the investment
choice, since idiosyncratic and market project yield the same cash flows in the high state, by assump-
tion. Diﬀerential in the expected total output between banks’ diﬀerent ex ante investment decisions is
generated by diﬀerences in the low cash flow realization states and the corresponding optimal regulatory
responses.
If all banks invest in the common project
E (⇧ (0)) = n · ↵  Rm   r + V  + n · (1  ↵)Rm   (1  ↵)n (r  Rm) (3.16)
The first term represents the expected banking output in the high state, when no failures occur. Since
the social loss from bank liquidation is perfectly oﬀset by the decrease in the costs of deposit insurance
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obtained through bank sales, expected banking output in the low state is equivalent to the situation
in which the regulator bails out all the failed banks, given they all invested in the common project.
Next, I consider the case in which all banks invest in the bank-specific projects. From the Proposition
2, it follows that the banking crisis will be systemic enough for the regulator to intervene, only when
more than k⇤i banks fail simultaneously. In the states in which only few banks fail, the regulator is
able to liquidate the banks such that the social loss from liquidation is lower than the gains from the
reduction in the cost of deposit insurance. Conversly, when all banks fail together the gains from bank
sales are always oﬀset by the social loss from liquidation. The total net banking output when banks
invest in the bank-specific projects is given in (3.17), while detailed derivations are provided in the
Appendix.
E (⇧ (1)) = n↵
 
RI   r + V
 
+ (1  ↵)nRI
+
k⇤IX
f=0
fPr (f) (2L (f) RI)
  (1  ↵)n (r  RI) (3.17)
The first row of (3.17) represents the expected banking output of the high and low cash flow realizations,
assuming that banks are bailed out in failure. In this case, I exploit the feature of the binominal
distribution, that the expected number of bank failures for n independent bank projects with failure
probability 1  ↵ is equal to the sum of independent failure probabilities across these n realizations.
The second row represents the gains from bank liquidations in the states of the world in which there is
few enough bank failures, such that the gains from bank sales are not entirely oﬀset by the social losses
from bank liquidation. Therefore, when the number of failed banks f is f 2 [0, k⇤I ): the condition
RI   L (f) < p (f) holds and participation constraint of the outsiders binds for any f, p (f) = L (f).
This implies that 2L (f) > RI for every f 2 [0, k⇤I ) representing the gains from bank liquidations at
high enough values. When f > k⇤I the crisis is systemic enough for the regulator to start bailing out
the banks and the gains from bank sales are entirely oﬀset by the social loss from bank liquidation.
The third row represents the expected costs of deposit insurance.
When comparing equations in (3.16) and (3.17), additional component existing when banks invest
in uncorrelated projects are the gains from no herding arising from the bank failures being un-
correlated. The gains from no herding are always strictly positive and defined by the expression
  =
k⇤IP
f=0
fPr (f) (2L (f) RI)
106
In order to determine the ex ante investment policy of banks that maximizes the net expected banking
output, I compare the outcomes given in equations (3.16) and (3.17). The additional gains arising from
the banks investment in their bank-specific projects consists of three components: (i) higher expected
banking output when low cash flows realize; (ii) the lower cost of deposit insurance ;(iii) potential
gains from no herding  .
Given previous assumptions on RI = Rm and the fact that gains from no herding are always positive,
it follows that the expected total output of the banking sector at date 0, net of any costs of anticipated
liquidations and bailouts is always higher when banks choose to invest in their uncorrelated investment
projects. In this setting, the ex post optimal ’fail less’ bailout policy, is also the bailout policy that
induces banks to implement the ex ante optimal investment choice.
3.6 Heterogeneous banks
Here, I relax the assumption that bank-specific project is neccessarily more eﬃcient than the market
project and anlalyze the optimal investment choices of ex ante heterogeneous banks under regulator
implementing the ’fail less’ bailout policy. There are two types of banks, where the type is determined
by the bank-specific project banks is endowed with. The good banks, similar to before, are endowed
with the idiosyncratic project eRG which yields higher cash flows in the low state than the market
project. The bad banks are endowed with the idiosyncratic project eRB which yields the lower cash
flows relative to the market project in the low state. Both bank types also have access to the common
market project R˜m defined as before. All projects yield the same cash flows in the high state, while
heterogeneity comes from the low state realizations summarized in (3.18)
R¯m = R¯G = R¯B
RG > Rm > RB (3.18)
Given that the economy is populated by n banks in total, now there will be g good banks and b bad
banks, such that g + b = n. Apart from distinguishing the two bank types based on the quality of
the bank-specific project in the low state, all other components of the model are the same. As before,
bank fails in case of the low state realization since none of the projects has high enough cash flows to
cover for the return promised to depositors.
Since now there are two types of banks, but banks are identical within the type, the heterogeneous
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bank game will be solved for the representative bank of each type. In other words, good banks may
diﬀer in the optimal investment decision than the bad, but all banks within the type invest in the same
way. I solve the model for the heterogeneous bank case, with two bank types starting from date 1 and
the Regulator’s subgame.
Regulator’s decision
Let j determine the project the bank has undertaken, where j = B,G,m. Then, for each project there
will be some number of bank liquidations k⇤j such that the regulator is indiﬀerent between liquidating
and bailing out the k⇤j   th bank that has invested in eRj project at date 0. Consequently, for each j,
the following will hold:
Rj   L
 
k⇤j
 
= p
 
k⇤j
 
(3.19)
Also, the break even condition for the outsiders holds. Then, k⇤j is implicitly defined by Rj = 2L
 
k⇤j
 
.
Given the relation between cash flows stated in (3.18) holds, and L (k) and p (k) are decreasing in k,
then:
k⇤B > k
⇤
m > k
⇤
G (3.20)
This implies that the lower the cash flow of the bank’s project , it will be less costly to liquidate the
bank in failure. Therefore, the number of liquidated failed banks before any bailouts happen will be
the highest among the bad banks that invested in the Bad idiosyncratic project, and the lowest among
the good banks that invested in the good idiosyncratic project.
The price outsiders pay is only contingent on the total number of banks that are being sold, while the
liquidation loss is increasing in the bank’s value in failure. Thus, the regulator always liquidates the
low-value banks first, while bailout the higher-value ones, if any bailouts are to happen. The extent
of how systemic the crisis has to be for the regulator to intervene depends on the investment project
the banks undertake and the number of banks with the same or worse project that failed together.
Proposition 4 defines the bailout policy of the regulator in the setting with heterogeneous banks.
Proposition 4
Let fj be the total number of failed banks that invested in project j where j = B,G,m. Let f =
P
j
fj
be the total number of all failed banks. Then, in any sub-game perfect equilibrium, Regulator’s ex-post
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optimal bailout policy is defined as follows:
• If f < k⇤G , no bailouts happen at all.
• If fB > k⇤B, then k⇤B of the failed bad banks that invested in the project B will be liquidated, while
fB   k⇤B will be bailed out. In all other possible outcomes any failed bank that invested in project
B will be liquidated.
• For any f and fj realized, liquidations start with the lowest value banks until the Regulator’s
indiﬀerence condition given in (3.19) is satisfied for the last marginal bank to be liquidated. The
rest of the failed banks with higher or equal values in failure are bailed out.
Unless the total number of all bank failures is lower than k⇤G, good bank that invested in project G are
always bailed out with some positive probability. The bad bank invested in the bank-specific project
B has positive probability of a bail out only when the total number of bad banks that failed is greater
than k⇤B .
Bad Bank’s decision
Let E (⇡Bi (xB , xG)) be the representative bad bank’s expected payoﬀ from the investment project
over two periods, given bad banks choose xB , while the good banks choose the investment xG.
Representative bad bank maximizes the expected payoﬀ by taking into account regulator’s optimal
bailout policy and potential investment choice of the Good banks. In a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium, all bad banks invest like their representative bank.
For the bad banks, it is never optimal to invest in the bad bank-specific project since in this case the
bank is bailed out only if enough of other bad banks invested in the idiosyncratic project fail simul-
taneously. For the bad banks it is always more profitable to invest in the market project, irrespective
of what other banks do. This is because the common project increases the probability of bailout in-
tervention happening and yields the higher value in failure relative to bad idiosyncratic project, thus
making the liquidation of the bank more costly for the regulator. At the same time, the market project
investment increases the overall probability of bailout intervention, and bad bank’s individual bailout
probability in the intervention.
Lemma 5
Given Regulator’s ex post optimal ’fail less’ bailout policy, it is a Bad banks’ dominant strategy to
invest in the common market project and therefore undertake systematic risk.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Good Bank’s decision
Good banks decide on the optimal investment by taking into account the regulator’s optimal ’fail less’
bailout policy, and the fact investing in the market project is a dominant strategy for the bad banks.
Let E (⇡Gi (xB , xG)) be the expected payoﬀ from the investment project over two periods of the Good
bank i, given bad banks choose xB , while the good banks choose investment xG.
The expected payoﬀ from investing in the common project, when all good banks invest in the common
market project is:
E (⇡Gi (0, 0)) = ↵
 
R¯m   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵)
✓
1  k
⇤
m
n
◆
Rm (3.21)
Similar to the homogeneous case, the representative good bank deviates and invest in the idiosyncratic
G project, only when the expected bailout subsidy from that investment is higher than the bailout
subsidy from herding with all other banks. This implies that, for ↵ < ↵⇤FL, where ↵⇤FL is defined in
(3.14), the good bank deviates and invests in the bank-specific project, even when other good and bad
banks choose to invest in the market.
If all good banks choose to invest in their bank-specific projects, the expected payof for the represen-
tative good bank is:
E (⇡Gi (0, 1)) = ↵
 
R¯G   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵)
h
↵Pr (fG   k⇤G)Pr
⇣
Bailout | fG, R˜G
⌘
+ (1  ↵) · 1
i
RG
(3.22)
From equation (3.22), it follows that the expected bailout subsidy when investing in the idiosyncratic
project G, consists of two parts. First, if the bad banks that invested in the market project do not fail,
the expected bailout subsidy depends on whether enough of good banks fail together. Bailout happens
only if the crisis is considered systemic among the good banks i.e. when there is more than k⇤G failures
of good banks. Second, in the case when the market project yields low cash flow, simultaneous failures
of all bad banks create the crisis systemic enough for the regulator to intervene. Then, any failed good
bank is bailed out with certainty.
However, it is neccessary to check whether it is profitable for the good bank i to deviate and invest in
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the market project, while the rest of the good banks invest in their bank-specific projects. The payoﬀ
from this deviation is
E (⇡Gi (0, xGi = 0, xG i = 1)) = ↵
 
R¯m   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵)
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm (3.23)
By comparing the expected payoﬀs of two investment strategies given in (3.22) and (3.23), it follows
that there exists some ↵⇤HFL such that the expected bailout subsidies for the good bank i of two
investment strategies are equal when ↵ = ↵⇤HFL. In other words, ↵⇤HFL is derived from the condition
in (3.24).
↵⇤HFL
g 1X
fG=k⇤G
Pr (fG)
✓
1  k
⇤
G
fG + 1
◆
+ (1  ↵⇤HFL) · 1 =
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
(3.24)
where Pr (fG) = C (g, fG)
 
↵
⇤
HFL
 g fG
(1  ↵⇤HFL)fG .
By comparing the expected bailout subsidies from the two investment strategies for the representative
good bank, it follows that investing in the market project, while all other good banks choose the
bank-specific projects is profitable when ↵ > ↵⇤HFL. Otherwise, there is no profitable deviation and all
good banks invest in the bank-specific projects. The optimal investment strategy for the good banks,
given bad banks’ optimal investment and anticipated regulator’s optimal bailout policy is summarized
in Lemma 9.
Lemma 6
Let ↵⇤FL be defined as in (3.14) and ↵⇤HFL defined by the following expression:
↵⇤HFL (1 ⇥ (↵⇤HFL)) = 1 
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
(3.25)
where ⇥ (↵⇤HFL) =
g 1P
fG=k⇤G
Pr (fG)
⇣
1  k⇤GfG+1
⌘
, and fG is the number of good banks that failed at date
1 and fG ⇠ B (g, 1  ↵). Then, ↵⇤FL < ↵⇤HFL and the optimal equilibrium investment strategies are:
• If ↵ < ↵⇤FL the good banks choose to invest in the idiosyncratic project G, x⇤G = 1
• If ↵ > ↵⇤HFL the good banks choose to invest in the market project, x⇤G = 0
• If ↵⇤FL  ↵  ↵⇤HFL, then there are two pure strategy symmetric equilibria:
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– if Good bank i believes that all other good banks will choose the common project, it is optimal
for Good bank i to do the same, therefore x⇤G = 0
– if Good bank i believes that all other good banks will choose the bank-specific project, it is
optimal for Good bank i to choose its bank-specific project, therefore x⇤G = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Ex ante optimal investment choice when banks heterogeneous
In order to establish whether the es post optimal ’fail less’ bailout policy implements the ex ante optimal
outcome when banking system consists of heterogeneous banks, I analyze the expectation at date 0
of the total banking output given diﬀerent possible bank investment decisions. Let E (⇧ (xB , xG))
represent the ex-ante banking output net of bailout/liquidation costs for the investment strategy of
bad banks xB and the investment strategy of good banks xG .
Similar to the homogeneous bank setting, since all projects yield equal cash flows in the high state,
it follows that the expected banking output of the high cash flows will be the same regardless of the
investment strategies diﬀerent banks undertake. Variation in the expected total output between banks’
diﬀerent ex ante investment decisions is generated by diﬀerences in the low cash flow realization states
and related costs of deposit insurance, as well as the potential gains from no herding, denoted by
 xBxG , where xB and xG represent the investment choices of bad and good banks. Therefore, in order
to maximize the expected net banking output regulator’s bailout policy should induce bank investment
decisions which maximizes the expected gains from no herding and the expected banking output in
the low cash flow realizations net of the costs of deposit insurance.
Let E (⇧ (0, 0)) be the total welfare when all banks invest in the common project as defined in (3.26).
Then bank failures are perfectly correlated and the regulator always liquidates the maximum number
of banks, oﬀsetting entire gains from reduced cost of deposit insurance by the social loss arising from
bank liquidations. Thus in this case, there are no gains from no herding.
E (⇧ (0, 0)) = n↵
 
R¯m   r + V
 
+ n (1  ↵)Rm
 n (1  ↵) (r  Rm) (3.26)
In case when good banks pick their bank-specific project, while the bad banks invest in the market,
the expected value of the total banking output net of any intervention costs is:
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E (⇧ (0, 1)) = b↵
 
R¯m   r + V
 
+ g↵
 
R¯G   r + V
 
+ 01
+b (1  ↵)Rm + g (1  ↵)RG
 b (1  ↵) (r  Rm)  g (1  ↵) (r  RG) (3.27)
where  01 are the expected gains from no herding, defined in (3.28) and arising from the good banks
choosing the uncorrelated bank-specific projects.
 01 = ↵
k⇤GX
fG=0
fGPr (fG) (2L (fG) RG) (3.28)
Whenever less than kG⇤ failures of good banks investing in projects G fail simultaneously, the regulator
is able to capture gains from selling the failed banks to outsiders. Namely, the fewer banks being sold,
the price outsiders are willing to pay is higher, and the reduction in deposit insurance cost outweighs
the losses in banking output that occur due to bank liquidations.
If bad banks choose the bank-specific project, while the good banks invest in the common project, the
expected value of the total banking output net of any intervention costs is:
E (⇧ (1, 0)) = b↵
 
R¯B   r + V
 
+ g↵
 
R¯m   r + V
 
+ 10
+b (1  ↵)RB + g (1  ↵)Rm
 b (1  ↵) (r  RB)  g (1  ↵) (r  Rm) (3.29)
where gains from no herding when bad banks invest in the bank-specific project and generate states
in which the regulator can capitalize on bank liquidations through the sales to outsiders are defined as
 10 = ↵
k⇤BX
fB=0
fBPr (fB) (2L (fB) RB) (3.30)
When both good and bad banks invest in their bank-specific project, the expected value of the total
banking output net of any intervention costs is:
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E (⇧ (1, 1)) = b↵
 
R¯B   r + V
 
+ g↵
 
R¯G   r + V
 
+ 11
+b (1  ↵)RB + g (1  ↵)RG
 b (1  ↵) (r  RB)  g (1  ↵) (r  RG) (3.31)
where  11 captures the corresponding expected gains from no herding and is defined as follows:
 11 =
k⇤GX
fB=0
Pr (fB) [
k⇤G fBX
fG=0
Pr (fG) (fB (2L (f) RB) + fG (2L (f) RG)) (3.32)
+
gX
fG=k⇤G fB
Pr (fG) (fB (2L (k
⇤
G) RB))]
+
k⇤BX
fB=k⇤G
Pr (fB) fB (2L (fB) RB)
Expression (3.32) distinguishes between three diﬀerent type of states of the world, defined by the
number of bank failures, in which uncorrelated bank failures generate gains. The first row represents
the gains realized in the states in which the number of bad bank failures is below k⇤G, implying that
depending on the number of good bank failures, there can be at most k⇤G bank liquidations. In terms
of welfare, if there are less than k⇤G failures in total, both bad and good banks will be selling at a
higher price than the regulator’s reservation price for either bank.
The second row represents the gains from bad bank liquidations at the higher price than the regulator’s
reservation corresponding to the bad banks. If the total number of failures is greater than k⇤G, but the
number of bad banks failing is still lower than k⇤G, the regulator will liquidate good failing banks at
the reservation price, while capture gains from bad bank liquidations.
Finally, the last term of (3.32) represents the net gains captured from the bad bank liquidations when
the number of bad bank failures is between k⇤G and k⇤B , implying that liquidation of bad banks is still
socially optimal, given the price outside investors are willing to pay.
In order to determine the ex ante optimal investment decisions, I compare the total banking outputs
across diﬀerent possible investment choices, focusing on the low cash flow state realizations and the
possible gains from no herding.
It is straghtforward to see that E (⇧ (0, 1)) > E (⇧ (0, 0)) always holds, since good banks choosing
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the bank-specific projects implies that they choose their more eﬃcient project yielding higher cash
flows, thus reducing the costs of deposit insurance, but also the uncorrelated project, thus reducing
the occurence of the systemic bank failures.
Similarly, E (⇧ (1, 1)) > E (⇧ (1, 0)) since using the expressions defined in (3.31) and (3.29), it follows
that
E (⇧ (1, 1))  E (⇧ (1, 0)) =  11    10 + 2 · g (1  ↵) (RG  Rm) (3.33)
where  11 =  10 +   and   2 captures the additional gains from no herding when all banks choose
the uncorrelated investment, relative to no herding gains arising from only bad banks investing in their
bank-specific projects.
Namely, the decision of good banks to invest in the bank-specific projects instead of the market
project always improves the banking output, since it allows capturing the gains from no herding
as well as higher cash flows. However, the optimal investment for the bad banks from the ex ante
perspective is less straightforward. Bad bank’s investment decision trades oﬀ the gains from no herding
by undertaking the bank-specific projects with the lower cash flow realizations and higher cost of deposit
insurance in the low state.
In order to determine ex ante value maximizing investment decision for the bad banks I analyze
In order to determine the conditions under which either investment decision of the bad banks maxi-
mizes the total banking output net of intervention costs, I assume that good banks choose the bank
specific projects and analyze under what conditions bad banks investing in their bank-specific projects
dominates the common project. Since good banks’ investmetn in the bank-specific project is always
welfare improving, this will be suﬃcient to determine the ex ante optimal investment decisions of both
good and bad banks.
By comparing the net expected banking output E (⇧ (1, 1)) and E (⇧ (0, 1)), it follows that it is optimal
for bad banks to invest in their bank-specific project is additional gains from less frequent systemic
crisis outweigh the losses from higher costs of deposit insurance in the low state realizations:
 11    01 > b (1  ↵) 2 (Rm  RB) (3.34)
This implies that there will be some lower-bound threshold on how bad the bank-specific project of
2   =
k⇤GP
fB=0
Pr (fB) [
k⇤G fBP
fG=0
Pr (fG) (fB (2L (f) RB) + fG (2L (f) RG))+
gP
fG=k
⇤
G fB
Pr (fG)
 
fB
 
2L
 
k⇤G
  RB  ]
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the bad banks can be, in order for the bad bank’s investment in the bank-specific project to be ex
ante value maximizing. Proposition 5 defines the conditions under which the total banking output net
of intervention costs is maximized when all banks choose their idiosyncratic projects versus when it is
optimal for the bad banks to herd by investing in the common project.
Proposition 5 If eRB represents the idiosyncratic project each bad bank is endowed with, such that
RB is the cash flow a project yields in the low state. Let  
 
↵, RG, k
⇤
j
 
and ⌦
 
↵, k⇤j
 
be derived through
algebraic manipulations of (3.32) and (3.28) when calculating  11    01. Then, there will be some R⇤B
defined as
 
 
↵, RG, k
⇤
j
   ⌦  ↵, k⇤j  R⇤B = 2b (1  ↵) (Rm  R⇤B)
such that
• If RB > R⇤B, total welfare is maximized when all banks, good and bad, invest in their own
bank-specific projects i.e. E (⇧ (1, 1)) > E (⇧ (0, 1))
• If RB  R⇤B, total welfare is maximized when bad banks invest in the market project, while the
good banks invest in their bank-specific projects G, i.e. E (⇧ (1, 1))  E (⇧ (0, 1))
Proof: See Appendix.
If bad banks are endowed with very poor bank-specific projects, E (⇧ (1, 0)) < E (⇧ (1, 1))  E (⇧ (0, 1))
holds and ’fail less’ bailout policy implements the ex ante value maximizing outcome. However, when
bad projects are not suﬃciently bad to oﬀset the gains from no herding the ’fail less’ is ex post optimal,
but does not ensure the ex ante optimal investment choices are made. Bad banks under the ’fail less’
policy still choose to invest in the common project, as it increases their individual bailout probability,
while also increasing the probability of simultaneous failures. Optimal outcome would entail bad banks
actually investing in their less eﬃcient bank-specific projects in order to reduce the probability of the
systemic crisis occuring and regulato’s intervention happening at all. However, in comparison to the
’too many to fail’ policy, since E (⇧ (0, 1)) > E (⇧ (0, 0)) always holds, ’fail less’ bailout policy always
dominates by implementing the higher net banking output outcome.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze one modification of the regulator’s state-contingent bailout policy on the
banks’ choice between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. A bank’s risk-taking decision is modelled as
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a decision to invest in a bank-specific project (capturing the idiosyncratic risk) or a common project
wherein all banks have access to (systematic risk). State-contingent bailout policy is defined by the ’too
many to fail’ implicit bailout guarantees which capture the eﬀect that bailouts are more probable when
many banks fail simultaneously, i.e. the banking crises is systemic. This aspect of the regulator’s policy
aﬀects the bank’s risk-taking incentives ex ante by strengthening incentives to undertake correlated
risks, thereby increasing the probability of systemic banking crises.
I argue that a bailout policy contingent on both the aggregate state and banks’ individual character-
istics may reduce their incentives to herd. For example, introducing the regulator who cares to bail
out banks that failed less compared to their peers can mitigate the incentives of banks to herd by
undertaking correlated projects.
The distinguishing feature of my model is that banks are heterogeneous in failure, as captured by the
diﬀerent cash flow realizations in default, depending on the bank’s investment choice. Second, in case
of a bank default, its continuation value is a function of this low cash flow realized in failure. This,
paired with the regulator who maximizes the total output of the banking sector net of any intervention
costs, endogenizes the ’fail less’ bailout policy.
I show that when a bank’s value in failure aﬀects its bailout probability, banks may prefer to invest
in an idiosyncratic project. In some states, this allows them to have a higher value and consequently,
a higher bailout probability, conditional on the bailout intervention, compared to peers which have
invested in a common project. In cases when a bank-specific project also entails a higher expected
value, the ’fail less’ bailout policy implements the ex ante optimal bank investment outcome.
The model also provides implications for cases where ex ante heterogeneous banks are endowed with
diﬀerent bank-specific projects. The results imply that the existence of the bad banks which always
choose to invest in a common project, further mitigates the herding incentives for good banks and
incentivizes them to invest in their eﬃcient bank-specific projects more often. Finally, I demonstrate
that a ’fail less’ bailout policy always dominates the ’too many to fail’ policy by implementing the ex
ante investment outcome that is more eﬃcient.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3 In order to find under which circumstances banks choose perfect or no interbank
correlation, I need to compare E (⇡ (0)) with E (⇡ (1)). If E (⇡ (0)) > E (⇡ (1)) banks would choose
to invest in the common project and by doing so, achieve the perfect interbank correlation, and
consequently perfectly synchronized failure. Therfore, I check if the condition E (⇡ (0)) E (⇡ (1)) > 0
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holds.
E (⇡ (0))  E (⇡ (1)) = (1  ↵)R
0@✓1  k⇤
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⇤
j + 1
◆1A (3.35)
From (3.35) we observe that given j 2 {k⇤, ...n  1} then 1  k⇤j+1  1  k
⇤
n . Thus, the following has to
hold:
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 
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◆ n 1X
j=k⇤
Pr (j) > 0 (3.36)
Since
n 1P
j=k⇤
Pr (j) < 1, then inequality (3.36) always has to be positive. In other words, the bank will
always choose to invest in the common project.
Ex ante banking output analysis - homogeneous case:
E (⇧ (0)) = n · ↵  Rm   r + V  + n · (1  ↵)Rm
 k⇤m (1  ↵) (Rm   L (k⇤m))
  (1  ↵) (n (r  Rm)  k⇤m · p (k⇤m)) (3.37)
Derivation of E (⇧ (1))
E (⇧ (1)) =
nX
f=0
Pr (f) (n  f)  RI   r + V  
+
k⇤I 1X
f=0
Pr (f) (f · (L (f)  (r  RI   p (f))))
+
nX
f=k⇤I
Pr (f) (fRI   k⇤I (RI   L (k⇤I ))  (f (r  RI)  k⇤I · p (k⇤I ))) (3.38)
In this case, I exploit the feature of the binominal distribution, that the expected number of bank
failures for n independent bank projects with failure probability 1 ↵ is equal to the sum of independent
failure probabilities across these n realizations.
Given that the expected number of failed banks
nP
f=0
fPr(f) represents the expected value of binomially
distributed variable f ⇠ B (n, 1  ↵), it follows that
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nX
f=0
fPr(f) = n (1  ↵)
holds. Then the first term of (3.38) is transformed into:
 
RI   r + V
 
(n  n (1  ↵)) = n↵  RI   r + V   (3.39)
Therefore (3.38) can be transformed into:
E (⇧ (1)) = n↵
 
Ri   r + V
 
+
+
k⇤i 1X
j=0
jPr (j) · L (j) 
k⇤i 1X
j=0
jPr (j) (r  Ri   p (j))
+Ri
nX
j=k⇤i
jPr (j)  k⇤i (Ri   L (k⇤i ))
nX
j=k⇤i
Pr (j) (3.40)
 
nX
j=k⇤i
Pr (j) (j (r  Ri)  k⇤i · p (k⇤i ))
In equilibrium, in the states in which more than k⇤i banks fail together, the Regulator liquidates
maximum number of banks such that Ri L (k⇤i ) = p (k⇤i ) holds. Then (3.40) can be further simplified
to the following:
E (⇧ (1)) = n↵
 
Ri   r + V
 
+
+
k⇤iX
j=0
jPr (j) · L (j) +Ri ·
nX
j=k⇤i+1
jPr (j) (3.41)
  (1  ↵)n (r  Ri) +
k⇤iX
j=0
jPr (j) · p (j)
where again the formula for expected value of binomially distributed variable has been used. In order
to obtain the expression (3.41), I used the following simplification:
(r  Ri)
0@k⇤i 1X
j=0
jPr (j) +
nX
j=k⇤i
jPr (j)
1A = (r  Ri) nX
j=0
jPr (j) = (r  Ri) (1  ↵)n
Given that the participation constraint of the outsiders is binding p (j) = L (j) for every number of
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liquidated banks j, and that
nP
j=k⇤i+1
jPr (j) =
nP
j=0
jPr (j) 
k⇤iP
j=0
jPr (j), expression (3.17) follows.
Proof of Lemma 5 Proof that xB = 0 is a dominant strategy, when xG = 0 :
Since 1  k⇤BfB+1  1 
k⇤B
b for all fB  b  1. Then, it follows that:
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In other words, expected bailout subsidy from investing in the common project is always greater than
the expected bailout subsidy of the bank-specific project, since the following holds:
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Proof that xB = 0 is a dominant strategy, when xG = 1 :
Since k⇤m < k⇤B holds, then the following must be true
b 1X
fB=k⇤m
Pr (fB) >
b 1X
fB=k⇤B
Pr (fB) >
b 1X
fB=k⇤B
Pr (fB)
✓
1  k
⇤
B
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◆
Thus, the expected bailout subsidy for the representative Bad bank i from investing in the market
project is greater than the bailout subsidy from the bank-specific project, even when all other bad
banks choose the bank-specific projects.
Proof of Lemma 6 In order to be optimal for the Good bank i to invest in the idiosyncratic project,
while all other banks are investing in the market project, it would have to be:
E (⇡Gi (0, xGi = 1, xG i = 0))  E (⇡Gi (0, 0)) > 0
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where E (⇡Gi (0, xGi = 1, xG i = 0)) is defined as follows
E (⇡Gi (0, xGi = 1, xG i = 0)) = ↵
 
RG   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵) (1  ↵) · 1 ·RG
Then, deviation is profitable as long as
(1  ↵)RG >
✓
1  k
⇤
m
n
◆
Rm (3.42)
Therefore, for ↵ < ↵⇤FL, where ↵⇤FL = 1 
⇣
1  k⇤mn
⌘
Rm
RG
, it will be profitable to deviate and invest in
the bank-specific project.
Then x⇤G = 1 is an equilibrium strategy, for ↵ < ↵⇤FL, if once all good banks go for the bank-specific
project, it is not profitable for the representative Good bank to deviate from that and invest in the
market project. In other words, as long as
↵
g 1X
fG=k⇤G
Pr (fG)
✓
1  k
⇤
G
fG + 1
◆
+ (1  ↵) · 1  
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
(3.43)
holds, x⇤G = 1 is an equilibrium investment strategy. Since b + 1 < n, then
⇣
1  k⇤mb+1
⌘
Rm <⇣
1  k⇤mn
⌘
Rm always holds. Given that for ↵ < ↵⇤FL, expression in (3.42) holds, then surely
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm <
0@↵ g 1X
fG=k⇤G
Pr (fG)
✓
1  k
⇤
G
fG + 1
◆
+ (1  ↵) · 1
1ARG (3.44)
holds. For ↵   ↵⇤FL it is not profitable to deviate and invest in the bank-specific project, while all
other banks are choosing the market project.
The payoﬀ from investing in the bank-specific project is given in (3.22), while the payoﬀ for the
representative Good bank, from deviating is the following:
E (⇡Gi (0, xGi = 0, xG i = 1)) = ↵
 
Rm   r
 
+ ↵V + (1  ↵)
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm (3.45)
Then, it follows that there will be some ↵⇤HFL for which the expected bailout subsidies are equated:
↵⇤HFL
g 1X
fG=k⇤G
Pr (fG)
✓
1  k
⇤
G
fG + 1
◆
+ (1  ↵⇤HFL) · 1 =
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
This can further be written as
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↵⇤HFL (1 ⇥ (↵⇤HFL)) = 1 
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
(3.46)
where ⇥ (↵) =
g 1P
fG=k⇤G
Pr (fG)
⇣
1  k⇤GfG+1
⌘
, and Pr (fG) = C (fG, g)↵g fG (1  ↵)fG .
Then, since ⇥ (↵) is a decreasing function in ↵, this implies that
↵ (1 ⇥ (↵)) < 1 
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
holds whenever ↵ > ↵⇤HFL. In other words, it will be optimal to deviate and invest in the market
project whenever ↵ > ↵⇤HFL.
In order to show that x⇤G = 0 is the equilibrium strategy when ↵ > ↵⇤HFL, it has to be that deviating
from this back to investing in the bank-specific project is not profitable. This, indeed, is the case, since
the expression
E (⇡Gi (0, xGi = 1, xG i = 0))  E (⇡Gi (0, 0)) = (1  ↵)RG  
✓
1  k
⇤
m
n
◆
Rm
is always negative, for ↵ > ↵⇤HFL. This follows directly from the observation that
↵⇤FL < ↵
⇤
HFL (3.47)
The relation given in (3.47) comes from the definition of ↵⇤FL = 1  
⇣
1  k⇤mn
⌘
Rm
RG
and the implicit
definiton of ↵⇤HFL given in (3.46). Since
↵⇤FL < 1 
✓
1  k
⇤
m
b+ 1
◆
Rm
RG
it follows that
↵⇤FL < ↵
⇤
HFL (1 ⇥ (↵⇤HFL)) < ↵⇤HFL
Proof of Proposition 5 If  11    01 > b (1  ↵) 2 (Rm  RB) holds, then the welfare is maximized
when all banks invest in their own bank-specific projects. Using definitions of  11 as in (3.32) and  01
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as in (3.28), it is possible to calculate the lowest payoﬀ of the bad banks’ idiosyncratic project R⇤B for
which it would be optimal for bad banks to choose their idiosyncratic project, although it is dominated
by the market project (Rm > RB).
 11    01 = 2b (1  ↵) (Rm  R⇤B)
Then, by replacing  11 and  01 with their definitions
k⇤GX
fB=0
Pr (fB) [
k⇤G fBX
fG=0
Pr (fG) (fB (2L (f) R⇤B) + fG (2L (f) RG))
+
gX
fG=k⇤G fB
Pr (fG) (fB (2L (k
⇤
G) R⇤B))]
+
k⇤BX
fB=k⇤G
Pr (fB) fB (2L (fB) R⇤B)
 ↵
k⇤GX
fG=0
fGPr (fG) (2L (fG) RG) = 2b (1  ↵) (Rm  R⇤B)
This can be further transformed into
k⇤GX
fB=0
Pr (fB)
24k⇤G fBX
fG=0
Pr (fG) f · 2L (f)+
gX
fG=k
⇤
G fB
Pr (fG) fB · 2L (k⇤G)
35+
k⇤BX
fB=k
⇤
G
Pr (fB) fB · 2L (fB)  ↵
k⇤GX
fG=0
fGPr (fG) (2L (fG) RG)
 
24 k⇤GX
fB=0
Pr (fB) fB
0@ gX
fG=0
Pr (fG)
1A+ k⇤BX
fB=k
⇤
G
Pr (fB) fB
35R⇤B = 2b (1  ↵) (Rm  R⇤B)(3.48)
Then, I define  
 
↵, RG, k
⇤
j
 
and ⌦
 
↵, k⇤j
 
, as follows
 
 
↵, RG, k
⇤
j
 
=
k⇤GX
fB=0
Pr (fB)
24k⇤G fBX
fG=0
Pr (fG) f · 2L (f)+
gX
fG=k
⇤
G fB
Pr (fG) fB · 2L (k⇤G)
35+ (3.49)
+
k⇤BX
fB=k
⇤
G
Pr (fB) fB · 2L (fB)  ↵
k⇤GX
fG=0
fGPr (fG) (2L (fG) RG)
⌦
 
↵, k⇤j
 
=
24 k⇤GX
fB=0
Pr (fB) fB
0@ gX
fG=0
Pr (fG)
1A+ k⇤BX
fB=k⇤G
Pr (fB) fB
35 (3.50)
Then equality (3.48) can be written as
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 
↵, RG, k
⇤
j
   ⌦  ↵, k⇤j  R⇤B = 2b (1  ↵) (Rm  R⇤B) (3.51)
Finally, the lowest cash flow that the bad idiosyncratic projects can yield, while still being welfare
maximizing for the bad banks to undertake these idiosyncratic projects is given as
R⇤B =
 
 
↵, RG, k
⇤
j
   2b (1  ↵)Rm
⌦
 
↵, k⇤j
   2b (1  ↵) (3.52)
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